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IN THE SUPPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
1 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN 1 
) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
1 
VS 1 
1 
STEWART TITLE GUARANTY 1 
COMPANY 1 
Defendant/Respondent 1 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
35949-2008 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and 
for the County of Kootenai. 
HONORABLE LANSING L HAYNES 
District Judge 
Sam Johnson 
405 S gth St., Suite 250 
Boise ID 83702 
Todd Reuter 
1200 Ironwood Dr., Suite 3 15 
Coeur d' Alene ID 83 8 14 
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Vernon Jerry Mortensen vs. Stewart Title Guaranty Co 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen vs. Stewart Title Guaranty Co 
Date Code User Judge 
7/2/2007 NCOC PARKER New Case Filed - Other Claims Lansing L. Haynes 
PARKER Filing: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No Lansing L. Haynes 
Prior Appearance Paid by: Vernon Jerry 
Mortensen Receipt number: 0751 344 Dated: 
7/2/2007 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: [NONE] 
SUM1 NAYLOR Summons Issued Lansing L. Haynes 
711 912007 AFSV HULL Affidavit Of Service Stewart Title Company of Lansing L. Haynes 
Coeur d'Alene, Inc. 711 1/07 
MCCORD Filing: I1A - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than Lansing L. Haynes 
$1 000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Todd 
Rueter Receipt number: 0754893 Dated: 
7/26/2007 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: [NONE] 
NOAP MCCORD Notice Of Appearance - Todd Reuter OBO Lansing L. Haynes 
Stewart Title Co. 
8/1/2007 N ITD MCCORD Notice Of Intent To Take Default Lansing L. Haynes 
APDF MCCORD Application For Entry Of Default Lansing L. Haynes 
8/6/2007 ANSW MCCOY Answer - Todd Reuter OBO Stewart Title Lansing L. Haynes 
8/29/2007 HRSC TAYLOR Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Lansing L. Haynes 
10101 12007 03:30 PM) 
TAYLOR Notice of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
9/5/2007 RSCN MCCOY Response to Status Conference Notice - Vernon Lansing L. Haynes 
Mortensen 
9/25/2007 RSCN VICTORIN Response to Status Conference NoticetTodd Lansing L. Haynes 
Reuter 
9/26/2007 MlSC HUFFMAN Plaintiffs First Requests for Admission to Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant 
10/1 12007 HRHD TAYLOR Hearing result for Status Conference held on Lansing L. Haynes 
10/01/2007 03:30 PM: Hearing Held 
10/3/2007 HRSC TAYLOR Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
06/16/2008 09:OO AM) 5 days 
TAYLOR Notice of Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
10/5/2007 ORDR TAYLOR Order For Court Mediation Lansing L. Haynes 
1011 812007 MlSC HUFFMAN Plaintiffs First Interrogatories and Request for Lansing L. Haynes 
Production of Documents 
10/26/2007 NTSV HUFFMAN Notice Of Service by Defendant re: Answers to Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiffs First Requests for Admission 
1 1 /I612007 NTSV GBROWN Notice Of Service by Defendant's First Set of Lansing L. Haynes 
lnterrogatories and Request for Production to 
Plaintiff 
1 111 912007 NTSV GBROWN Notice Of Service Re: Defendant's First Requests Lansing L. Haynes 
for Admission to Plaintiff 
NTSV GBROWN Notice Of Service by Defendant RE: Answers & Lansing L. Haynes 
Rresponses to Plaintiffs First lnterrogatories and 
Request for Production 
dicial District Court - Kootenai County 
Firm ROA Report 
User: VICTORIN I Date: 1/5/2009 1 Time: 03:50 PM 
I Page 2 of 5 Case: CV-2007-0004690 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen vs. Stewart Title Guaranty Co 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen vs. Stewart Title Guaranty Co 
Date Code User Judge 
12/3/2007 HRSC TAYLOR 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 03/04/2008 03:30 PM) Reuter 
1 hr 
Hearing Scheduled (Mediation 04/07/2008 John R. Stegner 
09:30 AM) 1 day 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
held on 03/04/2008 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Reuter 
1 hr 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 0211 912008 03:30 PM) PSJ 
Reuter, 1 hr 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 03/18/2008 03:30 PM) PSJ 
Reuter, 1 hr 
Affidavit of Todd Reuter in Support of Defs Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of John Holt re. Defs Motion for Lansing L. Haynes 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Scott Fonte in Support of Defs Motion Lansing L. Haynes 
for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit & CR 37 Certification of Todd Reuter in Lansing L. Haynes 
Support of Def s Motion to Compel 
Defs Notice Motion To Compel Answers to Lansing L. Haynes 
Written Discovery 
Defs Notice of Compliance re. expert Witness Lansing L. Haynes 
Disclosure 
Memorandum In Support Of Defs Motion for Lansing L. Haynes 
Summary Judgment 
Defs Notice & Motion For Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
Stipulation Motion to Substitute Parties Lansing L. Haynes 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
held on 0211 912008 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
PSJ 
Reuter, 1 hr 
Order Granting Stipulated Motion to Substitute Lansing L. Haynes 
Parties 
Notice Of Service Of Discovery Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant's Notice And Motion For Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 
Affidavit Of John Holt In Support Of Stewart Title Lansing L. Haynes 
Guaranty's Motion For Summary Judgment 
1211 212007 HRSC 
1 /4/2008 HRVC 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
HRSC TAYLOR 
HRSC TAYLOR 
1 11 712008 AFlS MCCORD 
AFFD MCCORD 
AFlS MCCORD 
AFFD MCCORD 
MNCL MCCORD 
NOTC MCCORD 
MEMS MCCORD 
MNSJ 
2/7/2008 STlP 
HRVC 
MCCORD 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
ORDR TAYLOR 
211 912008 NTSD 
MlSC 
LUNNEN 
LUNNEN 
MEMO LUNNEN 
AFFD LUNNEN 
Date: 1/5/2009 
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Page 3 of 5 Case; CV-2007-0004690 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen vs. Stewart Title Guaranty Co 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen vs. Stewart Title Guaranty Co 
Date Code User Judcle 
AFFD LUNNEN Affidavit Of Richard W Mollerup Regarding Lansing L. Haynes 
Stewart Title Guaranty's Motion For Summary 
Judgement 
AFFD LUNNEN Affidavit Of David English Regarding Stewart Lansing L. Haynes 
Title's Motion For Summary Judgment 
AFFD LUNNEN Affidavit Of Todd Reuter In Support Of Stewart Lansing L. Haynes 
Title Guaranty's Motion For Summary Judgment 
NTS D SHEDLOCK Notice Of Service Of Discovery - Todd Reuter, Lansing L. Haynes 
Esq. 3/4/08 
Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment 
MEMO BAXLEY 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFlS 
BAXLEY 
MCCORD 
MCCORD 
Affidavit Of Plaintiff Vernon Jerry Mortensen Lansing L. Haynes 
Affidavit of Michelle Fink Lansing L. Haynes 
2nd Affidavit of Todd Reuter in Support of Motion Lansing L. Haynes 
for Summary Judgment 
AFlS MCCORD 2nd Affidavit of John Holt in Support of Motion for Lansing L. Haynes 
Summary Judgment 
MCCORD Stewart Title's reply in support of its motion for Lansing L. Haynes 
summary judgement 
New File Created ********* 2 Of 2************ Lansing L. Haynes FlLE 
NOTE 
DCHH 
ROBINSON 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
Clerk's Notation TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT Lansing L. Haynes 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
held on 03/18/2008 03:30 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: LAURIE JOHNSON 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: MORE THAN 100 Reuter, 1 hr 
OPIN 
HRVC 
HRVC 
LETR 
HRSC 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
Memorandum Opinion and Order in re: Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on Lansing L. Haynes 
0611 612008 09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated 5 days 
Hearing result for Mediation held on 04/07/2008 John R. Stegner 
09:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 1 day 
Letter from Judge Stegner vacating the mediation Lansing L. Haynes 
hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/16/2008 10:30 Lansing L. Haynes 
AM) Present Judgment, 
Mtn for Attorney fees, Reuter, 30 min 
FlLE 
AFFD 
MCCOY 
MCCOY 
New File Created ******* FILE #3******** Lansing L. Haynes 
Affidavit of Todd Reuter in Support of Motion for Lansing L. Haynes 
.Attorney Fees & Costs 
MCAF MCCOY Defendant's Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Lansing L. Haynes 
Fees 
MEMS MCCOY Memorandum In Support Of Motion for Award of Lansing L. Haynes 
Reasonable Attorney Fees to Defendant as 
Prevailing Part 
Date: 1/5/2009 
Time: 03:50 PM 
,dicial District Court - Kootenai County 
Firm ROA Report 
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Vernon Jerry Mortensen vs. Stewart Title Guaranty Co 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen vs. Stewart Title Guaranty Co 
Date Code User Judge 
4/28/2008 NOTC MCCOY Notice & Motion for Presentment of Final Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment and Decree and For Attorney Fees 
MOTN 
MOTN 
LSMITH 
BAXLEY 
Motion for Reconsideration Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion To Disallow Defendant's Request for Lansing L. Haynes 
Costs and Attorneys Fees 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant's Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/13/2008 01 :30 Lansing L. Haynes 
PM) Present Judgment, Mtn for Attorney fees, 
Reuter, 30 min. 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider Lansing L. Haynes 
0611 312008 01 :30 PM) Sam Johnson, 1 112 hrs 
Hearing result for Motion held on 0511 612008 Lansing L. Haynes 
10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated Present Judgment, 
Mtn for Attorney fees, Reuter, 30 min 
Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
Amended Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Lansing L. Haynes 
Reconsideration 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum In Support of Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion For Award of Reasonable Attorney Fees 
and Costs 
SECOND Affidavit of Todd Reuter In Support of Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion For Attorney Fees and Costs 
Stewart Title's Response to Motion for Lansing L. Haynes 
Reconsideration 
Plaintiffs Reply in Support of Motion for Lansing L. Haynes 
reconsideration 
Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider held on Lansing L. Haynes 
06/13/2008 01:30 PM: Hearing Held Sam 
Johnson, 1 112 hrs TAKEN UNDER 
ADVISEMENT 
Memorandum Opinion and Order in RE: Plaintiffs Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion For Reconsideration 
Affidavit Of Theresa L. Keyes In Support Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant's Motion For Attorney Fees & Costs 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 1011 712008 10:OO Lansing L. Haynes 
AM) Attorney Fees and Costs 
Notice of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
Amended Notice of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
Hearing result for Motion held on 1011 712008 Lansing L. Haynes 
10:OO AM: Hearing Held Attorney Fees and 
Costs, Presentment of Final Judgment TAKEN 
UNDER ADVISEMENT 
Findings and Conclusions in Re: Costs and Lansing L. Haynes 
Attorney Fees 
MEMO BAXLEY 
HRSC TAYLOR 
HRSC 
HRVC 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
NOTH 
NOTH 
MEMO 
MCCORD 
MCCORD 
LSMITH 
MEMO BAXLEY 
AFFD 
MI SC 
MlSC 
HRHD 
BAXLEY 
RABROWN 
LSMITH 
TAYLOR 
MEMO 
AFFD 
HRSC 
LSMITH 
DARNELL 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR 
TAYLOR HRHD 
ORDR TAYLOR 
1 Date: 1/5/2009 
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Vernon Jerry Mortensen vs. Stewart Title Guaranty Co 
Date Code User Judge 
1 1 11 912008 DPWO RICKARD Disposition Without Trial Or Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
CVDl RICKARD Civil Disposition entered for: Stewart Title Lansing L. Haynes 
Guaranty Co, Defendant; Mortensen, Vernon 
Jerry, Plaintiff. Filing date: 11/19/2008 
FJDE RICKARD Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
STAT RICKARD Case status changed: Closed Lansing L. Haynes 
MCCORD Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court Lansing L. Haynes 
($86.00 for the Supreme Court to be receipted via 
Misc. Payments. The $15.00 Countx District 
Court fee to be inserted here.) Paid by: 
Johnston & Monteleone Receipt number: 
08241 70 Dated: 11/28/2008 Amount: $15.00 
(Check) For: Mortensen, Vernon Jerry (plaintiff) 
APSC MCCORD Appealed To The Supreme Court Lansing L. Haynes 
MCCORD Miscellaneous Payment: Supreme Court Appeal Lansing L. Haynes 
Fee (Please insert case #) Paid by: Johnson & 
Monteleone Receipt number: 0824171 Dated: 
1 1/28/2008 Amount: $86.00 (Check) 
BNDC MCCORD Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 824172 Dated Lansing L. Haynes 
1 1 /28/2008 for 100.00) 
STAT MCCORD Case status changed: Closed pending clerk Lansing L. Haynes 
action 
:i:,T!:L, 
1 
i s :  !:,lb - \  !;80TEKb.i; 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen 
P.O. Box D 
Bonners Ferry, ldaho 83805 
Telephone: (208) 267-1 385 
Facsimile: (208) 267-1279 
Pm Se Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, ) 
1 
Plainti, ) 
) 
vs. 1 COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
) JURY TRIAL 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY ) 
OF COEUR D'ALENE, INC., ) Fee Category: A-I 
1 Fee: $88.00 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Vernon Jerry Mortensen, and for causes of 
action against Defendant Stewart Title Company of Coeur d1AIene, Inc., alleges 
as follows: 
PARTIES 
1 Plaintiff, Vernon Jerry Mortensen ("Mortensen") is a resident of Boundary 
County, State of Idaho, owning real property in Kootenai County, State of Idaho. 
2. Defendant Stewart Title Company of Coeur dlAlene, Inc. ("Stewart Title") is 
an ldaho corporation, doing business in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 
3. On or about September 22, 1994, Mortensen purchased 160 acres from 
Floyd and Stella Peplinski located in Kootenai County, Idaho ("Mortensen 
Property"). 
4. At the time of the purchase, Defendant, Stewart Tile issued a Tile 
Commitment and a title insurance policy to Mortensen, insuring access to the 
above referenced 160 acres ("Title Policy"). 
5. In 2001, Mortensen sold the northern 80 acres of the 160 acres to David 
L. White and Michelle V. White, husband and wife ("Whites"). 
6. Stewart Title issued a Title Commitment and title insurance policy to 
Whites, insuring access to Whites' property ("White Property"). 
7. The access insured by Stewart Jitle traveled over and across property 
owned by Dennis and Sherrie Akers ("Akers"). 
8. Upon information and belief, sometime in 2001, Stewart Title recognized 
that a problem existed regarding the access to the Mortensen Property and 
White Property. 
9. Upon information and belief, Stewart Title contacted Akers and offered to 
purchase from them a small parcel of property containing the west end of the 
access road ("Access Road") and informed Akers that they needed that small 
parcel to provide legal easement into Mortensen and Whites. 
10. After Stewart Title spoke to Akers and offered to purchase the land from 
them, Akers sued Mortensen and Whites for trespass in the First Judicial District 
of the County of Kootenai, Case No. CV-02-222 ("Lawsuit"). 
11. Stewart Title failed to inform Mortensen or Whites that they believed there 
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was an access easement problem, that they had talked to Akers about it, or that 
they had tried to purchase property from Akers to fix an easement problem. 
12. Mortensen continued to use the Access Road, unaware that Akers had 
spoken with Stewart Title. 
13. Mortensen was not informed that Akers believed that Mortensen was 
trespassing when using the Access Road . - 
14. Upon initiation of the Lawsuit, Stewart Tile tendered defense to White to 
respond to the Lawsuit filed by Akers. 
15. Stewart Title eventually tendered defense to Mortensen and responded to 
the Lawsuit on Mortensen's behalf. 
16. Mortensen learned of Stewart Tile's conversation with Akers, their offer to 
purchase property from Akers, and their opinion that the easement across Akers' 
land was questionable when Sherrie Akers testified about it in court during the 
trial in which Akers sued Mortensen and Whites for trespass. 
17. Stewart Tile's actions incited Akers to sue Mortensen and Whites by 
instructing them that the west end of the Access Road located on Akers' property 
was not a valid easement even though Stewart Title themselves had insured 
ingress and egress for Mortensen in 1994 and Whites' in 2001. 
18. Upon information and belief, Stewart Title informed Akers that Stewart Title 
needed to purchase property from Akers at the west end of the Access Road in 
order to fix an easement problem; however, Stewart Tile did not make the 
purchase. 
19. During the Lawsuit, another issue arose regarding Mortensen and White's 
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access over the east end of the Access Road. 
20. In an attempt to resolve this problem, Stewart Title purchased a small 
triangular shaped parcel of property from Kathryn Baker, which was then 
quitclaim deeded to Mortensen and White. 
21. Stewart Title recorded the Quitclaim Deed and represented to and assured 
Mortensen and White that they owned the triangular shaped parcel. 
22. Ownership of the triangular shaped parcel was disputed throughout the 
lawsuit. 
23. During the Lawsuit, upon the representations made by Stewart Title, 
Mortensen and White began making improvements to the triangular shaped 
parcel. 
24. Akers Lawsuit ultimately resulted in a court trial and a non-favorable 
decision for Mortensen and White. 
25. The district court held that Mortensen and White did not have an 
easement to their respective properties' that they had trespassed by making 
improvements to the triangular shaped parcel, and that they were liable for 
damages for trespass, emotional distress and punitive damages. 
26. On or about April of 2004, when the district court issued its decision, 
Stewart Title represented to and assured Mortensen and White that it would 
assist them with appealing the district court's decision. The representations were 
made by telephone as well as in writing by letter to Mortensen and Whites. 
27. Shortly thereafter, Stewart Title changed its position and refused to 
continue defending the Lawsuit and pursue the appeal for Mortensen or Whites. 
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28. In addition, Stewart Title initiated its own lawsuit ("Stewart Title Lawsuit") 
against Mortensen and White for injunctive relief to cease all contact with Stewart 
Ttle. 
29. Mortensen was paid $200,000.00 under his title insurance policy by 
Stewart Title and Mortensen was directed to retain his own counsel to continue 
defending the Lawsuit. 
30. Mortensen and White each retained counsel to assist them throughout the 
appeal and further proceedings in the Lawsuit, without compensation from 
Stewart Title. 
31. The Lawsuit has lasted over five years, is still on going, and has cost 
Mortensen hundreds of thousands of dollars to defend since Stewart Title refused 
to continue with his defense. 
COUNT ONE - MISREPRESENTATION AND FRAUD 
32. Stewart Title represented to and promised Mortensen and White that it 
would see them through the entire legal action including a Supreme Court appeal 
if necessary. 
33. However when Stewart Title saw the size of the judgments against 
Mortensen and Whites, Stewart Title refused to defend Mortensen and White 
through the appeal process. 
34. Stewart Title has made misrepresentations and failed to defend Mortensen 
as required under the title insurance policy, causing damages to Mortensen in 
excess of $400,000.00, in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT TWO - PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
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35. Stewart Title's actions were reckless, willful and wanton, and an extreme 
deviation of reasonable standards of conduct. 
36. As a result of Stewart Title's actions, Mortensen will seek to amend this 
Complaint to allow an award of punitive damages pursuant to I.C. Section 6- 
1604. 
COUNT THREE - BREACH OF CONTRACT 
37. Stewart Title and Mortensen had a contract by virtue of the Title Insurance 
Policy, insuring access to the Mortensen Property. 
38. Stewart Tile was obligated to defend Mortensen throughout the Lawsuit, 
including the appeal and subsequent proceedings in order to defend Mortensen's 
access over the Access Road. 
39. Stewart Tile failed to fully defend Mortensen in the Lawsuit, breaching the 
parties' contract. 
40. As a result of Stewart Tile's breach of contract, Mortensen has been 
damaged in an amount in excess of $400,000.00. 
COUNT FOUR - BAD FAlTH 
41. Stewart Tile has an obligation to Mortensen to perform the terms of the 
insurance contract in good faith. 
42. Stewart Title failed to perform the terms of the insurance contract in good 
faith. 
43. Consequently, Stewart Title breached covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and as such, Mortensen has suffered damages in excess of $~0,000.00 
COUNT FIVE - EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
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44. As a result of Stewart Tile's reckless and negligent actions, Mortensen 
has suffered physical manifestations, including stress, sleeplessness, headaches 
and concentration problems. 
45. Such physical manifestations have caused Mortensen damages in an 
amount in excess of $1 0,000.00. 
46. Mortensen is entitled to recover damages for intentional and negiigent 
infliction of emotional distress, in an amount to be proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
I. Mortensen be awarded damages against Defendant for an amount 
in excess of $400,000.00, plus interest, for fraud, misrepresentation and bad 
faith; 
2. Mortensen be awarded damages against Defendant in excess of 
$10,000.00, plus interest, for bad faith; 
3. Mortensen be awarded damages against Defendant in excess of 
$1 0,000.00 for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; 
4. Mortensen be awarded all of his costs and attorneys' fees as 
deemed appropriate by the Court; and 
5. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
PLalNTlFF DEMANDS ATRIAL BY JURY OF NOT LESS THAN 12 JURORS. 
U ~ Y  DATED this 3 day of .&I$, 2007. 
-- 
'~EIRPI~(! JERRY MORT EN SEA^ 
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By: 
- 
I& JEANNE ADAMS 
His Attorney in Fact 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS 
COUNTY O F - K ' ~ ~  ) 
On this &~4( day of % 
-9 2007, before me, 
Notary Public, personally app&ed RAE JEANNE ADAMS, known oridehtified to me to be the 
person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument as the Attorney in Fact of VERNON JERRY 
MORTENSEN, and acknowledged to me that she subscribed the name of VERNON JERRY 
\T thereto as nrincinal. and her nwn na-nrnev in Fact A MORTENSEI . ----- --- -, ------ ,--, --- ---- - . .. 
-.-. 
=--  
My Commission Expires: i /  /dd 7 do//
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Todd Reuter ISB # 5573 
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 
PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP 
1200 Ironwood Drive. Suite 3 15 
Coeur d7Alene, Idaho'838 14-2660 
Telephone: (208) 667-1 839 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2494 
todd.reuter@klgates.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF 
COEUR D'ALENE, INC. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, 1 No. 07-4690 
Plaintiff, I NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF 
COEUR D'ALENE, INC., 
Fee Category: I. 1 .a. 
Amount: $58.00 
Defendant. 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE COURT 
AND TO: PLAINTIFF, Vernon Jerry Mortensen, Pro Se 
YOU AND EACH OF YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above- 
z named Defendant, Stewart Title Company of Coeur D'Alene, Inc., without waiving 
- .  
c.9 objections as to improper service or jurisdiction, hereby enters appearance in the above- 
- 
cY entitled action by the attorneys undersigned. You are hereby requested to serve all further 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - I 
K:\29690\0 02\17034\17034P24P6 
papers and proceedings in said cause, except original process, upon said attorneys at their 
address below stated: 
Todd Reuter 
K & L Gates, LLP 
1200 Ironwood Drive, Suite 3 1 5 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83 8 14-2660 
Telephone: (208) 667-1 839 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2494 
DATED this 25th day of July, 2007. 
Attorneys for ~ e f e n d a n t  
Stewart Title Company Of Coeur 
D'Alene, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on 3 c d a y  of July, 2007, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Hand Delivery Vernon Jerry Mortensen 
X Facsimile Transmission P.O. Box D 
X - First Class Mail Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805 
Over Ni ht Delivery A Fax No: (208) 267-1279 4s' Todd Reuter 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2 
K-\29690\0.002\17034\17034P24P6 
Todd Reuter ISB # 5573 
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 
PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP 
1200 Ironwood Drive, Suite 3 15 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83 8 14-2660 
Telephone: (208) 667- 1 839 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2494 
todd.reuter@klgates.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY 
OF COEUR D'ALENE, INC. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, 
c d  I NO. 07-4690 
Plaintiff, / /iMWER 
STEWART TTTLE COMPANY OF COEUR 
DIAI,ENE, INC., 
Defendant. I 
Defendant Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene, Inc. ("Stewart"), by and through its 
attorneys, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis LLP, hereby replies to Plaintiffs 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. as follows: 
GENERAL DENIAL 
Defendant Stewart and its counsel have not had sufficient time to fully and 
completely respond to the allegations and therefore submit this general denial. Stewart 
STEWART TITLE'S ANSWER 1 
~UBBBWOUX)205\1703d9dTR\~70?dP24PB 
expects to seek leave to file a more complete answer, including additional Affirmative 
Defenses, as soon as it can practically do so. Without waiving this general denial, 
Defendant Stewart answers the allegations as follows: 
PARTIES 
1 .  Defendant Stewart is without knowledge to sufficiently admit or deny the 
allegations in paragraph 1 and thexeforc denies the same. 
2. Defendant Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene, Inc. admits the allegations in 
paragraph 2, 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
3. Defendant Stewart is without knowledge to sufficiently admit or deny the 
allegations in paragraph 3 and therefore denies the same. 
4. Defendant Srewart is without knowledge to sufficiently admit or deny the 
allegations in paragraph 4 and therefore denies the same. 
5 .  Defendant Stewart is without knowledge to sufficiently admit or deny the 
allegations in paragraph 5 and therefore denies the same. 
6.  Defendant Stewart is without knowledge to sufficiently admit or deny the 
allegations in paragraph 6 and therefore denies the same. 
7. Defendant Stewart is without knowledge to sufficiently admit or deny the 
allegations in paragraph 7 and therefore denies the same. 
8. Defendant Stewart is without knowledge to sufficiently admit or deny the 
allegations in paragraph 8 and therefore denies the same. 
9. Defendant Stewart is without knowledge to suficiently admit or deny the 
allegations in paragraph 9 and therefore denies the same. 
STEWART TITLE'S ANS \KEK 2 
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10. Defendant Stewart is without knowlcdgc to sufficiently admit or dcny the 
allegations in paragrap11 10 and therefore denies the same. 
1 1. Defendant Stewart i s  without kl~owledge to sufficiently admit 01- deny the 
allcgations in paragraph 1 1  and thcrefo~t denies the same. 
12. Dcfcndant Stcwart i s  without knowicdge to sufiYcicntly admit or dcny thc 
allegations in paragraph 12 and therefore denies [he same. 
13. Derendanl Slewan is wilhoul knowledge to suf'ficienrly admit or deny rhe 
allegations in paragraph 13 and therefore denies the same. 
14. Defendalit Stewart is without krlowledgs to sufficiently admit or deny the 
allegations in paragraph 14 and therefore denies  he same. 
15. Del'endant Stewart is without knowlcdgc to sufficiently admit or deny the 
allegarions in paragraph 15 and rl~crcforc dcnies thc sai~tc. 
16. Defendant Stewart is without knowledge to sufficiently admit or deny thc 
allegarions in paragraph 16 and therefore denies the same, 
17. Ilefendant Stewart is without knowledge to sufficiently admit or dcny the 
allegations in paragraph 17 and tliereforc denies t11c samc. 
18. Dcfcndmt Slcwarl is without knowlcdgc to s ~ i l l i ~ i ~ i l t l y  admit or deny the 
~lllegarions in paragraph 1 8 and therefore denies the same. 
19. Defendan1 S~ewarl is without knowledge lo suSliciently admit or dcny thc 
allegations in paragraph 19 and therefore denies the same. 
20. Defendant Stcwart is without knowledge to sufficien~ly admit or deny the 
allegations in paragraph 20 and therefore denies Ihe same. 
21. Defendan[ Stewart is without knowledge to sufficienlly admit or dcny thc 
allegations in paragraph 2 1 and therefore denies the s~une. 
22. Defendant S~ewarl is without knowledge to sufficienrly admit or deny thc 
allegations in paragraph 22 and thereforc denies the same. 
23. Defendant Stewart i s  withoul knowledgc to sul'ficiently admil or deny thc 
allcya~ions in paragraph 27 and thcrcfbrc denies the same. 
24. Dekndant Stcwart is without knowlcdge to sufiiciently adinit or deny the 
allegations in paragraph 24 and therefore denies thc same. 
25. Ikfcndant Slewart is without knowlcdge to sufficiently admit or dcny thc 
allegntions in paragraph 25 and tl~erefore dcnics thc same. 
36, Defendant Stewart is witho\lt knowledge to suficiently admil or del~y the 
allegations in paragraph 26 and Lhereforc denies rhe sane. 
27. Ilefcndant Stewart is withour knowlcdge to sufficiently admit or dcny Ihe 
allegations in paragraph 27 and thereforc dcnies the same. 
28. Defendant Stcwar~ is without knowledge to sull icicn~ly admit or deny the 
allcgations in parawdph 28 and therefore denies the same. 
29. Defendant Stewart is without knowledge to  si~mciently admit or deny thc 
allcgations in paragraph 29 and thcrcforc denies the same. 
30. Defendant Stcwarl is wilhout knowledge to suflicion~ly admit or deny thc 
allegations in paragraph 30 and thererore denies the saine. 
3 1. Dcfendant Stewart is without knowledge lo sufficiently admit or deny t l~c  
allegations in paragraph 3 1 and therefore dcnics ~ h c  s m e .  
COUNT ONE - MTSKEPK.ESENTATXOIU ANIl P'ItAUD 
32. Defendant Stcwnrl: is without knowledge to sufficiently admil or deny the 
allegarions in paragraph 32 and therefore denies thc same. 
33. Defendant Stcwart is withoul knowledge to sufficiently admit or deny thc 
allcgalions in paragraph 33 nrld thcrcl'orc denies thc same. 
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34. Defendant Stewart denies the allegations ill paragraph 34. 
COUNT TWO - PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
35, DcIcnd*mt Stcwart dcnics lhc allegations in paragraph 35.  
36. No rcsponsc! is racluires olher tl~an to deny any basis for a claim for 
punitive darnagcs. 
COUNT TIIREE - l31GACH OF CONTRACT 
37. Defendanr Stewari is without knowledge to sufficiently admit or deny the 
a1 legations in paragraph 37 and thcrcforc dcnics t hc samc. 
38, Tjcfendant Stewart is  without knowlcdgc 10 sui'liciel~tly admit or deny the 
allegations in partgraph 38 and therefore denies the samc. 
39. Defendan1 Srewal-1 denies the allegations in pal-agraph 39. 
40. Dcfcndant Stewart denies thc allegations in paragraph 40. 
COUNT FOUR - BAD FAITH 
41. Dcfcndant Srewart is wi lho~ l  knowledge to sufficiently admit or deny the 
allegations in paragraph 4 1 and therelore denies the same. 
42. Dokndanl SLewarl denies the allegalions in paragraph 42. 
43. Defendant Stewart denies the allegntio~~s in  paragraph 43. 
COUNT FlVE - EMOTIONAL DlSTRESS 
44. Dcfcndant Srewart denies any reckless or negligent conduc~. Ir is w i ~ h o u ~  
knowledge to sufficien~ljr admit nl- deny the remaining allcgations in paragraph 44 and 
therefore denies 11ie same. 
45. Defendant Stcwa1'1 is without knowiedyc LO sullicien1ly adinit or deny the 
allegations in paragraph 45 and therefore denies the same. 
4 Ilcfcndant Stewart denies tha allegations in paragraph 46. 
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APPXIZMATIVE ANT) OTHER DEFENSES 
1. PlailltiIT s complaint fails to state a claim for which relief rnay bc granted. 
2. PlaintiTf s claims are barred in whole or in parl by the applicable slcztute of 
limitations. 
3. Some or all of the claims arc barred under the doclrines of  waiver, lachcs, 
estoppel, collateral estoppel, relilica~inn, settlement, and acquiescencc. 
4. Payment of all nbligotions to t.'lainliil'I~as been madc. 
5 .  Stewart Titlc of Coeur d' Alene did nor insurance issuc the policy at issue. 
6. Plaintiff has named the wrong party defendanl. 
7 .  Plninriti  has ontcred inlo an agreement that has fully acldrcsscd all of 
obliga~ions owed to Plaintiff. Pe~-formancc in ammkm.x with that agreement has bccn 
rendered. Plaintiff's claim is thereforc barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfac~ion, 
REQUEST FOR RlCLIRl' 
WI-IEi<EFORE, having fully answered all allegations contained in the Complaint, 
Dcfendant Stcwart requests that: 
A. Plaintiff takes notl~ing by his Complaint; 
B. 'I'lle Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and withoi~t cost to Dcfcndanl 
Stewarr; 
C. Dcfendant be awardcd its costs and altorncys' I'ees incurrcd in defcnse of 
this action as provided by law; and 
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U. Dcfc'cndan~ be granted such other and funhcr relicfas 111r Cuun may deem 
just and equitable. 
DATED this 6th day of August, 2007. 
Attorneys fo; I%rendant 
Stewart Title Coinpnny 
of Cocur d'Alene 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
79 I HEREBY CERTII'Y thtrl on tho -4Jday of August, 2007, I csuscd lo bc scrvcd a true 
and correct copy ol'thc foregoing by the mcthod indicated below, w d  addressed to thc 
following: 
Overnight Delivery Mr. Vornon Jerry Mortcnsen 
' Iiacsimile Transmission 1'0 Box D 
& First Class Mail nonners Iicrry, ID 83805 
-___ I h n d  Delivercd Pro Se Plninfiff 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY O f  KOOTENAl Jss i:z - .> - J7$; 
O'CLOCK 
flK,DISTRICT CBU T 
u -  \ DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, 
) Case No. CV-2007-4690 
Plaintiff(s), 1 
1 ORDER FOR COURT MEDIATION 
VS. 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY 1 
OF COEUR D'ALENE, INC., ) 
1 
Defendantls). 1 
This matter has been scheduled to commence for a five (5) day jury trial on 
June 16, 2008 at 9:00 a.m.; in Kootenai County, and the Court having determined that 
the case would be appropriate for court-assisted settlement efforts; therefore, the 
Honorable John R. Stegner shall be assigned to conduct an appropriate 
settlemenffmediation conference. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties comply with any directives issued by 
Judge Stegner in efforts to pursue the alternative dispute resolution process. The parties 
can be reached at: 
Vernon Mortensen, Pro se, phone no. 208-267-1 385 
Todd Reuter, Attorney at Law, phone no. 208-667-1839 
DATED this day of nc\roL ,2007 
\-&4",c, ~.barlnoh? 
LANSING~.  HAYNPS 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
ORDER FOR COURT MEDIATION: ? 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that true copies of the foregoing have be n mailed, postage 
prepaid or sent by interoffice mail, this 2 day of OL% , 2007, to: 
Honorable John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
PO Box 9068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Fax: 208-883-571 9 
Vernon Mortensen 
Pro se 
PO Box 1922 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805 
Fax: 208-267-1 279 
Todd Reuter 
Attorney at Law 
1200 Ironwood Drive, Suite 315 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 208-765-2494 
Trial Court Administrator 
Fax: 208-446-1 224 
DANIEL ENGLISH 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
ORDER FOR COURT MEDIATION: 2 
Todd Reuter ISB # 5573 
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 
PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP 
1200 Ironwood Drive, Su~ te  315 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 838 14- 1 839 
Telephone: (208) 667-1 839 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2494 
todd.reuter@klgates.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY 
OF COEUR D'ALENE, N C .  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF. THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF COEUR 
D'ALENE, INC., 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF TODD REUTER 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
z 
-
1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify. 
(9 
- 
2. The matters set forth herein are based on my own personal knowledge. 
AFFIDAVIT OF TODD 
REUTER IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
3. I am counsel for the defendant in this matter. 
4. I have reviewed various pleadings from the court file in Akers v. Morlensen, el 
al, Kootenai County Case No. CV-02-222 and obtained copies of various pleadings from 
that file. It is my understanding that Judge Mitchell initially decided the case on January 
2,2003, and then issued further findings and conclusions. Attached hereto are true and 
correct copies of some of those pleadings. It is my further understanding that the case was 
appealed (see Akers v. DL White et al, 142 Idaho 293 (2005)), remanded, decided, then 
appealed again, and that the case is presently on appeal. 
5. Exhibit 1 hereto is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of VJ Mortensen In 
Support of Motion For Summary Judgment filed in the Akers case on June 12,2002. 
6. Exhibit 3 hereto is a true and correct copy of the court's January 2,2003, 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
7 .  Exhibit 4 hereto is a true and correct copy of the court's April 1,  2004 
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order. 
8. Exhibit 8 hereto is a true and correct copy of Requests for Admission served 
on Mr. Mortensen in this case on November 16,2007, including the certificate of service 
and Notice of Service of same. 
9. Exhibit 9 hereto is a true and correct copy of the District Court's December 8, 
2006 Third Amended Judgment and Decree on Remand. 
AFFIDAVIT OF TODD 
REUTER IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SPOKANE ) 
TODD REUTER, being first duly sworn, upon oath states as follows: 
I have read the foregoing Affidavit, know the contents thereof, and believe the 
same to be true and correct. 
Defendant, Stewart Title of Coeur 
d'Alene, Inc. 
A 
- 
SIGNED AND AFFIRMED before me on the 17 day of 
My appointment qxjires: GCPmAUm \o-'Zq10 
AFFIDAVIT OF TODD 
REUTER IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on 17th day of January, 2008, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Hand Delivery Vernon J. Mortensen 
Facsimile Transmission 2 120 David Thompson Drive 
First Class Mail PO Box D 
Over Night Delivery Bonners Ferry, ID 83804 
Telephone: (208) 267- 1385 
Facsimile: (208) 267- 1279 
AFFIDAVIT OF TODD 
REUTER IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
EXHIBIT 1 
Michael E. Reagan 
LIESCHE, REAGAN, WALLACE 
& WALLACE, P.A. 
1044 Northwest Boulevard 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: 2081664-1 561 
Facsimile: 2081667-4034 
FILED. 4 
ISB M081 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO; IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.) Case No. CV 02-222 
AKERS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. i AFFIDAVIT OF K J. MORTENSEN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. ) -* b . . -  
WHITE, husband and wife; and 1 
VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI 1 
E. MORTENSEN. husband and wife. ) 
Defendants. 
1 
1 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS. 
County of Kootenai ) 
VERNON J. MORTENSEN, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the defendants in the above-entitled matter. 
AFFIDAVIT OF VERNON J. MORTENSEN, Page 1 
Id7 0075.04 Imr\ WhiteDL\Akers\Afi-Marfensen) , -. I' .- , 
I . -  a e 2. In September 1994, 1 purchased 160 acres from Mr. and Mrs. Peplinski. At 
the time of purchase, North Idaho Title insured the ingress and egress to the property on 
an existing road going up a hill to the property past the property of the Plaintiffs Akers. 
3. At the time I purchased the 160 acres, 1 also purchased from Mr. Peplinski 
an oversized gate that was installed at the entrance end of the access road that leads to 
1 both the property I purchased and to the home of the Akers. Mr. Akers and I agreed with 
to keep the gate closed as a deterrent to trespassing, but unlocked, except during hunting 
season. We each had a key to my lock on my gate. Starting in December, 2001,l sold 
120 of the 160 acres 1 purchased from the Peplinskis to Defendants White. 
4. Since my purchase of the property in 1994,l have regularly and continuolisly 
used the subject private roadway for an access to and from my property. Over the years, 
I have logged portions of the 160 acres, with logging equipment and trucks passing and re- 
passing on the roadway. Over the years, I have used the road for recreational use of my 
land as well as agricultural uses. 1 have had any number of real estate agent's prospective 
purchasers and agents pass and re-pass the roadway as access to my 1 60 acres over the 
years. 
5. When I purchased the property in 1994, the toad had a graveled surface 
which had been recently graded and graveled and the width of the improvements took up 
most of the area between the Reynolds' and the Akers' fences. I used the curved portion 
of the road near the approach, as I did the remainder of the road, because 1 believed 1 had 
the right to do so, never having asked for oireceived the permission of the Akers to use 
the road or any part of it. 
6. Over the years since I purchased the property, I have performed repairs and 
maintenance/improvernents to the road. I have placed, or caused to be placed, gravel or 
fill material on the road bed, graded, and made other improvements to the road with heavy 
.equipment. 
7. 1 do not believe that any of my use, maintenance or improvement of the 
roadway has ever damaged Mr. Akers or increased the burden on his property, and he has 
never made any such claim to me until the filing of this lawsuit. 
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8. Exceot for using h e  madway or oaashm going to Akers' 
s~errk with them tegardlng Uw roed. end when Mr. Akors Invited me to kxh at his a- 
can, 1 have not entered *- the propetty of the Men. 
9. ~ h e r . l ~ d n a ~ d p ~ i n 1 8 9 1 . o ~ w ~ i h e n i g p r o ~ m h  
Akers' p r o m ,  t he re  was no aams b my ~mpmty. Bceptfor mis pivete rmdway, 
I have no other access to the 40 ams 1 still own, which 1 pmhlesd from tb Papllws. 
My 40 acres is completely summded by pcivate)y owned land and I ham the ri&t af 
a=es hrough the 12Q acres I sold b Defendants Whiqr b connect b the WM\ af the 
subject p a t e  roadway, but othemise. 1 have no legal access to get to a public right&- 
way. Except for the wbjed private midway. my 40 a- is cornpicmy landbdced, 
d h e h  aassible onb by air, 
10. 1 have a great and present neceesity Po en easement over and a m s  the 
subject p k t e  roadway to m k u e  using my propeRy In the way that I have tlnce I 
purchased it in 1994 and for any c#W 1- purpaee. 
1 . Just orlor to my purdrase of tk property from me Peplinslds, the Pepk'nskls 
obtained e restmining wder a@wt the Aken from taking any step that mould change, 
modify wlimit the use afequipment ofthQPlaM ormRibiling or inbering with Peplinski 
in using the road. T i e  PepBnskis hod c b h d  that the Akns had damaged some of the 
irnptovemenb the Peplinskis hed msde tothe road and w~ in ts r fe rhg  with the Peplislris' 
use of the road. Thtt case was eventually sew and my urrdenter?ding was that I had the 
right b use, maintair;. repair and impme the mad. which I did. Up unW about the timc of 
filing this hwsun. the Alters never bttwfered with my use. maintenam, repair w 
irnprovernent of the mad. 
' 4 - . -  
Further your amant sayeth naught 
X u  
VERNON J.MOKIENSEN 
S U B S C S ~ D  SWORN b lhis !o day d June. 2002. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /t/ day of June. 2002, a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing document was served upon: 
Leander L. James, Esq. 7'iifi EJvared . Owens, James & Vernon, P.A. 
Overnight Mail 1250 Ironwood Dr., Ste. 320 
- Facsimile P 0 Box 1578 
Coeur dlAlene, ID 8381 6-1578 
Fax: 664- 1 684 
f- ' 
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STATE OF IDAHO 1 
County of KOOTENAI )= 
FILED 1-2 4-3  
4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THJ3 FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERNE L. 
AKERS, husband and  wife, 
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON 
J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. 
MORTENSEN, husband and  wife, 
Case No*. CV-02-222 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and  
ORDER 
1. Defendants Whites and Mortensens are respective marital communities 
residing in and owning property in Kootenai County, Idaho, and are subject to the 
personal jurisdiction of this Court, and venue is properly with this Court. 
2. Defendant D. L. White Construction, Inc., is  a n  Idaho corporation engaged in 
construction and development in Kootenai County, Idaho, and is subject to the 
jurisdiction of this Court. 
3. Defendants Mortensens are engaged in farming, ranching and  land 
development in North Idaho. 
. .. 
4. Plaintiffs are a marital community residing in Kootew C ty, Idaho, and 7% 
d 
AKERS v. WHITE, FINDINGS OF F A m .  CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER Pazr I 
are subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court. 
5. The Plaintiffs are owners of certain real property located in Kootenai County, 
Idaho, more particularly described in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 attached to Plaintiffs' 
Complaint (Plaintiffs' real property), Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 1, and such property is 
subject to the in rem jurisdiction of this Court. 
6. Plaintiffs purchased said real property in 1980. Plaintrffs' Exhibit 1. Said 
property is a servient estate and contains an  easement traversing part of its southern 
border, specifically the southern border of Government Lot 2. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3. 
Plaintiffs also own land drectly west and continguous to the land they own in 
Government Lot 2 ,  as shown in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6. 
7. The dimensions of the easement are more particularly described by the Rasor 
survey in Plaintiffs' Exhibits 6 and 7. The easement is a graveled drive, approximately 
12.2 feet in width with a maximum slope of approximately 18%. 
8. Millsap Loop Road is a monument referenced in plaintiffs' deed and referred 
to as the "county road" in that deed. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 (Exhibit A thereto). 
9. The Eastern Border of Plaintiffs' property runs from the centerline of Millsap 
Loop Road, then southerly 244.46 feet alon'g the centerline of thl rogd, where it leaves 
said centerline south 26"32"26' West 44.85 feet to the south line of Government Lot 2, 
excepting out the easterly 30 feet from the centerline of Millsap Loop Road for public 
road right-of-way purposes. 
10. Dolly Kelch owns the land east of Plaintiffs' real property and, according to 
her deed, east of Millsap Loop ~ o a d ' s  centerline. 
i 1. Due to surveying errors, Millsap Loop Road is erroneously depicted at  times 
as turning almost 90" east at the southeast comer of Plaintiffs' real property, directly 
west of the Kelch property. The configuration and location of Millsap Loop Road from 
1966 to the present date was and is depicted on the 1973 aerial photographs, 
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Defendants' Exhibit D-13, D-44, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6, Testimony of Bill Reynolds, Biil 
Millsap, and Richard Peplinski. This Court finds Millsap Loop Road has never traversed 
the path depicted on the 1980 Meckel Record of Survey (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 15 and 6)' 
and that the surveyor who prepared such documents could not have visited the site to 
venfy the actual location of Millsap Loop Road. Scott Rasor testified that apparently 
Jim Meckel did not survey at the time he laid out the subdivision map, and this Court 
finds that opinion to be fully supported by the evidence. The Court finds 
uncontradicted the testimony of professional land surveyor Scott Rasor, who reviewed 
the "Viewer's Reportn (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16) and concluded that Millsap Loop Road was 
in fact curved (and not at a more nearly 90 degree angle) well before 1966. As depicted 
on the 1980 Meckel Record of Survey (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 15 and 6)' the location of 
Millsap Loop Road, and correspondingly, the eastern boundary of plaintiffs' land, is in 
error. The northeasterly and southeasterly comers of plaintiffs' property as shown on 
the 1980 Meckel Record of Survey (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 15 and 6) is Likewise in error. 
Scott Rasor testified that the bearing and distance from the deed (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 1)' follows Meckel's survey (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 and 6)' but contraxy to the deed 
which says it goes to the center line of ~ i l l i a ~  Loop Road, the be* and-distance 
deviate &om the monument which is Millsap Loop Road. 
12. Millsap Loop Road actually curves east, as depicted in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 7, 
first page of the survey of Scott Rasor. Plaintiffs own to the centerline of Millsap Loop 
Road (less 30' for half of the Millsap Loop Road right-of-way) as that road actually exists 
today, which is in the same location it existed on August 22, 1980, the date Wilhelrns 
and Wigens deeded to plaintiffs their land. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. Additionally, the 
intent of the Warranty Deed conveying the Kelch property from Katherine Ann Baker to 
Robert L. Kelch and Dolly A. Kelch (Defendants' Exhibit 24) was to grant Mr. and Mrs. 
Kelch the property east of the .erroneously surveyed centerline of Millsap Loop Road. 
Thus, if Plaintiffs, by virtue of their deed, did not own the "disputed triangular area" 
(that area bounded on one side by the errant eastern boundary of Plaintiffs' real 
property according to Plaintiffs' Ewbi t s  15 and 6 ,  as identified by Scott Rasor in 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 7, on another side by the southern border of Government Lot 2 and on 
the third side by the right-of-way of Millsap Loop Road), then the Kelches obtained 
ownership of that disputed triangular area on August 2, 1984, pursuant to the Baker - 
Kelch conveyance (Defendants' Exhibit 24). 
Defendants claim that "On July 16, 2002, Defendants Mortensen and White 
acquired the property bounded on the west by the easterly boundary of the Akers 
property as described above, on the north and east by Millsap Loop Road and on the 
south by the south line of Government Lot 2, as more particularly described in Trial 
Exhibit D-23, citing the testimony of David English, Defendant White and Defendant 
Mortensen, and that all such property lies west of Millsap Loop Road." Defendants 
Proposed Amended Findings of Fact, p. 3, a 10. For the reasons stated in these 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, this Court denies that claim by 
defendants. 
13. By virtue of the quit claim deed between Ms. Kelch a d  ~faint&s-~laintiffs~ 
Exhibit 2), Ms. Kelch conveyed to the Akers her interest in a large portion of the 
disputed triangular area, more particularly described in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2. Therefore, 
even if Plaintiffs did not previously own this disputed triangular area by virtue of the 
deed by which they obtained their parcel, they obtained ownership of this area 
pursuant to the Kelch - Akers conveyance as described in PlaintiffsJ Exhibit 2. 
14. In 1940 A.J. Millsaps and Nellie Millsaps conveyed Lot 2 Section 19 to W.L. 
Millsaps and Patricia A. Millsaps (hereinafter collectively "W. L. Millsaps"). 
15. In 1945 W.L. Millsaps purchased 160 acres, more or less, now owned by 
Defendants White and Mortensen. 
16. In 1945 A.J. Millsaps and Nellie Ruth Millsaps cbnveyed a 20' by 50' strip of 
land located on what is now the Akers's estate to W.L. Millsaps (more particularly 
described in Quit Claim Deed # 172952, Defendants' Exhibit D 16) for right-of-way 
purposes. This 20' by 50' strip of land is located in section 24, adjoining but to the west 
of Government Lot 2. 
17. In 1948 W.L. Millsaps purchased the servient estate of the aforementioned 
20' by 50' easement, creating unity of title between the dominant and servient estates of 
said easement. Defendants "expert" James Enghsh, a title officer with Stewart Title, 
testihed that it was a "scriveners error" that caused the 20' by 50' easement not to be 
carried over and protected from the doctrine of "mergern. The Court frnds his testimony 
in this regard to be not credible, and his conclusions not supported by the facts or the 
law. 
18. W. L. Millsaps and Patricia A. Millsaps (hereinafter collectively "W. L. 
Millsaps") were the common grantors of the real property of both Plaintiffs and 
Defendants. On December 28, 1966, W. L. Millsaps conveyed Lot Two (2)' Section 
Nineteen (19), Townshp 50 North, Range 5 W.B.M., Southeast ?4 Northeast ?4 of 
Section 24, Township 50 North, Range 6 w.B.M., Kootenai count$, ~daho, &6.ntaining 80 
acres, more or less, to Vernon L. Baker and Katherine A n n  Baker (collectively referred to 
as Baker), reserving to W. L. Millsaps "a roadway right-of-way over and across the 
southern portion of Lot 2 as the same now erdsts, for purposes of ingress and egress to 
adjoining property." (Complaint Exhibit 1, Plaintins' Exhibit 3, 175, Defendants' Exhibit 
D3). That deed was not recorded until November 2, 1979. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3, 175, 
Defendants' Exhibit D-3. 
19. In 1966 the "roadway right of way" referenced in the reservation language 
contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3, 175, Warranty Deed between W. L. Millsaps and Akers 
had the following characteristics: 
a) The easement was a dirt drive that ran parallel to the southern 
border of Government Lot 2. 
b) The southern edge of the easement was located approximately 
three feet north of the adjoining property to the south (Reynold's 
property) 
d 
CJ -1 ne easemenr was approximately 12'- 16' feet in width. 
d) The easement intersected the Reynold's driveway at 
approximately a 90" angle (see Exhibit. 17)' with some curve to 
accommodate farm machinery. 
The easement was located south of what is now the Akers's 
driveway approach from Millsap Loop Road and excluded that 
approach. 
The easement was used exclusively for field access and farming 
purposes, primarily during the Spring, Summer and Fall. 
The easement was impassable at times in the spring due to a 
"bog" and seasonal creek. 
h) The easement was Lsed primarily for cultiva&ng hi May-June 
and haying in July - August. 
i) The west end of the easement curved at a sharp right angle 
south into the Millsaps' property. 
20. On April 13, 1984, in an &davit admitted into evidence, W.L. Millsaps 
explained that in 1966 when they sold to Bakers, his intent was to reserve an access 
easement over the roadway right of way as the same then existed for ingress and egress 
for =farming equipment" which consisted of "trucks*, and "vakous types of field 
equipment such as combines*. Defendants' Exhibit D5. This &davit only speaks to 
the written easement across the southern portion of Government Lot 2. In the &davit, 
r-. - -- 
western boundary of Government Lot 2. According to that Affidavit, the land to the west 
of the western boundary of Goveqnment Lot 2 (the land in section 24) was sold to the 
Peplinskis. That occurred in 1967, Findings of Fact, infra fi 25. The problem from 
defendants standpoint, is the fact that defendants' predecessor in interest, Peplinski, 
does not own the land directly west of the western boundary of Government Lot 2 (that 
western boundary of Government Lot 2 is also the western terminus of the express 
easement to which W.L. Millsaps conveyed and discussed in that affidavit), plaintiffs 
own that land directly west of the western boundary of Government Lot 2.  Plaintdfs' 
Exhibit 1 (and Exhibit A thereto). Thus, the land that was meant to be directly 
accessed by the express easement given by W.L. Millsaps, is now owned by 
plaintiffs. 
As to the qualities of this "roadn, W.L. Millsaps affidavit is consistent with the 
testimony of William Reynolds, who testified in 1966 the "roadn consisted of a two tire 
track trail, used by Millsaps about six times a year for haying and some logging, never 
used in the winter, impassable in the spring except with a dozer. Reynolds tesuied 
Peplinslds' use of the "roadn when they o&ed it was the same. khat 'road''-cbnnected 
to his driveway at approximately a 90 degree angle. William Reynolds owns 580 acres 
directly south of plaintins' land, and who, except for three years while in the service, 
Lived there since 1945. 
2 1. In 1966, a fence h e  running north-south separated the Millsaps's property 
from the Reynold's property. Bill Millsap's testimony was unclear as to the location of 
this fenceline and whether or not it was east of the current fenceline. This fenceline 
met what is now the southern edge of the Akers's property at a 90 degree angle 280 feet 
[scaled off the Rasor Survey] east of the section 19-24 comer marker. Bill Millsaps was 
also unclear as to whether the access road went on to Reynolds' property or whether it 
went on to that portion of plaintiffs land west of the western boundary of Government 
Lot 2. Thus, in 1966, it is unclear whether one could access the Millsaps' 160 acres 
without traveling on the right of way outside Government Lot 2. 
22. Approximately ten feet of the easement's width at  the eastern end of the 
right of way (where it intersected with the Reynolds drive in 1966) has since been 
covered by the Reynolds' parking area. There remains six feet in width of the 1966 right 
of way not covered by the Reynold's parking area. This six foot wide portion of the 
easement runs east-west parallel to the Reynolds parking area bordered by logs more 
particularly identified in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 7, the Rasor Survey. 
23. After the 1966 Millsaps - Baker conveyance, W. L. Millsaps retained 160 
acres adjoining the property which they sold to the Bakers. 
24. The Bakers are the predecessors in interest of Plaintiffs. 
25. On January 20, 1967, the Millsaps conveyed this property to Floyd G. and 
Stella A. Peplinski, who continued to seasonally fann the same with their son, Richard 
Peplinski. 
26. The curve into the Millsaps' property at the west end of the driveway in 1966 
C 
was east of its current location, in ~ove&ent Lot 2. As stated supm in  din^ of Fact 
7 2 1, Bill Millsap was unclear as to the location of that "road* after it left Government 
Lot 2. William Reynolds testified that after the "road* left the west boundary of 
Government Lot 2, it turned sharply in a 90 degree bend then went south, essentially 
right around the northwest comer of Reynolds' land. This is corroborated by 
Defendants Exhibits D41 (map from photos taken in 1978) D42 (represented by Mr. 
Reagan as a 1973 aerial photo), D43 (represented by Mr. Reagan as a 1973 map) and 
D44 (represented by Mr. Reagan as a 1973 aerial photo), and thus, this Court fmds this 
to be the approximate route of the "road" in 1966. Mr. Reynolds testified Peplinski 
worked on this area of the road toward the end of his ownership, and in doing so, 
caused part of Reynolds' fence to fall down. Sheme Akers similarly testified that it was 
well after 1980 that Peplinski altered the course of the road to the west of the western 
boundary of Government Lot 2. Dennis Akers testified that even though Peplinskis 
modified this area of the "road" west of the western boundary of Government Lot 2, 
defendant Mortensen later altered it even further, changing the course of the road and 
digging down, to the point where Akers cannot go on the west end of his property via 
this "roadn. Sheme Akers and Dennis Akers both testified they gave Peplinskis and 
defendants permission to use this area to the west of the western boundary of 
Government Lot 2. Defendants' counsel cross examined Dennis Akers based on his 
1995 deposition at page 16, but there was no inconsistency as the deposition a t  pages 
16-18 show what was being discussed was the eastern portion of plaintiffs' land, not the 
west. Also, all indications are that the 1995 litigation only concerned the east end of 
plaintiffs' land, and that the permission or lack thereof regarding the west end of 
plaintiffs land did not come up in that litigation. Richard Peplinski testified that he 
never got perrqission from the Akers to use this road. However, Richard Peplinss was 
at no time the owner of the land, though he worked the land. The testimony of the 
. .- - 
Akerses that they gave Richard Peplinski's iather Floyd ~eplinski'perknission, remains 
uncontroverted. It is permission to the actual owner of the property that should 
control. The Court finds that given what little is known about the earlier lawsuit 
between Peplinskis and Akers, the fact that Peplinskis brought the suit then settled, 
makes Richard Peplinski's testimony that Akerses never gave him any permission, to be 
not as credible as the Akerses testimony that they gave permission to Peplinskis. 
The parties are at a disadvantage as little remains of the earlier suit between 
Peplinskis and Akers. Dennis Akers testified that leading up to that lawsuit, Pepliksis 
fenced off the upper portion of the road, then Peplinskis sued Akers but the suit was 
settled on March 4, 1995 because Peplinskis wanted out of the lawsuit. That testimony 
0 ' 2; ; { 
is uncontradicted by Richard Peplinski (who testified that he helped in the 
communication process of that lawsuit), and the fact that the Peplinski-Akers lawsuit 
settled is an inference that Peplingkis knew they had Limited rights as to the eastern 
portion as well as no rights to the western portion of Akers' land. 
27. With the Akers' permission, Richard Peplinski extended the driveway west of 
Government lot 2 and, with Akers's permission, used this driveway west of Government 
Lot 2 for fanning and occasionally logging in the spring, summer and fall. 
28. The reservation language contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3, 175, Defendants' 
Exhibit D3, the W.L. Millsaps to Baker deed, reserves an express easement in favor of 
grantors therein, (W.L. Millsaps), Defendants' predecessor, but only over Government 
Lot 2. The easement is limited to how the right-of-way existed in 1966 due to the 
language "as the same now exists." The easement is for "ingress and egress to adjoining 
property" and, as stated later in the deed, "for roadway right-of-way". The easement is 
not limited to "field access for fanning" as argued by plaintiffs. This express easement 
does not grant Defendants an easement over that portion of Plaintiffs' property west of 
the west boundary of Government Lot 2, nor does it grant an easement over Plaintiffs' 
separate permitted approach in the southeiitern portion of ~lain'tiffs' prop'ifty. 
Defendants' express easement runs 53 1.98 feet from the western border of Government 
Lot 2 in a straight easterly direction to the Reynolds' driveway, as indicated on Plaintiffs' 
Exhibits 7 and 15. The intersection of this easement with the Reynold's driveway is 
visible in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 17. 
29. In 1982 Plaintiffs obtained a single family approach permit to Millsap Loop 
Road from Post Falls Highway District and thereby constructed a curved approach from 
Millsap Loop Road to Plaintiffs' driveway on the east end of plaintiffs' property. 
Testimony of Sheme Akers, Dennis Akers. William Reynolds recalled that Plaintiffs put 
in this curved approach at about the same time Plaintiffs built thelr house. Dennis 
1 Akers testified the curved approach was required by the county for safety reasons 
regarding sight distances, in order for the Akers to get a permit from the county to build 
their house. The entirety of this curved approach was on Plaintiffs' property. Before the 
curved approach was built in 1982, Shenie Akers testified Peplinskis used Reynolds' 
driveway south then proceeded west along the south half of Government Lot 2, to 
access Peplinskis'land. After the curved portion was built in 1982, defendants' 
predecessors-in-interest, the Peplinskis, as well as Defendants, used this curved 
approach with Plaintiffs' pennission. Dennis Akers testified that he gave Floyd 
Peplinski, the owner of the land, and his son who used the land, permission to use the 
new curved section of the driveway on the east intersecting with Millsap Loop Road, and 
permission to use Akers' land west of the western boundary of Government Lot 2. 
Richard Peplinski contradicted that, claiming no permission was ever sought or given. 
This Court finds convincing the questioning of Dennis Akers on cross examination by 
defendants' attorney. Dennis Akers was asked about the prior lawsuit between 
Peplinski and Akers and Peplinski, and agreed that Akers alleged Peplinski was 
trespassing in that lawsuit. Counsel for Mortensen then asked "How can Pepliskis be 
trespassing if you gave them permission?" io which Akers respo6ded, "~hlrS ivas 
permission as long as things remained the same, when they didn't, we took it away." 
This Court finds that explanation credible, and the testimony of both of the plaintiffs to 
be more credible than that of Richard Peplinski. The fact that Peplinskis dismissed the 
lawsuit the brought, adds to that determination. Plaintiffs revoked said permission on 
two occasions: fvst when the ~ e ~ l h s k i s  attempted to expand the easement burden and 
width and second when the Defendants attempted to expand the easement burden and 
width. 
30. The Akers gave the Peplinskis pennission to use the Akers's curved 
approach on the east end of plaintiffs' property, except for a brief period during the 
lawsuit between the Peplinskis and the Akers. 
31. On September 22, 1994, the Peplinskis sold the two 80 acre parcels 
(comprising 160 acres) to defend@ Mortensens. The 160 acres Mortensons purchased 
Lies south of and adjacent to Plaintiffs' land. According to the testimony of Mr. 
Mortensen, at the time of that sale Mr. Mortensen knew the Peplinskis (primarily 
Richard Peplinski) were involved in litigation with Plaintiffs regarding maintenance of 
the "roadn, and particularly the eastern end where it intersects with the highway. 
Defendants Mortensen had knowledge of this dispute, Mr. Mortenson testSed he 
reviewed the court file on the Peplinsk lawsuit "thoroughly" before purchasing the 
property in 1994. Morentsens purchased the 160 acres for a reduced value, as Mr. 
Moretensen testified "a fkaction of the pricen, due that lawsuit. Mr. Mortensen testified 
he purchased the 160 acres for about $250,000, established by Peplinski via a land 
exchange. Mr. Mortenson testified he buys land and sells it for profit in his own name 
and in the name of the business he and his wife own, Timberland Ag LLC. 
At the time Mortensen was considering purchasing this property, Sherrie Akers 
testified she received a phone call from Stewart Title, calling on behalf of Mortensen 
(I.R.E. 80 1, admission of a party - agent), &.nthg to know if the'&rs would be willing 
to quitclaim a portion of their land to the west of Government Lot 2, t o  which she said 
Mr. Mortensen testified specifically and unequivocally that the Peplinski lawsuit 
did not in any way involve the issue of access beyond the west boundary of Government 
Lot 2. Since there was no express easement in favor of Peplinskis beyond the west 
boundary of Government Lot 2, and since access beyond the west boundary of 
Government Lot 2 was not an issue in the Peplinski/Akers lawsuit, that tends to 
indicate that the limited use by Peplinskis across the small portion of land owned by 
Akers to the west of Government Lot 2, was with permission. If the Peplinskis and 
p f  ' 1  
Akers were not arguing about it in the lawsuit, it shows it was not an issue between 
them back in 1995. 
32. Subsequently, Morten~ens purchased another 100 acres adjoining this 160- 
I acre parcel to the south of the 160 acre parcel. Mr. Mortensen testified the 100 acres 
was purchased by Timberland Ag LLC and the 160 acres was purchased by the 
Mortensens. 
33. The 260 acres of contiguous Mortensen land bordered, or was near, a county 
road to the south from which Mortensen accessed the 260-acre parcel on a "back road." 
Mortensen testified he has an easement from a county road into this 260 acres. On 
direct examination, Mr. Mortensen testified he had a prescriptive easement over the 
Forest Service property, having been referred by plaintiffs'counsel to the Deposition of 
Vernon J. Mortensen (taken June 26,2002), p. 109, L. 14 - p. 1 10, L. 10. On cross 
examination by his own attorney, Mr. Mortensen testified "I'm assuming there's an 
easement there because I did get title insurance." On redirect he testified he was and is 
relying on the title company, and "That's why they're [the title company] paying all his 
costs and expenses." William Reynolds also testified that he had seen Mr. Mortenson 
come in on plaintiffs land off i f  ~ i l l s a ~  Loo; Road, and not come'ouc infe-g that Mr. 
Mortenson used this county road. Reynolds described how good a road this county 
road was, and that it extended into the 100 acres owned by Mortenson, south of the 
160 acres Mortenson sold to Whites. Defendants had David English a title officer of 
Stewart Title testify that in his opinion there was no document of record that would give 
defendants an easement over this back road. However, it is defendants burden to prove 
this point by clear and convincing evidence (as discussed infra in Conclusions of Law 1 
7), and the testimony from the mouth of defendant Mr. Mortenson is sufficient to cause 
defendants to fail in that burden of proof. David English testified on cross examination 
that people can get access and permission to cross state land. 
f 
34. Defendants D. L. White Construction, Inc., David L. White and Michelle V. 
White m t e s )  are developers. In December 200 1, Whites purchased 80 acres of the 
Mortensen 260-acre parcel then ~ w n e d  (more specifically, Whites bought 80 acres of the 
160 acres adjoining PlaintiffsJ real property, part of the land sold from Millsaps to 
Peplinskis), intending to develop this land into parcels as small as five acres with 
homes. Whites are currently creating a housing development south of Plaintiffs' 
property on the 80 acres. According to Mr. Mortensen, Whites have access through the 
"back road" to the 80 acres. Mr. Mortensen testified he had a prescriptive easement 
over the Forest Service property. Deposition of Vernon J. Mortensen (taken June 26, 
2002), p. 109, L. 14 - p. 110, L. 10. Defendant David L. White, in his deposition taken 
June 26,2002, also testified about this "back easement" that would be available for the 
parcels he purchased from Mortensens. Deposition of David L. White, p. 28, L. 3 - p. 
29, L. 4. There is thus evidence, largely from defendants themselves, that this "back 
road" provides both defendants Mortensens and Whites legal access to their properties 
on a smooth, graded gravel road kom the south of their land. 
35. Plaintiffs gave defendants and their predecessors-in-interest permission to 
.-.- . 
use that portion of plaintiffs' driveway west bf Government Lot 2 A d  >evoked said 
permission on two occasions, i.e., when the Peplinskis, and later the defendants, tried 
to widen the driveway and increase the use and burden on the same. 
36. Plaintiffs revoked defendants' permission to use the curved approach and 
the driveway west of Government Lot 2 in January 2002. Plaintiffs posted same with 
"No Trespassing" signs within 660 feet of each other. 
37. Sometime between December 2001 and January 2002, defendants White 
and Mortensen entered into a business relationship, whereby both parties planned to 
widen plaintiffs' single family permitted approach and driveway to accommodate their 
planned housing development. By that time, defendant White had split the northerly 
80 acres of the 160-acre parcel into at least four 20-acre Defendant Mortensen 
had split the 160-acre parcel into at least two further parcels. These so-called "free 
splitsw were done for the purpose of accommodating defendants' housing development. 
38. By creating more than four free splits, defendants violated Kootenai County 
Subdivision Ordinance No. 306. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 74. Testimony of Scott Rasor. 
39. Defendants subsequent attempts to develop these parcels were in violation 
of Kootenai County Subdivision Ordinance No. 306. Testimony of Scott Rasor. 
40. Defendants thereafter attempted to widen and increase the burden on 
plaintiffs' driveway for an illegal purpose, i.e. for an illegal subdivision. 
41. The driveway on Plaintiffs' property and easement width do not meet the 
minimum requirements under Kootenai County Ordinance No. 248 for access to 
defendants' planned housing development. 
42. The driveway and easement width and grade do not meet minimum 
requirements of the Kootenai County Fire District for access to a residence on 
defendants' property. 
43. The driveway and easement do not meet Kootenai County specifications for 
1 
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access to a residence on defendants' property. 
44. On or about January 3,2002, defendants, without authority or proper 
permits, commenced excavation work on plaintiffs' real property in an attempt to widen 
plaintiffs' driveway and lower its grade for access to defendants' housing development. 
In doing so, defendants excavated portions of plaintiffs' real property, dumped dirt and 
gravel on plaintiffs' real property, damaged plaintiffs' fence, gate, lock, tree and other 
parts of plaintiffs' property. 
45. On or about January 3, 2002, a Kootenai County Building Inspector caught 
defendants engaged in the unlawful excavation and immediately entered a Stop Work 
Order, identified in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 74. Said Stop Work Order provided in part that 
defendants violated the following: "Kootenai County Ordinance 22 1 (A) Section 330 1, 
Chapter 33, Excavations & Fill. County Ordinance 283 Site Disturbance." (See Exh. 
74). 
46. Prior to defendants' attempts to widen and reduce the grade of plaintiffs' 
driveway, defendants were on notice that plaintiffs had had a similar dispute with the 
Peplinskis. Mr. Mortensen testified he knew of the lawsuit between Peplinskis and 
Akers. William Reynolds also testified he told Mr. Mortensen Reynolds felt Mortensens 
could not develop this road before they began developing it, because his understanding 
from his fiend William Millsaps was it was an agricultural easement. Defendants were 
further on notice that plaintiffs had revoked defendants' permission to drive on 
plaintiffs' approach and on plaintiffs' driveway west of Government Lot 2. Plaintiffs had 
further urged defendants not to excavate, alter or otherwise disturb plaintiffs' real 
property - 
47. Defendants intentionally ignored plaintiffs' requests and disregarded their 
concerns. Defendants willfully trespassed on plaintiffs' property and willfully altered 
and damaged plaintiffs' property. While willfully trespassing on plaintiffs' real property, 
defendant Mortensen further damaged plaktiffs' pickup, fence, &b&r andhther 
ProPertY 
48. Defendants intentionally misrepresented to their agents, employees, the 
County Building Inspector, the Kootenai County Sheriff and the public that defendants 
had a legal right to engage in the activities.on plaintiffs' property described above, when 
defendants knew their legal rights were at best questionable and undetermined. 
Defendants could have come to no other conclusion than that they had no express 
easement past the western boundary of Government Lot 2, i d  that the best they could 
hope for is to convince a court that they had a claim of implied easement, prescriptive 
easement or easement by necessity. The problem with that is, at the time he purchased C ' -! .' , ;
from Peplinskis (or at least by the time defendants committed their acts that led to the 
present lawsuit), Mr. Mortensen knew there were some claims made against Peplinskis 
by the Akers and that Peplinskis dismissed that lawsuit without Peplinski gaining any 
legal rights, Mr. Mortensen knew he paid a reduced price due to the lack of access, and 
Mr. Mortensen was convinced he had access via a back road to his property. Thus, 
there is serious doubt that defendants in good faith believed they had access to their 
land over plaintiffs land. 
Plaintiffs argue that defendants attempted to use a letter drafted in 1994 by 
Attorney Michael J. Newell as binding legal authority for defendants to excavate on 
plaintiffs' real property (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 172)) but  there was no proof of that claim 
offered at trial. That letter had no legal effect on plaintiffs' real property and did not give 
defendants any legal rights. The reason defendants had knowledge that they had no 
right to excavate on plaintiffs' real property is manifold. First, there is nothing in the 
deed from W.L. Millsaps to Bakers, which gives Millsaps and their successors 
(defendants) a right to excavate or widen the easement over Bakers and their 
successors' (plaintiffs') land. Second, the easement only goes over the land owned by 
Bakers and their successors' (plaintiffs) l&d contained in ~ove&m:nt lot.2: In other 
words, defendants do not have the right to even travel over, let alone excavate or widen, 
and portion of plaintiffs' land not contained in Government lot 2. That is, defendants 
knew they had no right to travel over, let alone excavate the land owned by plaintiffs to 
the west of Government lot 2. Third, as mentioned above, at the time he purchased 
from Peplinskis (or soon thereaher), Mr. Mortensen knew there were some claims made 
against Peplinskis by the Akers and that Peplinskis dismissed their lawsuit without 
gaining any legal rights, Mr. Mortensen knew he paid a reduced price due to the lack of 
access, and Mr. Mortensen was convinced he had access via a back road to his 
49. Kootenai County Building Department cited defendants a second time for 
dumping fill dirt and excavating on Plaintiffs' property in May 2002 in violation of the 
Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance. 
50. Defendant Mortensen has violated the Subdivision Ordinance on prior 
occasions and has thereby harmed innocent purchasers of property. (See testimony of 
Scott Rasor) . 
5 1. Defendants willfully disregarded the subdivision ordinance and Kootenai 
County building ordinances in their efforts to illegally widen and otherwise alter the 
driveway on plaintiffs' property. 
52. After commencement of plaintiffs' lawsuit on January 10, 2002, and after 
having been served with plaintiffs' Complaint, defendants willfully continued to engage 
in the above-described activities on plaintiffs' property. 
53. Defendants' development of plaintiffs' driveway included attempts to widen 
plaintiffs' driveway into a 60-feet road and reduce its grade. 
54. Defendants' development of plaintiffs' approach included attempts to widen 
the approach without obtaining an approach permit from the Post Falls Highway 
District as required by law. 
55. Defendants have damaged plaintiffs' approach, driveway, real property and 
gate with heavy equipment and other vehicles. 
56. Plaintiffs have exclusively maintained the approach and driveway since they 
. originally purchased the property in 1980. ' 
57. Prior to their attempted development of the driveway, defendants engaged in 
no maintenance or repair of the easement. 
58. Defendants have diverted water onto plaintiffs' property that has further 
damaged the driveway and plaintiffs' real property. 
59. Defendants' planned development of the easement into a road would create 
an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs' property. 
60. Defendants have unreasonably interfered with plaintiffs' use of their 
approach and driveway. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the following: 
IL 
P 
1. Defendants have an express easement over Plaintiffs' property on Government 
Lot 2 only along the southern border of Government Lot 2. The width of said easement 
is limited to the traveled portion of the driveway, 12.2 feet in width, except for the 
eastern section north of the Reynolds's parking area. At that location, Defendants have 
an easement over the remaining six (6) feet in width of the original right of way from the 
Reynolds's parking area north six (6) feet. 
2. Said easement is bounded by the border of Government Lot 2 to the west and 
the Reynolds' driveway to the east. This easement is for "ingress and egress to the 
adjoining property." There are at least two problems from the defendants' standpoint as 
. C 
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to each end (west and east) of this express easement. 
First, the easement terminates at  the west boundary of Government Lot 2, and 
the only land directly west of that, is more of plaintiffs land. Thus, since the plaintiffs 
own the land directly west of Government Lot 2, the written easement of record 
. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3, 175, Defendants' Exhibit D3), provides access only to plaintiffs' 
land. As mentioned supra in 7 20 of the Findings of Fact, the land that was meant to 
be accessed by the express easement given by W.L. Millsaps, is now owned by 
plaintiffs. At the present time, defendants' express easement goes to no land owned by 
defendants, it terminates on land owned by the plaintiffs. 
Second, as to the curved portion of plaintiffs' driveway that connects this written 
recorded easement along the southern boundary of plaintiifs land in Government Lct 2, 
the curved portion is still within Government Lot 2, however, the curved portion was 
clearly not in existence back in 1966, and thus is not included in the language of the 
deed (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3, 175, Defendants' Exhibit D3) which reads "as the same now 
exists." Thus, at most, defendants have an easement over the portion of that triangular 
land, as it existed back in 1966, which is essentially William Reynolds' driveway, then 
turns left at a 90 degree angle to meet up  with the recorded easement along the 
southern boundary of plaintiffs land in Government Lot 2. Testimony of William 
Reynolds. 
3. The written easement of record (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3, 175, Defendants' Exhibit 
D3) is by its own language limited to how the right-of-way existed in 1966 due to the 
language "as the same now exists." Said easement is a not a field easement for 
farming/logging purposes only, as argued by plaintiffs. 
4. Mr. Mortensen testified he never asked Akers for permission to use any part 
of the road since he purchased in 1994, that he never tried to hide his travel from 
plaintiffs, although the frequency of his travel was rare. Dennis Akers testified he gave 
permission to Peplinskis and defendants to'use the east curved icceks to kmshp b o p  
Road, and the portion of his property west of the western boundary of Government Lot 
2. This Court finds Dennis Akers testimony on that issue more credible. Permission to 
use is supported inferentially by the fact that Peplinskis settled the lawsuit they 
brought against Akers without obtaining any clear legal right to access their land. This 
Court also finds credible the testimony of Dennis Akers that Mr. Mortensen left a card 
in Akerses' door wanting Akers to call, that Mortensen was going to buy the land from 
Peplinskis the next day, that Akers then gave Mortensen permission, and all proceeded 
well until defendants comparatively recently began altering the roadway. The Court 
finds that account more credible than Mr. Mortensen's testimony on direct in 
defendants' case in chief that a couple of months after he purchased from Peplinskis, 
Mr. Mortensen spoke with Dennis Akers about a truck blocking the driveway, 
whereupon Mr. Mortensen infonned Akers that he was the new owner, and Akers 
allegedly said "no way you're the new owner because Peplinskis are in the middle of a 
lawsuit." This Court is persuaded by Dennis Akers testimony on rebuttal, that his 
deposition was taken on March 6, 1995 because that lawsuit brought by the Peplinskis 
against Akers had not yet resolved, that this was after Mortensens had purchased, and 
in that deposition Dennis Akers testified that he told the new purchaser the location of 
the easement. Plaintiffs have met their burden of proof (Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 
675, 946 P.2d 975 (1997) regarding pennission to use the curved portion to the east, 
and the portion to the west of the western boundary of Government Lot 2. 
Defendants had a license over plaintiffs' curved approach and that portion of 
plaintiffs' driveway lying west of Government Lot 2, which has been revoked. Plaintiffs' 
revoked this license in January 2002, and defendants thus, have had no further legal 
right to travel over said areas. 
Any claim of easement by prescription is defeated by this pennission. 25 Am Ju r  
' C 
2d 1 60. Even if the permission were not granted, defendants have not met -d the 
requirements of a prescriptive easement. The Court finds Dennis Akers' testimony 
credible, that he and Floyd Peplinski were friends. The Court finds Dennis Akers' 
testimony credible that any problems with Peplinskis were settled with that lawsuit, and 
that there were no problems with defendafits until they began altering the road surface 
comparatively recently. Thus, even if no permission was articulated by Akers to 
Peplinski or to defendants, there was no hostile or adverse use, nor any claim of right, 
until defendants began digging on or otherwise altering pl&tiffs land, beyond mere 
maintenance. 
5. Defendants do not have a prescriptive easement over any portion of Plaintiffs' 
property. 
6. The 20'by 50' easement created in 1945 (Instrument No. 172592, Defendants 
Exhibit D 16, described supra in 16 of the Findings of Fact), ceased to exist in 1948 by 
virtue of the doctrine of merger, when Defendants' predecessors-in-interest became 
owners of both the dominant and s e ~ e n t  estates of that easement. 
7. Defendants do not have an implied easement or an easement by necessity 
over any part of Plaintiffs' property. It is defendants who have the burden of proving 
easement by necessity, and that must be by clear and convincing proof. B. J. 
Development, Inc. v. Parsons, 126 Idaho 504, 887 P.2d 49 (Ct.App. 1994) (Key Cite No. 2, 
Headnote No. 2); Abbo# v. Herring, 62 N.Y.S.2d 1028, 468 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1984). The 
testimony of Mr. Mortensen himself, that he felt he had access through this back way 
causes defendants to fail in that burden of proof. 
Mortensen h e w  he had access problems when he purchased this land from 
Peplinskis. This Court finds credible William Reynolds' testimony that Mr. Mortensen 
approached him to sell an easement or trade some ground so Mr. Mortensen could get 
into his land through the easement over the south part of plaintiffs' land in Government 
Lot 2, but Reynolds refused. On re-cross ekamination of Mr. ~ o k e n k e n  by his own 
attorney, Mr. Mortensen frst  denied asking Reynolds if he could buy some of his 
property, but then sort of admitted William Reynolds could be telling the truth about 
that conversation. 
Reynolds testified it is about 100 feet from Mortensens 100 acres across state 
land to the county road. Mr. Mortensen testified the he owned a large tract 'that pretty 
much came out to the county road, but that he doesn't own it now. Deposition of 
Vernon J. Mortensen (taken June 26,2002), p. 47, Ll. 10-16. Mr. Mortensen testified 
he had a prescriptive easement over the Forest Service property. Mortensen deposition, 
p. 109, L. 14 - p. 110, L. 10. Mortensen testSed that he sold some of this land closer to 
the county road. An owner of property, however, cannot create the necessity by his or 
her own actions. B. J. Development, Inc. v. Parsons, 126 Idaho 504, 508, 887 P.2d 49, 
53 (Ct.App. 1994). A remote grantee cannot create the necessity upon which he relies. 
Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 7 1,80,  665 P.2d 1081, 1090 (Ct.App. 1983). 
As to the issue of an implied easement by apparent continuous use, there must 
be an "'apparent continuous use' by the common owner before the severance." Cordwell 
v. Smith, 105 Idaho 7 1,77,665 P.2d 108 1, 1087 (Ct.App. 1983). There is no evidence of 
such by defendants' in the present case. The most evidence presented on this issue 
was by defendants witness, Bill MiLlsaps, son of W.L. Mdlasps. He testified that in 
1966, back at the time of severance, the location of the roadway was similar to the 
photograph shown in Defendants' Exhibit D44. However, there was little testimony of 
what use was made of that road to the west of the western boundary of Government Lot 
2 back in 1996 and before. Bill Millsaps testified about the old "Sullivan Place", and he 
thought his father purchased from Sullivans but didn't know if Reynolds lived in the old 
"Sullivan Place." His testimony was unclear at best. Because implied easements are in 
derogation of the rule that written instruments speak for themselves, they are not 
favored by the courts. Cordwell v. Smith, i05 Idaho 7 1, 77, 665 p.24 108 i ,-lo87 
(Ct-App. 1983). Those who assert the existence of an implied easement have the burden 
of proving facts which establish it. Id. Defendants have failed to do so. 
8. The eastern border of Plaintiffs' property runs from the centerline of Millsap 
Loop Road, then southerly 244.46 feet along the said centerline where it leaves the 
centerline south 44.85 feet to the south line of Government Lot 2, more particularly 
described in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 7 (Boundw & Topographic Survey .of Scott Rasor dated 
9/5/02). As noted supra in Finding of Fact 7 11, as to the east boundary of plaintiffs 
land as shown in the deed (Plaintiffs' Exhibit I), there is a discrepancy between the 
bearing and distance and the monument, Mdlsap Loop Road. Professional Land 
Surveyor Scott Rasor testified that the call for a monument in a deed takes priority and 
controls over bearing and distance. That was not impeached by defendants' expert 
David Enghsh. In construing a deed, physical features existing upon the ground and 
referred to in the description must be considered. Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82, 
245 P.2d 1052 (1952). The following quote fiom DD & L Inc. v. Burgess, 753 P.2d 56 1, 
564 (Wash.App. 1981) is on point and instructive on this issue as applied to the facts in 
the present case: 
" w h a t  are the boundaries is a question of law, and where the boundaries are is 
a question of fact." Rusk v. Little, 309 A.2d 867, 869 (Me. 1973); Texas Co. v. 
Andrade, 52 S.W.2d 1063 (Tex.Civ.App. 1932). 
[T]o interpret the words, "from the center line of the . . . Railroad," as referring to 
the center of the track, is to strengthen the descriptive part of the deed by fixing 
an easily recognized monument .... The words "center line of the railroad" refer to 
the center of the track, and indicate the track as a monument which aids in 
determining a certain boundary. 
Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co. v. Tamplin, 156 Ill. 285,40 N.E. 960, 962 (1895). Though 
the monument referred to in a deed does not actually exist a t  the time the deed 
was drafted, but is afterwards erected by the parties with the intention that it 
shall confonn t o  the deed, it will control. 6 G. Thompson, Real Property 5 3044 
(1962 repl.). See also Makepeace v. Bancroft, 12 Mass. 469 (18 15); cf. W. 
Robillard & L. Bouman, A Treatise on the Law of Surveying and Boundaries 5 
26.1 1 (5th ed. 1987) (a road as constructed becomes the monument and 
controls). 
The east boundary of plaintiffs' land is the boundary of the right of way for Miltsap Loop 
e . - 
Road, as it exists today, which is in the same location as it existed in 1966. Thus, 
defendants do not need the deed £rom Kelsch, but even if they did, they have that deed. 
Defendants simply do not own any area to the east of Millsap Loop Road. The deed 
from Baker to Mortensens (Defendants Exhibit D23) is of no sigruficance for the same 
reason the deed from Kelsch to plaintiffs is of no significance. Plaintiffs own to the right 
of way of Millsap Loop Road. 
9. Even if Plaintiffs' eastern border did not incorporate the disputed triangular 
area, Plaintiffs are currently the legal owners of the disputed triangular area pursuant 
to the Kelch-Akers' conveyance, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6, as more particularly described in 
the legal description therein. . c '  54 
10. Defendants impermissibly attempted to increase the burden on the servient 
estate (Plaintiffs' property) by lengthening, widening and excavating the PlainWs 
driveway and easement area and subjecting the same to increased traffic volumes. 
11. Defendants have a duty to maintain the easement, but do not have a right to 
develop the easement beyond the parameters as defined in the deed reserving the 
easement. Defendants specifically do not have the right to widen the driveway surface 
on plaintiffs' property, to reduce the grade of plaintiffs' driveway or to lengthen plaintiffs' 
driveway. 
12. Defendants are developing the easement increasing the burden on the 
servient estate for an illegal purpose. This is supported by the conversations Scott 
Rasor had with Mr. Mortensen at the time Rasor worked for Empire Surveying, that 
Mortensen was attempting to make splits that did not conform to the county ordinance. 
13. Defendants' willfully trespassed on plaintiffs' property. The land was posted 
"no trespassing" (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 52, 2 1)' and defendants still trespassed. 
14. Defendants are liable to plaintiffs' for damages under common law and 
statutory trespass. 
15. Defendants have unreasonably hterfered with plaintih b e  of their 
16. Defendants' willful trespass on plaintiffs' property and willful interference 
with plaintiffs' property has resulted in damages to plaintiffs to be determined in the 
second portion of this bifurcated trial. 
17. Defendants engaged in malicious, oppressive, wanton conduct. 
18. Defendants were grossly negligent. 
19. Plaintiffs and defendants moved to amend the complaint and counterclaim 
respectively to add claims of punitive damages pursuant to I.C. 6- 1604 prior to the 
commencement of trial. Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the Court reserved 
I ruling until hearing evidence at trial. 
20. Defendants' Motion to Amend to allow punitive damages is DENIED. 
2 1. Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend to add a claim for punitive damages under 56- 
1604 is GRANTED. 
22. Defendants'willful trespass supports an award of treble damages pursuant 
to I.C. 86-202. 
23. Trial was bifurcated pursuant to a stipulation of the parties and order of this 
Court between the easement issues and damages. Plaintiffs' damages shall be 
determined at the second phase of trial on damages. 
25. Defendants' Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence 
made at the end of their case in chief was granted, allowing a defense or claim by 
defendants that the reformation should be allowed, based on David Enghsh's testimony 
that there was a scriveners error. The Court commented at the time that the evidence 
of the grantor's intent was thin to non-existent. Defendants filed their Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim to Amended Complaint on November 1,2002. The Court has 
reviewed that pleading and remains not persuaded by David English's testimony. The 
deed clearly limits the easement to Govemrhent Lot 2. The deed language is  not 
ambiguous. Reformation is not allowed. 
26. On November 5, 2002, plaintiffs moved to strike Defendants' Trial Brief and 
Closing Argument Filed November 4, 2002. That motion is DENIED. On November 6, 
2002, defendants filed a Motion for Extension of Time for Filing Brief, and even though 
this motion requested allowance for the filing of a brief already filed on November 4, 
2002, that motion is GRANTED. 
27. Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree quieting title as fo the east boundary of 
their land, to the right of way of Millsap Loop Road as it exists today. Plaintiffs are 
entitled to a decree quieting title as to the portion of their land west of the western 
boundary of Government Lot 2. Plaintiffs are returned to the sole and exclusive 
possession of r ed  property to the west of the western boundary of Government 
I Lot 2, and as to the eastern portion of plaintiffs land, defendants have an easement over 
plaintiffs' land as described supra in Conclusion of Law f l  1. Defendants and 
defendandproperty are subject to ejectement from plaintiffs' real property located west 
of the western boundary of Government Lot 2, by the Sherriff by issuance of Writs of 
Assistance, Possession, and Eviction, if needed. A permanent injunction restraining the 
defendants from further trespass upon, and interference with, the plaintiffs' quiet 
enjoyment of plaintiffs' real property is GRANTED. 
28. Plaintiffs are the prevailing party. While an express easement exists in favor 
of defendants, the existence of that easement was not in dispute by plainti&. The 
location of that easement was in dispute, and plaintiffs prevailed as to the issue of 
location of the easement. Plaintiffs prevailed on defendants claims of implied easement, 
easement by implication (continuous use prior to severance), and easement by 
prescription. Plaintiffs have obtained the relief sought, defendants have not. 
ENTERED this2bA day of January, 2003. 
John T. Mitchell, District Judge u 
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AKERS v. WHITE. FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER 
EXHIBIT 4 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
County of KOOTENAI )U 
FILED '%/-@/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
Plaintiffs, 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRlE L. 
AKERS, husband and wife, 
vs. 
Case No. CV-02-222 
D. L. WHLTE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID 
L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHlTE, husband 
and wife; and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and 
MARTI E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION, ON 
NEW TRIAL ISSUES, AND ADDR7ONL 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW REGARDING DAMAGES and 
ORDER 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 
. - 
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Court trial in this matter began on September 9,2002. The parties told the Court at the 
June, 28,2002 this would be a three day court trial. After three days of trial, ending on 
September 11,2002, the matter was continued to October 15,2002. After the first few days of 
trial, and upon the suggestion of the Court, this matter was bifurcated by stipulation of the 
parties. The existence or non-existence of various easements was tried first, the issue of , 
damages left to a later point in time. Three more days of trial occurred between October 15-17, 
2002, and an additional day on October 2 1,2002. Briefing and proposed findings were 
submitted by all parties. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER, AND ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ! -, 
- I 
r-* 
The Court issued its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order" on January 3, 
2003. Essentially, the Court ruled defendants have an express easement over plaintiffs Akers' 
property along the southern border of ~ovemment Lot 2, but that the easement ends on the 
western boundary of Government Lot 2, thus, the easement does not run all the way to 
defendants' land. Conclusion of Law 77 1-2,6. The Court ruled defendants did not have a 
prescriptive easement across any other portion of Akers' property (Conclusion of Law 3-5) 
and the defendants did not have an implied easement by necessity across any other portion of 
Akers' land. Conclusion of Law a 7. The Court also ruled that the Akers owned to the 
centerline of Millsap Loop Road (Conclusion of Law fl7,8), and that Akers are the owners of 
the disputed triangular area to the east of their property, either by direct deed (Id.) or by the 
Kelsch-Akers deed. Conclusion of Law 7 9. The Court ruled defendants conduct resulted in 
damages to be later determined (Conclusion of Law 7 14,23) , -that defendants engaged in 
malicious, oppressive, wanton and grossly negligent conduct (Conclusion of Law 77 1 5- 181, and 
that they willfully trespassed on Akers' land. Conclusion of Law fi 13. 
In the Court's March 26,2003 Order, Costs to Akers were allowed in the amount of 
.. . L--- 
.. * .-. .'i ... 
$5,793.01, the issue of attorney fees was left to be heard after the completion of the trial on 
damages. 
Defendants filed a "Motion for a New Trial" under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(4) on August 21,2003. 
Defendants moved for a New Trial and for a continuation of the trial on damages due to "newly 
discovered evidence". At the September 2,2003 hearing, it became apparent that defense 
counsel had this ''newly discovered evidence" since at least the spring of 2003 (in fact, Alan 
Kiebert testified he had given Mortenm this new information in January 2003), so this material 
was hardly "newly discovered" evidence. The motion to vacate and continue the trial was 
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denied, but the motion for new trial was granted. The Motion for New Trial was characterized 
by the Court as a motion to "re-open" the previous trial, based on this "new" evidence. The 
Court has discretion to reopen a c&e prior to final judgment, to allow the presentation of 
additional evidence and testimony. Davison 's Air Service, Inc., 119 Idaho 967, 812 P.2d 274 
(1991). The trial on Akers' damages and the defendants' 'Wew Trial" (re-opened trial) began 
December 16,2003, carried over to December 17,2003 and concluded December 22,2003. 
Again, all parties submitted proposed findings and briefing. 
On September 3,2003, Akers filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's granting 
of defendants' Motion for a New Trial, and on November 11,2003 the Court denied Akers' 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
On October 3,2003, Akers moved for leave to file a second amended complaint, to allow 
a claim for punitive damages by Sherrie Akers, and on November 17,2003 and Order was filed 
granting such pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(b). 
Finally, on November 5,2003, defendants Mortensens filed a 'Motion for 
Reconsideration of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Filed January 2,. 2003, or 
. - . .I--. 
. ' @  - . L -. 
Alternatively Motion to Certify Order Pursuant to 1.RC.P. 54(B)." Defendants Mortensens 
claimed that 'hew facts exist that would effect the original decision of this Court, the substantive 
law on easements was not fully explored by counsel and presented to this court, and for other 
grounds and reasons that will be further explored in the Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, which will be forthcoming." Id., p. 2. On November 21,2003 a brief in 
support was filed by defendants Mortensens, and Mortensens noticed up their motions for the 
morning of trial on December 16,2003. The Mortensens in that brief ask the Court to reconsider 
its finding number seven that the easement was approximately 12.2 feet in width (Memorandum 
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in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 2-3), its finding number eleven that Jim Meckel 
did not visit the area when he laid out the subdivision map (Id., pp. 3-4), and its findings number 
eighteen, twenty, twenty-six, twen~-eight, twenty-nine, thirty, thirty-five and thrity-six (Id. pp. 
4-9), though later they more candidly state they want the "entire Findings of Fact" reconsidered. 
Id. p. 9. Mortensens also wanted the Court's conclusions of law as to express easement (Id., pp. 
10-1 6), and easement by implication (Id., pp. 16-22) reconsidered. Akers responded with a brief 
on December 8,2003. Oral argument was held on December 16,2003. The Court advised 
counsel for defendants Mortensons, that the LR.C.P. 5401) issue had previously been raised by 
prior counsel for Mortensens, and was denied by the Court on March 26,2003. The motion to 
reconsider was taken under advisement, the parties were told the Court would issue its decision 
on these motions along with its additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
11. COURT'S RULING ON MORTENSENS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
As shown immediately above, defendants Mortensens in essence disagreed with the 
entirety of this Court's January 2,2003 Order. 
-A' 
' 4 .* ..- -. 
First, the ~ckensens  ask the Court to reconsider its hding number seven that the 
easement was approximately 12.2 feet in width. Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, pp. 2-3. That finding is consistent with the testimony of Scott Rasor, with Scott 
Rasor's survey. Since the January 2,2003 Order, the Court has personally waked the entire 
length of that easement along with counsel for all parties. The qew of the premises solidifies the 
Court's finding. That finding is consistent with the requisite law that "A grant indefinite as to 
width and location must impose no greater burden than is necessary. Coulsen v. Aberdeen- 
Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 6 19,628,277 P. 542,545 (1929). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER, AND ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER Page 4 
f ? '  ' "  
Second, Mortensens ask the Court to reconsider its finding number eleven that Jim 
Meckel did not visit the area when he laid out the subdivision map. Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 3-4. This Court's Finding of Fact 7 11 reads in part: 
This Court finds Millsap Loop Road has never t raverd the path depicted on the 1980 
Meckel Record of Survey (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 15 and 6)' and that the surveyor who 
prepared such documents could not have visited the site to verify the actual location of 
Millsap Loop Road. Scott Rasor testified that apparently Jim Meckel did not survey at 
the time he laid out the subdivision map, and this Court finds that opinion to be fully 
supported by the evidence. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 1 1. Since those findings were made, Jim 
Meckel testified. In his testimony, Meckel testified he recalled being present at the time the 
record of survey was made, that he had a clear recollection of locating the wells, but everything 
else was not clear some twenty-five years later. What was clear was that he was wrong on 
Exhibit BB and Z in the way he depicted Millsap Loop Road. The only correction made to the 
above finding, then, is that Jim Meckel was present when he prepared that survey. The corrected 
Finding of Fact 7 1 1 reads: 
This Court finds ~ i l l s a ~  Loop Road h& never traversed the pith thepicteid bii the 1980 
Meckel Record of Survey. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 15 and Defendants' Exhibit Z. Millsap 
Loop Road actually traversed the path shown on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 179. 
Jim Meckel, the surveyor who prepared Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 and Defendants' Exhibit Z 
made a mistake and did not accurately depict and did not verify the actual location of 
Millsap Loop Road. Early in the trial Scott Rasor testified that apparently Jim Meckel 
did not survey at the time he laid out the subdivision map, and this Court found that 
opinion to be fully supported by the evidence. However, later in the trial, Jim Meckel 
testified that he was present, but he achowledged that he did make a mistake on the 
location of the Millsap Loop Road. Jim Meckel's presence at the time of the survey is 
really immaterial. What is material, is the location of Millsap Loop Road, and Jim 
- Meckel confirmed that it was located as shown on Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 179 and not as 
shown on Exhibit 15 and Exhibit Z. . 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER, AND ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER Page 5 
Third, defendants correctly note that finding number nineteen [defendants errantly called 
out finding number eighteen, Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration, p. 41 incorrectly 
stated that ". . .contained in plaintiffs Exhibit 3, 175, Warranty Deed W.L. Millsaps and 
Akers.. .", that the deed is between Millsaps and Baker. Accordingly, finding number eighteen 
is corrected to read in pertinent part ". . .contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3, 175, Warranty Deed 
W.L. Millsaps and Baker had the following charachteristics.. .". 
Fourth, defendants correctly note that Defendants' Exhbit D5 was not admitted at trial. 
Finding of Fact 720 reads in part: 
On April 13, 1984, in an affidavit admitted into evidence, W.L. Millsaps explained that in 1966 
when they sold to Bakers, his intent was to reserve an access easement over the roadway right of 
way as the same then existed for ingress and egress for "farming equipment" which consisted of 
L ~ c k s " ,  and 'tarious types of field equipment such as combines". Defendants' Exhibit D5. 
This affidavit only speaks to the written easement across the southern portion of Government Lot 
2. In the affidavit, W.L. Millsaps does not claim to have ever given any sort of easement to the 
west of the western boundary of Government Lot 2. According to that Affidavit, the land to the 
west of the western boundary of Government Lot 2 {the land in section 24) was sold to the 
Peplinskis. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, pp. 6-7. However, Peplinski, Millsap and 
Reynolds all testified that that easement was used for farm equipment. All other portions of 
.. - 
-r: . ' - . *  4 ... "i -. Finding of Fact 7 20 remain. 
Fifth, as pertains to finding number 26,28,29,30,25 and 36, the Court has reviewed 
defendants objections set forth in Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, pp. 5-7. The Court stands by its original findings and is not persuaded by 
defendants' arguments. 
Regarding the Court's prior Conclusions of Law, the defendants h t  argue that they have 
an express easement which ". . .spans from the approach fiom Millsap Loop Road, a l l  the way 
through Government Lot 2, ahd crossing over the Section h e ,  and then turning onto Defendants' 
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Property." Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 10. Defendants conclude 
their lengthy argument with the equally unsupported claim: 'Tollowing the well-established 
principles of law, Defendants have &I express easement over and across the entire access road as 
it traverses to their 160 acres." Id. p. 16. The fatal flaw to this argument is there is no express 
easement beyond the boundary of Government Lot 2 on the west. Defendants' easement dead 
ends at that boundary. Any easement beyond that vanished under the doctrine of merger, as 
previously addressed by the Court in Findings of Fact 15-17, Conclusion of Law 7 1. 
Defendants arguments regarding Seacornbe v. Weeks, 11 5 Idaho 433,767 P.2d 276 (1 989) are 
misplaced. 
Next, regarding the Court's prior Conclusions of Law, defendants argue: 'In addition to 
the express easement through Plaintiffs' property, Defendants have an implied easement by prior 
use for the very small portion of the access road that traverses over Government Lot 2 into 
Section 24." Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 16. Defendants 
correctly note the elements of an easement by implication from prior use (Id..), but incorrectly 
apply the facts of this case to those elements. The easement by implication theory advanced by 
- 
.C ' 
- .  * 8 .- - - 
defendants, applies only to that tiny section of land which Akers own lying west of Government 
Lot 2. This Court previously found that in 1948, W.L. Millasps purchased the servient estate of 
the aforementioned 20' by 50' easement, creating unity of title between the dominant and 
servient estates of said easement. Finding of Fact, 7 17. This Court also previously noted that 
"Bill Millsaps was also unclear as to whether the access road went on to Reynolds' property or 
whether it went on that portion of plaintiffs land west of the western boundary of Government 
Lot 2." Findings of Fact, 1 21, pp. 7-8. ~he'pertinent ime period is 1948. Defendants have not 
met their burden of proving that this roadway in 1948 actually continued on beyond the west 
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boundary of Government Lot 2, or whether it dipped down onto Reynolds' land before reaching 
the western boundary of Government Lot 2. Thus, the element of "continuous use" was not met 
by defendants, indeed, poof of "ani use" was not met by defendants. Moving to times more 
recent than 1948, Akers testified that at the time he purchased the property in 1980, the road at 
the top of the hill did not exist and that it has been developed with his permission since he 
purchased the property. There is another element lacking in defendants' easement by implication 
fiom prior use theory. The element of "reasonable necessity" is lacking. The Court has already 
discussed the fact that: "The testimony of Mr. Mortensen himself, that he felt he had access 
through this back way causes defendants to fail in that burden of proof." Findings of Fact, 
Conclusion of Law and Order, Conclusion of Law 7 7, p. 22. This Court now makes clear that 
such finding, based on Mr. Mortensen's own testimony, applies to both the element of necessity 
for the theory of easement by necessity, and the element of "reasonable necessity" for the theory 
of implied easement by prior use. There is a distinction, as noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637,642,99 1 P.2d 362,367 (1 999). This Court specifically finds 
defendants have not met their burden of proving reasonable necessity, due to the testimony of 
, -b-. -' * 4 .- '6 -. 
Mr. Mortensen. Finally, defendants urge the Memorandum Decision issued by First District 
Judge Charles Hosack in Thomas L. Jaeger, et al. v. Lowell K Nickem) et al., Case No. CV-99 
5213 is instructive. The Court has reviewed such decision, and it is not factually on point. In 
Jaeger, the Court was not presented with a failure of the defendants to prove where this road 
actually went. As discussed above, defendants have failed to prove that back in 1948, when 
merger occurred, that this road traveled west beyond the western boundary of Government Lot 2 
before bending south, or whether it bent south onto Reynolds' latld before it even reached 
Government Lot 2. 
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11. COURT'S RULING ON "NEW TRIAL'' ISSUES. 
Defendants' August 2 1,2003 "Motion for New Trial and Motion to Vacate Trial Setting 
on Damages" was based upon an &davit of Micheal E. Reagan and an Affidavit of Alan V. 
Kiebert dated and filed the same date, and another Affidavit of Alan V. Kiebert filed August 25, 
2003. The essence of those affidavits is that the Post Falls Highway District records showed a 
"Millsap Road No. 229", and that this roadway was additional to and different &om Millsap 
Loop Road, previously known as Plonske Road or No. 98. The argument was that this Millsap 
Road No, 229 right of way was in the area of the disputed triangular area on the east side of 
Akres' land, and that if this area was covered by a public right of way, defendants could not have 
trespassed upon the eastern portion of Akres' land. 
Alan Kiebert testified at length about the viewer's report for Millsap Road. Exhibit A. 
He testified about Millsap Road 229. He testified that in his opinion, Millsap Road 229 was a 
valid right of way even at the present time. Kiebert testified about the location of an old school' 
house, which is key to the location of that right of way, but that schoolhouse was located by 
Kiebert through comments made by Bill Reynolds who was not alive at the time the schoolhouse 
. :C-- - '  6 .-.--a- -. 
existed. Kiebert testified he could have used a different method (the schoolhouse that does not 
exist) as opposed to using the quarter comer, to determine the location of this Millsap Road 229. 
Bill Reynolds testified in rebuttal he had never spoken with Kiebert, he testified he has no 
personal knowledge of whether what is shown in Exhibit E was a schoolhouse, he has been told 
it was a schoolhouse but it has no foundation under it. Reynolds has also heard theremay have 
been two schoolhouses near there at the turn of the century. 
Mike Kaes is a professional land surveyor in Washington and Idaho, who works for 
Ruen-Yeager. He was hired by Post Falls Highway District to research this area. He was 
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familiar with Kiebert's analysis under Exhibit 33 1. Kaes did not agree with Kiebert's analysis, 
because "There was better evidence regarding the quarter comers" and "The school is not as 
good a monument as the quarter cdmm? Kaes testified that even though the quarter comer has 
been relocated, he does not believe it is inaccurate. Kaes testified that the surveying manual 
gives the appropriate procedures for relocating obliterated comers, and that Meckel's survey 
indicates he relocated the quarter corners. Kaes' bottom line was Kiebert was off at least 69 feet 
in locating Millsap Road 229. The Court specifically finds Kaes more credible than Kiebert. 
What is clear is that Millsap Road 229 was never built. Kiebert also testified that if 
there were evidence that Millsap Road 229 were abandoned by Post Falls Highway District, it 
would undermine his opinion. Darrell Lynn Humphries, board member and chairman of the 
board for the Post Falls Highway District for the last nine years, testified that Millsap Road 229 
was never built. Humphries testified that at their regular meeting the fist  Wednesday of 
December 2003, the board took action based on their review of the records, and a h e d  that 
Millsap Road 229 had been abandoned as of September 4,1948.. He explained that there were 
other roads that had been abandoned in the area, and that the words "closed" in Plaintiffs' 
. - + .  - 
: b ...-- -. 
Exhibit 332 means the same as "vacated" in today's terms, as the procedure back in 1948 was 
done by statute. He explained that if it ever was accepted into the highway district as an open 
road, there still could be a right of way, but that the highway district feels Millsap Road 229 was 
not ever a right of way. On cross examination, ~umph ie s  testified that although Exhibit 332 
. indicates this Court's finding that defendants had alternative access to their land was a reason for 
board's closing Millsap Road 229, Humphries feels that should be corrected because he didn't 
feel that this Court's decision was a factor h their decision to close Millsap Road 229. In any 
event, Post Falls Highway District's decision regarding Millsap Road 229 is compelling 
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evidence that if a right of way ever did exist, it is vacated or closed. This Court specifically h d s  
defense counsel's arguments in Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second 
Proposed Findings of Fact and ~onklusions of Law, p. 5, misleading, and not supported by 
Humphreys' testimony. 
Even if this Court were to believe that there exists a valid right of way via Millsap Road 
229, fiom the defendants' standpoint, all it would do is further eliminate the reasonable necessity 
element of implied easement or easement by necessity. 
James P. Meckel, a licensed surveyor since 1978, testified. Defendants' Exhibit Q is a 
record of survey bearing his signature back on December 7, 1978. It was recorded on December 
19, 1978. Jim Meckel vaguely recalled being on the property, and that he viewed some of the 
property and that he may have set some of the pins. He recalled being there to locatethe wells. 
He did not recall why the survey was done. He recalled that when the survey was done there was 
a county road in existence. He testified that as to Exhibit Z, another record of survey he made of 
this area on August 19, 1980, he was intending to show the east boundary of what is Akers' 
parcel, as Millsap Loop Road, the existing county road. He testified that the surveys-are 
.c- 
- 8 - ..- - 
inaccurate in that regard as shown on Exhibit BB and Z. Exhibit BB is yet another record of 
survey he prepared on October 25, 1979, which is where they first rnischaracterized it, and later 
repeated that mischaracterization on Exhibit Z. 
James Meckel also testified that he prepared Exhibit R, the deed that went to Akers. He 
testified that on a more probable than not basis, we intended to follow the centerline of the 
county road, and the only county road in existence then, as now, was Millsap Loop Road, and 
that Meckel Engineering mischaracterized the lower portion of that county road as it actually 
existed. Meckel testified that Exhibit 179 (the Scott Rasor survey done on September 5,2002 for 
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Meckel Engineering) accurately portrays the roads as they actually exist, especially the location 
and the relationship between Millsap Loop Road and the road along the south boundary of Akers 
parcel. Meckel testified that it was his intent to divide to the Akers and others to the west of 
Millsap Loop Road, the property to the west of the road, and to the Kesches the land to the east 
of Millsap Loop Road. He testified that if the error in Exhibit BB and Z were not corrected, 
there could be a "hiatus", a situation where due to a gap in the surveys, the land is simply left 
out, and no one owns it since it is unaccounted for. Jim Meckel was clear in his testimony about 
what should have happened, and that the Millsap Loop Road as shown in Exhibit Z and BB was 
a mistake, and it should have been as shown on Exhibit 179. As explained by Jim Meckel, who 
prepared the deed to Akers, the Akers own to the right of way of Millsap Loop Road. That is 
their eastern boundary. 
As a result of the "new trial" (re-opened trial), nothing has changed regarding the eastern 
boun- of Akers' land. This Court's prior finding of fact 1 12 and 7 13 remain the Court's 
finding of fact, and conclusion of law 7 8  remains the Court's conclusion of law on that issue. 
. -  
. . .r--' 
" . , .' b .^ .'i - 
The following findings of fact are supplemental to findings 1-60 made in this Court's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated- January 2,2003: 
1. Defendants' w i M  trespass encompassed Plaintiffs' permitted approach, the disputed 
triangular area, those portions of Government Lot 2 outside the scope of the express easement 
and Plaintiffs' real property west of Government Lot 2. The trespass consisted of multiple 
physical trespasses and trespass by water channeled onto Plaintiffs' property. 
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2. The evidence of the reasonable and necessary costs of repairs for the above damage 
caused by Defendants multiple willful trespasses is$17,002.85, calculated as follows: 
a. $2,210.00.  ater rid and labor costs to repair and restore the road surface to its 
original condition, including repairing water damage that caused grooving and rutting of the 
easement road. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 2, 7,287B (also identified as Exhibit 176), Testimony of 
Terry Mort. Terry Mort is found to be a credible witness, and he testified that the estimate was 
for $1,760, to which $528.50 had to be added for a total of $2,288.50, and then doubled since his 
bid only encompassed up to the driveway to the house, and the length of the traveled surface is 
about twice that length. However, on cross-examination he admitted his confusion, and stated 
$1,760.00 is the reasonable cost for repair to the damage. Mort testified the damage was due to 
the road being broken up due to the use of tracked equipment on the road. Dennis Akers testified 
he saw both defendants run their tracked equipment across his land tearing up the roadway. He 
testified he saw them unload the equipment off a trailer near Millsap Loop Road, then take that 
tracked equipment across his land. There was no reason defendants could not have taken the 
equipment across the road on trailers (ignoring for the moment the fact that their easement ends 
. -r-- . .. . 
.. . . - '  % - .--i - 
at the boundary of Government Lot 2 and Section 24), which would have alleviated such 
damage. The Court finds this to be unreasonable conduct on the part of both defendants. Dennis 
Akers also testified the triangular area needed about three more loads of crushed rock to deal 
with the '%boggy" area, at $150 per load, or $450.00 total. Defendants object that the $1,760.00 
was "merely a bid, and no work was ever performed on the road." Defendants' Reply to 
Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 7. 
Nothing in Idaho law says that damage arnohts must have been paid first by an injured party in 
order for them to be actionable damages. Nothing in Idaho law says a bid cannot suflice. The 
, . 
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measure of damages in property damage cases is "The reasonable cost of necessary repairs [not 
the cost of actual repairs made] to the damaged property, plus the difference between its fair 
market value before it was damaged and its fair market value after repairs." IDJI 2d 9.07. 
b. $1,640.00. Material costs to complete restoration of Akers' permitted approach 
lying outside the road easement area, including cost to remove material dumped a second time by 
Defendants. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 296,297 and 301, Testimony of Charles Anderson, Testimony 
of Dennis Akers. Defendants make the same objection that the costs were never actually 
incurred. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 7. The same ruling based on IDJI 2d 9.07 applies. 
c. $410.00. Reimbursement of cost to remove k t  load of dirt dumped by 
Defendants on Plaintiffs' approach area lying outside of the easement. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 302, 
Testimony of Bill Reynolds. Defendants make the same objection that the costs were never 
actually incurred. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 8. The same ruling based on IDJI 2d 9.07 applies. 
d. $6,000.00. Compensation to Plaintiff Dennis Akers for Mr. Akers's labor and use 
.. - 
.. -c- . " . . .  * . .i -.. 
of Mr. Akers's heavy equipment utilized for repairing damage to Plaintiffs' approach and 
restoration of the land outside the easement damaged as a result of Defendants' willful trespass. 
This award represents the fair market value of Mr. Akers's time as an experienced equipment 
operator and fair rental value based upon machine hours for his equipment and is itemized as 
follows: $2,800 for 70 hours which has an average fair market value of $40.00 per hour for Mr., 
Akerszs time spent prior to the liability phase of trial; $1,600 for 40 hours of Mr. Akers's time 
after the liability phase of trial; plus reimbufsement of $1,600 equipment costs based upon 40 
machine hours at $40 per hour. Defendants make the same objection that the costs were never 
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actually incurred. This Court hnds defendants arguments made at Defendants' Reply to 
Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 8- 
e. $1,036.00. This includes: repair cost reimbursement of $300 paid for damage 
caused by Defendants tearing out fence and gate posts, and $736 to repair fencing on Akers' real 
property outside the area of the easement, adjacent to Akers' driveway approach and west of 
Government lot 2 tom out by Defendants. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 181, 1 13,308 and 309. 
Defendants make the same objection that the costs were never actually incurred. Defendants' 
Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, p. 10. The same ruling based on IDJI 2d 9.07 applies. The defendants also argue that 
Dennis Akers does not intend to fix the fence. Defendants make the same objection that the costs 
were never actually incurred. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 10. Since Dennis Akers' answer cited by 
defendants was to a compound question, defendants' argument is at best, speculative. 
f. Akers claimed $750.00 for the cost of replacing a mature pine tree located outside 
. C.' 
' b ....*. 
the express easement area which was damaged by Defendants' backhoe activity. Plaintiffs 
proposed Finding 2.f. The court finds such tree damaged, but fairly insignificantly, so as not to 
justify the replacement cost argued by the Akers. 
g- $800.00. Akers' claimed $900.00 for lost wages arising as a consequence of 
Dennis Akers missing work while attempting to defend his real property fiom Defendants' 
willfill trespass. Plaintiffs' Proposed Finding 2.g. Dennis Akers testified he spent about 20 
hours defending his property. He testified he makes $30/hour excavating, and $50/hour doing 
body shop work. An average of $40/hour is appropriate. 
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h. $405.00. Cost of sod replacement for the triangular area outside of easement. 
Exhibit 114. Testimony of Sherrie Akers. Defendants make the same objection that the costs 
were never actually incurred. ~efeidants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, p. 11. The same ruling based on IDJI 2d 
9.07 applies. 
1. Akers argued for $175.00 for the cost of carpet cleaning necessitated fiom 
tracking of dirt into their residence fiom Defendants' unlawful activities on Akers' property, 
citing Plaintiffs' Exhs. 1 15, 180 and 18 1. Plaintiffs Proposed Second Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law Re: Damages, Finding 7 2.i. The Court is unwilling to find such as an item 
of damage. Such item of damage could have been alleviated by removal of shoes, washing 
shoes, brushing, etc. Each party has a duty to mitigate their damages. IDJI 2d 9.14. 
j- $225.00. Sherrie Akers testified she missed 7.5 hours of work at $30/hour, as a 
consequence of her attempting to defend her real property fiom Defendants' wiW trespass. 
k. .$2,337.54. Cost to restore survey work damaged by Defendants' willfid trespass, 
including restaking survey boundaries necessitated by Defendants' andlor their agent's removal 
.c- = C .-.- - 
of survey stakes and markers outside the easement area. Plaintiffs' Exh. 3 12. Dennis Akers' 
testimony is credible, that White's employee removed these stakes on an almost daily basis for a 
period of time. Dennis Akers testified that often these stakes and the no trespassing signs were 
removed and left next to Akers' house. The court finds defendants' argument that ". . .absolutely 
no evidence was presented the Defendants removed a .  surveying stakes, steel posts or 
otherwise" to be completely false. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 16. The Court finds not credible David 
White's denial that he ever moved these stakes or caused to be removed these stakes. Mortensen 
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Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed Findings of Fact and 
1 Conclusions of Law, p. 12, to be unpersuasive. 
1. $1,939.31. Cost of repair to Akers' 2000 Chevrolet pickup damaged when 
defendant Vernon J. Mortensen ran into it with a bulldozer. Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 10 1, 1 78, 
300, 14 1, Testimony of Gary Scott Shawver. Shawver's credible and uncontradicted testimony 
is that the original estimate of $1,789.31 is $150 low due to his labor costs increasing $2 per hour 
since the estimate, and the parts costs increasing about 10% since the estimate. Defendants make 
the same objection that the costs were never actually incurred. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' 
"' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 13. The same 
ruling based on IDJI 2d 9.07 applies. Defendants also argue that it was "Dennis Akers [who] 
drove at a high rate of speed toward the bulldozer Defendant Mortensen was driving, and 
slammed on his brakes, but was unable to come to a complete stop before hitting the bulldozer." 
Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 7. The Court again && Mortensen's testimohy nbt credimc. 
m. Akers requested $6,200.00 costs to remediate slumping onto Akers7 Section 24 
parcel. Akers claimed in his proposed findings fl2.m.' that this "has begun, and to a reasonable 
degree of certainty, will continue to occur until remediated" and that "The slumping commenced 
when Defendants deposited a large amount of loose fill dirt adjacent to Plaintiffs' property." 
Dennis Akers testified the slumping "isn't there yet", that in his opinion, and he testified he has 
built roads and has taught hydraulics to excavators, that it will come on to his land. That may be 
true, but at the present, these damages are speculative until such damage actually occurs. 
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n. As set forth below in the Conclusions of Law, defendants Vernon Mortensen and 
David White at all pertinent times are jointly and severally Liable for compensatory damages to 
the Akers' property, for the trebled hamages, and for Sherrie Akers' emotional distress. 
0. As an additiona1 ground for compensatory damages, Vernon Mortensen agreed hi 
his testimony at trial, that he is liable for paying for half of the cost of the easement. Defendants 
thus owe half of the above damages on that basis alone. However, due to their conduct, the full 
amount is awarded as damages, not as their obligation to maintain the easement. 
3. Defendants were confkontational with plaintiff Sherrie Akers on occasions when she 
sought to prevent their trespass on her property. 
4. Mr. White bullied, threatened and intimidated Sherrie Akers as she tried to assist the 
police in their investigation of an occasion when Defendants trespassed. 
5.  D.L. White Construction, Inc.'s operator purposely ran its dump truck toward Shenie 
Akers and within two feet of her body, acting as though he were going to run over Sherrie Akers 
on an occasion when Defendants trespassed. 
6.  During the same time period as above, D.L. White Construction, Inc.'s operator 
. - -c.- 
' - '  4 ,- . ... 
threatened to run Sherrie Akers off her property and threatened to dig a three-foot ditch across 
Plaintiffs' driveway to impede her use of the driveway. 
7. Defendants actually impeded Sherrie Akers's access to her work (she is a cardiac nurse at 
a Spokane hospital) by intentionally dumping dirt across Plaintiffs' driveway, which served no 
purpose other than to block Plaintiffs' ingress and egress. 
8. -Defendant Vemon Mortensen cut Plaintiffs' padlock to Plaintiffs' gated entry and 
bulldozed down Plaintiffs' gate and fence posts, none of which were located on the express 
easement. 
f> - L : ::.> 
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9. Defendant White had an operator who continuously dropped the blade of heavy 
machinery and removed chunks of earth fiom the driveway, both inside and outside the easement 
area Testimony of Dennis Akers. ~laintiffs' Exhibit 303,304. 
10. Defendants ran tracked vehicles up and down the entire driveway, including inside and 
outside the easement area, for no reason. Testimony of Dennis Akers. Defendants would take 
the tracked equipment from the top of the road, go down to the bottom of the road, do nothing 
with the cat dozer, and return back to the top. Id. The Court finds this was done with the intent 
to destroy the road surface and interfere with Akers' real property rights. 
11. Defendant D.L. White Construction, Inc.'s operator told Dennis Akers such things as: '1 
can't wait 'ti1 we finally run you off of this [Plaintiffs'] property." Testimony of Dennis Akers. 
This Court finds such testimony of Dennis Akers credible. 
12. On more than one occasion, Defendants pulled up Akers' survey pins in violation of 
Idaho statute, survey stakes, steel posts and removed 'Wo Trespassing" signs on Plaintiffs' real 
property. Again, the court finds defendants' argument that ". . .absolutely no evidence was 
presented the Defendants removed . - any surveying stakes, steel posts or otherwise" to be 
.s- : b - - C  . 
completely false. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 16. 
13. Defendant White consciously disregarded the Court's pexmanent injunction (restraining 
Defendants h m  trespassing on Plaintiffs' real property) by trespassing on Plaintiffs' property at 
night, behind Plaintiffs' home, in an effort to intimidate and fiighten Plaintiffs, and did 
intimidate and fighten Sheme Akers. Dennis Akers testimony is found credible that the Friday 
before the last trial days, David White was f&d off the easement, clearly on Akers' land, thrity 
feet fiom their house, that Dennis Akers ran after him and saw White get in his truck, and when 
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Akers told him "I've caught you again trespassing", White responded "Go to hell." This is in 
violation of this Court's prior orders. This Court finds not credible David White's testimony that 
he was not on the Akers property or the road on that night, that instead he was up on the other 
side of the barn on his own property. Dennis Akers testified that White has sat in his vehicle on 
Millsap Loop Road and watching the Akers' house. White did not rebut this. Dennis Akers 
testified that several times during this protracted trial, there were outbursts in the hallway by 
White and Mortensen. White did not rebut this, nor did Mortensen. 
15. Defendants made material misrepresentations to their agents and police officers regarding 
their legal rights to operate heavy equipment upon Akers' property. 
16. Defendants deceived police officers who were investigating their illegal activities on 
Akers' real property by representing they had a legal right to do so. Defendants' intent to 
deceive is illustrated by the statement Dennis Akers overheard Vernon Mortensen telling David 
White: "I can't believe we pulled this off and neither one of us is even in jail." Testimony of 
Dennis Akers. Vernon Mortensen denied making such statement, but this Court finds such claim 
by  ort tens& to be not credibie. 
17. Defendant Mortensen misrepresented facts to the Kootenai County prosecutor (making 
false claims of material facts) in an effort to persuade the prosecutor to prosecute Plaintiff 
Dennis Akers. This tactic was an attempt to manipulate the legal system, to intimidate Plaintiffs 
and to misuse the legal system to gain an advantage in a civil proceeding by use of a criminal 
18. Defendant Vernon Mortensen further.threatened, intimidated and attempted to incite Mr. 
Akers while on Plaintiffs' real property by physically approaching Mr. Akers in a threatening 
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manner and cursing at him, calling Mr. Akers such things as: "Son-of-a-bitch" and "chicken 
shit." 
19. Defendant Vernon Mortensen intentionally rammed Akers' truck with a bulldozer. 
20. Defendants blocked Akers' access to their real property at their customary driveway 
approach and the west end of Government Lot 2 on different occasions with a bulldozer, trucks 
and by excavating and dumping dirt on Akers' real property. 
21. Defendant Vernon Mortensen intentionally drove through Akers' barbed wire fence. 
22. Defendants illegally removed thousands of dollars worth of pit run material placed by 
Akm on the easement road to maintain it. Defendants then dumped dirt and gravel in an effort 
to hide the theft. 
23. Defendant White dug up Akers' access to the back of Akers' property. 
24. Defendant Vernon Mortensen threatened witness Bill Reynolds in an attempt to influence 
his testimony in this litigation. Bill Reynolds testified that just before he testified in December, 
2003, Vernon Mortensen said "There is now a county road through your house, I'm suing you 
for everything you're worth, &t that gate mo&d or I'll sue you for tha't.', h s  C d S  finds such 
testimony of Bill Reynolds credible, and such illustrates the pattern of both defendants, but 
Vernon Mortensen in particular, and their belief that they can do whatever they want without 
consequence. Vernon Mortensen testified he recalled talking to Bill Reynolds, that Mortensen 
testified Mortensen said "hello" to Reynolds, told him he was happy to see him and that he 
hoped they could resolve their dispute sensibly. Obviously Mortensen has a completely different 
version of the meeting than Reynolds. This Court finds Mortensen's testimony to be not 
credible. 
,-. . 
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25. Vernon Mortensen disregarded the deputy sheriffs verbal request to leave the Aken 
alone. 
26. The Court has personally observed defendant David White while on the stand testifying, 
raising his voice and addressing Plaintiffs in anger and has heard testimony that he has yelled at 
Plaintiffs during recesses in the trial while Plaintiffs were waiting in the hallway in direct 
contravention of this Court's order prohibiting the parties fiom speaking with each other during 
the trial proceedings. The Court has watched defendant Vernon Mortensen testify, and has 
noticed time and time again, his inability to answer a question put to him, either by the opposing 
attorney or his own attorney. At trial on December 15,2004, Mortensen was asked whether he 
sold four properties knowing there was an ongoing dispute over access. Mortensen went on a 
rant, claiming this was malicious prosecution, that Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed, and that 
he would not be intimidated by any of this. He claimed plaintiffs' counsel was trying to extort 
money from an insurance company and using us (he and White) as pawns to do so. 
27. As a result of Defendants' grossly negligent conduct, harassment, threatening, bullying 
and intimidation of Plaintiff Sherrie Akers, Mrs. Akers is afiaid to return home. She-is in fear of 
- :c-. ' b --. C - 
damage by Defendants to her red and personal property, in fear of having access to her home 
cut-off and in fear of her physical safety. She is especially afraid to be alone at night due to 
Defendants' prior intimidating behavior. 
28. Defendants' tortious conduct has resulted in physical manifestations of emotional distress 
in Sherrie Akers, including anxiety, stomachaches, migraines and sleeplessness. Tr. Vol. III, p. 
29. Defendants' tortious conduct has caused Sheme Akers to be in such fear of her health 
and safety that she has tried to move fiom Plaintiffs' real property and is in fear of continuing to 
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live on Plaintiffs' real property because of Defendants' ongoing tortious conduct, which has 
continued despite the Court's orders. Tr. Vol. El, p. 1320, L1. 18-25. 
30. The Court finds Sherrie Akers to be a very credible witness. During the course of trial, 
Mrs. Akers's anxiety was observed by this Court (including in her demeanor and voice). 
3 1. Vernon Mortensen (Mortensen) purchased sixty acres near Plaintiffs' property after the 
commencement of the instant lawsuit. Mortensen is now in the process of developing this 
property. He is subdividing said sixty acres into five-acre parcels and has sold four of these 
parcels. Mortensen has been in a dispute with an adjoining landowner regarding whether or not 
Mortensen illegally subdivided this property and whether or not he has an easement to his 60- 
acre development. The easement-road dispute -.  regarding access to these 60 acres is substantially 
similar to the dispute in the present case in that Mortensen is attempting to develop land with a 
disputed access and sell parcels of land to innocent purchasers, thereby leaving the innocent 
purchasers with potential disputes with adjoining landowners, Kootenai County, the Fire District 
and the Highway District. Mortensen's testimony at Tr. Vol. III, p. 1425, L. 24 - p. 1426, L. 7. 
Mortensen has utilized substadtiilly the same d&elopment strategy in'the bast. If Eot deterred, 
he is likely to engage in this conduct in the future. Scott Rasor testified about Mortensen's prior 
land development projects that harmed innocent Idaho land owners. Tr. Vol II, p. 539, L. 3 - p. 
540, L. 20. Mortensen admitted he is now developing and selling forty acres near the subject 
property in spite of another easement road dispute similar to the present case. Tr. Vol. III, p. 
1425, L. 24 - p. 1426, L. 7. Even Mortensen's own expert Kiebert testified that he has testified 
in litigation on Mortensen's behalf on more than one occasion, that he has worked on subdivision 
projects for Mortensen before and that some of these projects the parcels Mortensen has sold 
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have not been surveyed, that Mortensen works too fast in selling lots before they are surveyed, 
and that he has told Mortensen that it is not prudent to do that. 
32. Since 1980 Defendant ~oriensen has owned Mortensen Math. Mortensen Math is a 
highly successful company whose products are sold internationally. Mortensen has generated 
over 300 publications in this business. Mortensen has made millions of dollars through this 
business that he has used in part, and continues to use in part, to purchase and develop real 
property for profit in north Idaho. 
33. Vernon Mortensen did not disclose the existence of Mortensen Math in discovery, even 
in light of an Order by the Court granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel such disclosure. 
34. Defendants Mortensen currently own a number of parcels of real property in north Idaho. 
Defendant Mortensen is a land "speculator" who buys larger parcels and resells them as smaller 
parcels, thus buying larger parcels to subdivide for speculative profits. Mortensen buys and sells 
,. .. 
land through his company Timber-Land-Ag, U C .  Defendants Mortensen are the only members 
of this limited liability company. Mortensen does not distinguish between his company and 
himself in his land dealings, using his company as an alter ego in such dealings. - 
..- 
. -S'. - 
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35. Mortensens own a cattle ranch in Bonners Ferry, including 100 to 150 cow/calf pairs. 
36. Mortensens purchased the original 160 acres involved in this litigation in 1994 by trading 
a piece of land worth $200,000. Thus, Mortensens paid $1,250 per acre. 
37. Mortensens sold 80 acres of the original 160 acres to Mr. White for $460,000, or $5,750 
an acre, during 2001-2002. Thus, Mortensens received a profit of $4,500 per acre, for a 360% 
total return on investment. 
38. Mortensen has aspirations of making "millions of dollars" through the sale and 
development of land with White. 
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39. Mortensen testified that he is on the verge of bankruptcy. Throughout these proceedings, 
the Court has observed Mortensen to prevaricate in some instances, and not to be credible in 
others. Mortensen has made a cons'cious effort to mislead the Akers and the Court in an effort to 
hide the significant value of his income and assets. With regard to this particular testimony, the 
Court finds Mortensen's testimony to be an attempt to hide the true strength of his fiscal 
condition. Once again, Mortensen's testimony is not credible. 
40. Defendant White's assets include the 90 acres he purchased fkom Mortensen with a value 
of at least $460,000. 
41. Vernon Mortensen has violated and disregarded Kootenai County ordinances and the 
orders of this Court for pecuniary gain, specifically to increase the value of his land development 
projects. In his actions, testimony and demeanor he has shown a conscious disregard and 
disrespect for the law. He has harmed innocent North Idaho landowners, including Plaintiffs, by 
- - -  --- 
this conscious disregard for the law. As such, it is highly 1ikely.that he will continue to harm 
Plaintiffs and other Idaho landowners unless he is deterred from engaging in like conduct in the 
future. 
- - 5 . -  .. 
' -  * b .---i - 
42. David White and D.L. White Construction, Inc., has violated and disregarded Kootenai 
County ordinances and the orders of this Court for pecuniary gain, specifically to increase the 
value of his land development project. In his actions, testimony and demeanor he has shown a 
... ... 
conscious disregard and disrespect for the law. He hi& harmed innocent North Idaho 
landowners, including Plaintiffs, by this conscious disregard for the law. As such, it is highly 
likelythat he will continue to hann Plaintiffs and other Idaho landowners unless he is deterred 
fiom engaging in like conduct in the future. 
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V. ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING DAMAGES. 
The following Conclusions of Law are supplemental to Conclusions of Law 1-28 in this 
Court's Findings of Fad, ~onclusidns of Law and Order dated January 3,2003: 
1. Pursuant to LC. 86-202, the willful trespass damages are trebled in the total amount of: 
$51,008.55. Defendants are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiffs in said amount. Defendants 
argue that in order to have trebled damages awarded against them, their conduct must be 
intentional, and that since they "thought" they owned a right of way, they can only be negligent 
for being wrong in their belief. Post-Trial Memorandum, pp. 21-25. Defendants cite 
Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,639,862 P.2d 32 1,33 1 (Ct.App. 1993). That is an 
accurate summary of Bumgarner's holding. But that is an interesting argument for Mortensen 
especially, to make. This is not the &st time Mortensen has bought property low, sold quickly 
for a marked increase, then found himself in litigation because of a lack of access to that 
property. Mortensen is arguing that as long as he argues about access and is later proven wrong, 
he can't be liable for treble damages. The fallacy of that argument in the present case is: 1) 
Mortensen bought at a low price because there were problems with access, he knew of the prior 
. * 
' b - .* . 
Peplinski suit; 2) he tried buying right of way fiom Bill Reynolds to fix that problem, but Bill 
Reynolds was unwilling to do so, and 3) Stewart Title company called and spoke to Sherrie 
Akers in December 2001. Additional reasons were set forth in this Court's prior finding of fact 7 
48. Defendants intentionally misrepresented to their agents, employees, the County 
Building Inspector, the Kootenai County Sheriff and the public that defendants had a legal 
- right to engage in the activities on plaintiffs' property described above, when defendants 
knew their legal rights were at best questionable and undetermined. Defendants could 
have come to no other conclusion than that they had no express easement past the western 
boundary of Government Lot 2, and that the best they could hope for is to convince a court 
that they had a claim of implied easement, prescriptive easement or easement by necessity. 
The problem with that is, at the time he purchased from Peplinskis (or at least by the time 
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defendants committed their acts that led to the present lawsuit), Mr. Mortensen knew there 
were some claims made against Peplinskis by the Akers and that Peplinskis dismissed that 
lawsuit without Peplinski gaining any legal rights, Mr. Mortensen knew he paid a reduced 
price due to the lack of access, and Mr. Mortensm was convinced he had access via a back 
road to his property. Thus, h6re is serious doubt that defendants in good faith believed they 
had access to their land over plaintiffs land. 
Plaintiffs argue that defendants attempted to use a letter drafted in 1994 by Attorney 
Michael J. Newel1 as binding legal authority for defendants to excavate on plaintiffs' real 
property (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 172), but there was no proof of that claim offered at trial. That letter 
had no legal effect on plaintiffs' real property and did not give defendants any legal rights. The 
reason defendants had knowledge that they had no right to excavate on plaintiffs' real property is 
manifold. First, there is nothing in the deed from W.L. Millsaps to Bakers, which gives Millsaps 
and their successors (defendants) a right to excavate or widen the easement over Bakers and their 
successors' (plaintiffs') land. Second, the easement only goes over the land owned by Bakers and 
their successors' (plaintiffs') land contained in Government lot 2. In other words, defetidants do 
not have the right to even travel over, let alone excavate or widen, and portion of plaintiffs' land 
not contained in Government lot 2. That is, defendants knew they had no right to kavel over, let 
alone excavate the land owned by plaintiffs to the west of Government lot 2. Third, as mentioned 
above, at the time he purchased from Peplinskis (or soon thereafter), Mr. Mortensen knew there 
were some claims made against Peplinskis by the Akers and that Peplinskis dismissed their 
lawsuit without gaining any legal rights, Mr. Mortensen knew he paid a reduced price due to the 
lack of access, and Mr. Mortensen was convinced he had access via a back road to his property. 
Findmgs, 7 48. All of these things cut against defendants' claim of ownership being "negligent". 
Defendants at all times knew their claims were at best speculative. Defendants knew they had no 
express or deeded easement. Defendants knew at best they would have to purchase actual right 
of way to their property fiom the Akers, others, or simply hope for the best in litigation. But it 
wasn't defendants who brought this litigation:'.it was Akers who brouat the litig&Ebn due to the 
intimidating, high-handed conduct of the defendants. In order for Bumgarner to give defendants 
a "safe harbor" for "guessing wrong" or "negligent" conduct, it would seem imperative for 
defendants to have initiated the litigation, for them to try to work this out in a more civilized 
manner in our courts. Instead, they chose intkidation, to which the Akers responded with 
litigation. 
2. The evidence of the reasonable and necessary costs of repairs for the above damage 
caused by Defendants multiple willful trespasses is $17,002.85. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER, AND ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER page 27 (-j ./? 
3. Defendants have caused Sheme Akers significant emotional distress for which Mrs. 
Akers is entitled to just compensation. The Court finds the total amount of Sherrie Akers's 
compensatory damages for her emdtional distress in the amount of S10,000.00. Defendants me 
jointly and severally liable for this damage. 
4. As to compensatory damages for Akers property, and for Sherrie Akers emotional 
distress, and for the trebled damages, defendants Mortensens and White are jointly and severally 
liable for those damages under Idaho Code 5 6-803, as this Court finds at all pertinent times they 
were each "acting in concert" as deilned by that statute, in that they were "pursuing a common 
plan or design which result[ed] in the commission of an intentional or reckless tortuous act." 
5. Looking at the criteria of StateFann Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, Slip 
Op. No. 01-1289 (2003), p. 8, an award of punitive damage against Mortensen is appropriate. 
The harm caused to Akers was physical, emotional, and not just economic. Mortensen's conduct 
evinced an indifference to or reckless disregard for the health or safety of others. Mortensen's 
conduct was repeated, occurring over a lengthy period of time and even after Court order in this 
case, this was not an isolated incident. The harm resulted from intentional malice, trickery or 
, ,a-: 
" @  _.. i- -. 
deceit. Finally, compared to Mortensen and whoever is backing this litigation on Mortensen's 
behalf, the Akers are financially vulnerable in comparison. Campbell states ". . .that a recidivist 
may be punished more severely than a first offender [because] repeated misconduct is more 
reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance.. ." Id. p. 13, citing BMW of North 
America, Jnc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,577 (1996). The amount of punitive damages likely to 
deter Defendant Mortensens from engaging in like conduct in the future is $150,000.00. 
6. The amount of punitive damages likely to deter Defendht Whites ffom engaging in like 
conduct in the future is $30,000.00. 
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VI. ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDE&D defendants Mortensens "Motion for Reconsideration of 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Filed January 2,2003, or Alternatively Motion 
to Certify Order Pursuant to 1.RC.P. 54(B)" is DENIED IN ALL ASPECTS, consistent with 
the above opinion. 
IT IS FURTHERE ORDERED that upon hearing additional evidence presented after 
the Court's January 2,2003 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, that each and every 
finding of fact and conclusion of law set forth in such remains intact. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' counsel shall prepare a judgment 
consistent with the above opinion and this Order. The issue of attorney fees remains open. 
DATED this 4e day of + 2004- 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVEE 
I hereby certify that on the z d a y  of w -t 2004, I caused to be smed  a true and coned copy of the 
foregoing instrument by the method indi ted below, and addressed to the following ' - . - 
Michael E. Reagan Leander James 
Attorney at Law Attorney at Law 
1044 Northwest Blvd 1875 North Lakewood Dr., Suite 200 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14 Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14 
u.s.MAIL 
- - U-S.MAIL & TELECOPY (FAX) (208) 667-4034 
Terry R Yost 
P.O. Box 1583 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
Boise, ID 83701 
- U.S.MAIL 
TELECOPY (FAX) 1-208-386-9428 
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EXHIBIT 8 
Todd Reuter ISB # 5573 
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 
PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP 
1200 Ironwood Drive, Suite 3 15 
Coeur dYAlene, Idaho 83 8 14-1 839 
Telephone: (208) 667- 1 83 9 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2494 
todd.reuter@klgates.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY 
OF COEUR D'ALENE, INC. 
IN THE DISTFUCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, I No. 07-4690 
Plaintiff, 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF COEUR 
D'ALENE, INC., 
Defendant. I 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST REQUESTS 
FOR ADMISSION TO PLAINTIFF 
TO: Plaintiff Pro Se, Vernon Jerry Mortensen 
Defendant Stewart Title Company of Coeur dYAlene, Inc. propounds the following 
requests for admission to Plaintiff Pro Se. 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
TO PLAINTIFF - 1 
K:\2023782\W026\17034_TR\17034P24SZ 
DEFINITIONS 
The term "you" as used herein refers to Plaintiff Vernon Jerry Mortensen. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
If you do not serve a written answer or objection to the following Requests for 
Admission, signed by you or your attorney, within thirty (30) days after service of the 
Requests, the Requests shall be deemed admitted. 
Your answer must specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons 
why you cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. If objection is made, you must state 
the reasons therefor. 
Your denial must fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and if good 
faith requires that you qualify your answer or deny only a part of the matter, you must 
specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. 
You may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to 
admit or deny unless you state that you have made reasonable inquiry and that the 
information known or readily obtainable by you is insufficient to enable you to admit or 
deny. 
DATED this 16th day of November, 2007. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF 
COEUR D'ALENE, INC. 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
TO PLAINTIFF - 2 
K\2023782\00026\17034-TR\17034P24SZ 
REOUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1 : Admit Stewart Title Company of Coeur 
dYAlene never issued you a title insurance policy. 
ANSWER: 
REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit Stewart Title Company of Coeur d' 
Alene never insured you. 
ANSWER: 
REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit Stewart Title Company of Coeur 
d'Alene made no representations of any kind to you. 
ANSWER: 
REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit Stewart Title Company of Coeur 
d'Alene did not represent or defend you in the Akers v. Mortensen lawsuit. 
ANSWER: 
DEFENDANT' S FIRST 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
TO PLAINTIFF - 3 
REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit you were not an additional insured 
on the policy issued by Stewart Title Company of Coeur d'Alene to David and Michelle 
White. 
ANSWER: 
RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION dated this day of 
,2007. 
BY 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen, Plaintiff Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16 day of November, 2007,I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Overnight Delivery Mr. Vernon Jerry Mortensen 
Facsimile Transmission PO Box D 
7--- 
,pC First Class Mail Bonners Ferry, ID 83805 
Hand Delivered Pro Se Plaintiff 
-I&??< Todd Reuter 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
TO PLAINTIFF - 4 
k\2023782\00026\17034JR\17034P24SZ 
Todd RmWr TSB # sn3 
hnoEaey# &r Orfcndnm 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY 
OF COEbX D'ALENS INC. 
PI THE arsrmuc~ c o m ~  OFTIE FIRST mew D E ~ U C T  
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF K W ~ A ~  
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, 1 No. 07.4690 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF COEUR 
D'ALENE, RJC.. 
Pkintiff, 
Noricc i s  bmby @VM, pnunt to ldah COM Rule 36 (cX2l th;u Dej&n&n~ '8 
Fksr Ruquesm For Admlxsion to PlaJdnf ww med upon Pbintiff Pro Se. fhIr ssrvicer 
wor accomplished as rht 16m day of Nwcmbcr, 2007, via U. 8. W, pbotaee pnpaiq 
llddm6mld as follaws: 
NOTZCE OF SERVICE RE 
DEFENDANT'S FlPST REQWTS 
FOR ADkU!?lSlON TO PLAINTEF 
PAGE 213 YCVD AT 1111912007 1:03:45 PM [Pacific Standard Time] "VR:SPOFAXII * DNIS:3497 TSlD:2087652404 "DURATION (mmss):0146 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen 
P.O. Box D 
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805 
DATED this 16th day of November, 2007. 
Attorneys for defendant 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF 
COEUR D'ALENE, INC. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE BY 
DEFENDANT RE: 
DISCOVERY - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of November, 2007, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following person in the manner described 
below: 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen 
P.O. Box D 
Bonners Feny, Idaho 83805 
Via U.S. Mail 
Via Hand Delivery 
Via Overnight Delivery 
,k Via Facsimile #208-267-1279 
Todd Reuter 
NOTICE OF SERVICE BY 
DEFENDANT RE: 
DISCOVERY - 3 
K:U023782\OD026\17034-TR\17034P24TH 
EXHIBIT 9 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 - - 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENN 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. 
AKERS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. 
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-02-222 
THIRD 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE ON REMAND 
The Court having previously entered its Judgment and Decree on May 25, 
2004, and entered its Order on Remand on September 7, 2006, following remand 
from the Idaho Supreme Court case of'Akers v. D.L. mite CohsO-dction,-lnc., et a!., 
142 Idaho 93, 127 P.3d 196 (2005); 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND ' 
DECREED: 
1. Defendants do not have .any implied easement rights in Plaintiffs' 
property. 
2. The Court hereby enters a decree granting an easement by prescription to 
Defendants across Plaintiffs' property as follows: a twelve point two 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE ON REMAND - 1 
C.;  .I 6 
foot (12.2') wide strip located just inside the northeast comer of 
defendants' land, turning south immediately west of the west boundary 
of Government Lot 2 (where the express easement ends) and the east 
boundary of Parcel B as depicted .by "hatch" marks on Exhibit "B" 
attached hereto. The 12.2' wide easement mates with the western 
boundary of the express easement across plaintiffs' Government Lot 2, 
and immediately proceeds south at an immediate right angle or 45" turn 
on plaintiffs' Parcel B, onto defendants' property, as shown on Exhibit 
"B". The outer boundary of this easement as it turns on plaintiffs' Parcel 
B, is an arc 12.2' from the axis, and the axis of the arc is the West 
Quarter Section Comer of Section 19, TSON., R.5W., as shown on 
Record of Survey in Kootenai County Case Number CV 02-222, and 
attached as Exhibit "A" of the original Judgment and Decree filed in this 
case on May 25, 2004. To avoid conflict between land owners, the 
entire easement, both the express and prescriptive portions should be 
7 6  4 
definitely and certainly fixed. Argosy Trust v. Wininger, 14 i  Idaho 570, 
572-73, 114 P.3d 128,130-3 1 (2005), citing Hall v. Taylor, 57 Idaho 662, 
668-69, 67 P.2d 901, 903 (1937); Kosanke v. Kopp, 74 Idaho 302, 261 
P.2d 8 15 (1 953); Palmer v. Fitzpatrick, 97 Idaho 925, 557 P.2d 203 
(1 976). As defendants' prescriptive easement burdens plaintiffs' Parcel 
B, and the express easement burdens plaintiffs' Government Lot 2, 
defendants shall jointly and severally bear the expense of the survey to 
locate this prescriptive easement across all of the land owned by 
AMENDED JUDGMENT. AND DECREE ON REMAND - 2 
r7 0' ; . /  
plaintiffs. Defendants are ordered to prepare and record a metes and 
bounds survey, based upon Exhibit "A" to the Judgment and Decree filed 
May 25,2004 and Exhibit 'B" attached to this Third Amended Judgment 
and Decree on Remand. 
3, Plaintiffs are awarded compensatory damages for willful trespass in the 
amount of $17,002.85, which amount of trespass damages are trebled 
pursuant to LC. $6-202 for the total' amount of $51,008.55, which 
amount is awarded jointly and severally against Defendants D. L. 
WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE 
V. WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and 
MARTI E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, pursuant to I.C. $6-803. 
4. Sherri Akers is awarded compensatory damages for emotional distress in 
the amount of $10,000.00 jointly and severally against Defendants D. L. 
. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID L. WHITE and 
MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. 
. .r ' C ..i . 
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, 
pursuant to I.C. $6-803. 
5.  Plaintiffs are awarded punitive damages jointly and severally against 
Defendants Vernon J. Mortensen axid Marti E. Mortensen, husband and 
wife, in the amount of $150,000..00. 
- 6. Plaintiffs are awarded punitive damages jointly and severally against 
Defendants David L. White and Michelle V. White, husband and wife, in 
the amount of $30,000.00. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE ON REMAND - 3 0 . .;i ., 1 
7. Plaintiffs' award of costs and attomey fees jointly and severally against 
each defendant in the amount of One Hundred Five Thousand, Five 
Hundred ~ h i r t ~ - f  our Dollars and Six Cents ($105,534.06) together with 
interest at the applicable statutory rate is reinstated; 
8. Plaintiffs shall further be entitled to seek a judgment of costs and 
attomey fees incurred after remand as permitted by rule or statute. 
ENTERED this 8~ day of December, 2006. 
INN p. MITCHELL 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE ON REMAND - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of December, 2006, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Robert E. Covington 
8884 North Government Way, Suite A 
Hayden, ID 83 835 
FAX: (208)762-4546 
Terri R. Yost 
Jones, Gledhill, Hess, Fuhrman & Eiden, P.A. 
The 9h & Idaho Center 
225 North 9fi Street, Suite 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208)33 1-1 170 
Facsimile: (208)33 1 - 1529 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 'AND DECREE ON REMAND - 5 C 6 
Akers 
T.N. 12094 
'204 oacr 
Todd Reuter ISB # 5573 
KIRKPATRlCK & LOCKHART 
PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP 
1200 Ironwood Drive, Suite 3 15 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 838 14-1 839 
Telephone: (208) 667-1 839 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2494 
todd.reuter@klgates.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY 
OF COEUR D'ALENE, INC. 
1N THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, I N o  07-4690 
Plaintiff, 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF COEUR 
D'ALENE, INC., 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN HOLT 
KEGAKDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
1. 1 am over the age of 18 and am competent to testify to the matters set forth 
CYI ' 
0 herein. 
2. The testimony set forth herein is based on my own personal knowledge. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN HOLT 
KEGAKDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT - 1 
3. 1 have been an enlployee of Stewart Title Guaranty Company since 1995. 1 
began my career there as a district manager, responsible for opening new offices. 1 all1 
presently a Field Customer Representative responsible for handling claims in the region 
that includes ldaho. 1 have been in that position since 2000. 
4. 1 ail1 an attorney licensed to practice in the state of Idaho. 
5 .  1 currently work in the Stewart Title Guaranty Company office located in 
Eagle, ldaho. 
6. Stewart Title Guaranty Company is a Texas corporation. It is a separate 
corporation from Stewai-t Title of Coeur dlAlene and does not own it. 
7 .  In 1994, North ldaho Title was an agent of Stewart Title Guaranty 
Company for the purpose of issuing title policies underwritten by Stewart Title Guaranty. 
8.  1 have reviewed the policy issued to Vernon Mortensen, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached here as Exhibit 2. That policy was issued by North ldaho Title 
in 1994. Stewai-t Title Guaranty was the insurance company that underwrote (i.e. 
provided the actual insurance for) the policy. 
9. The Mortensen policy (Ex. 2) insured access to the property described in 
that policy. 
10. Sherrie and Dennis Alters sued Vernon Mortensen and others in Kootenai 
County Case No. CV-02-222. Mortenseil tendered the matter to Stewart Title Guaranty. 1 
handled the matter for Stewai-t Title Guaranty. 
11. Stewart Title Guaranty retained Coeur d'Alene attorney, Michael Reagan, 
to defend Mortensen in the Akers case. 
AFFlDAVlT OF JOHN HOLT 
KEGAKDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT - 2 
12. Stewart Title Guaranty retained Boise attorney, Richard Mollerup, to 
advise it regarding coverage issues as they relate to the issues raised in Alcer-s v. 
Mortensen, et crl. 
13.  Stewart Title Guaranty decided to pay Mr. Mortensen the policy limits of' 
$200,000 and not pay for an appeal of'the Alcers case. A true and correct copy of' Mr. 
Mollerup's May 18, 2004 letter to Mr. Mortensen is attached hereto as Exhibit 5. This 
letter was made in the regular course of' our business, as it related to the handling of the 
Akers v. Mortensen case. 
14. Nearly identical letters to Mr. Mollerup's May 18,2004 letter were also 
faxed to Mr. Mortensen's lawyers, Milte Keagan and Terry Copple. True and correct 
copies of those letters are attached hereto as Exbibit 6. This letter was made in the regular 
course of our business, as it related to the handling of the Akers v. Mortensen case. 
15. Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene is an agent of Stewart Title Guaranty 
Company. It was incorporated in 1997 as Stewart Title of North Idaho, Inc. A true and 
correct copy of the Idaho Secretary of State's website entry for Stewart Title of Coeur 
d'Alene is attached hereto as Exhibit 7. 1 played a role in opening that office. Stewart 
Title of North ldaho changed its name to Stewai-t Title of Coeur d'Alene in 2000. See Ex. 
7. To be clear, Stewart Title of North ldaho was not related to North Idaho Title and was 
not North ldaho Title's successor. 
16. Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene was not involved in the Akers case. It did 
not play any role in the decision to hire couilsel for Mortensen. It did not play ally role in 
decisions related to that case. It did not play ally role in the decision to pay Mr. 
Mortensen policy liinits or the decision not to pay for the prosecutioil of an appeal. To my 
AFFlDAVlT OF JOHN HOLT 
KEGAKDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTlON FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT - 3 
knowledge, i t  did not insure Mortensen or issue any policy to him. Mr. Mortensen alleges 
in paragraph 9 of his coillplaint that "Stewart Title contacted Alters. . ." 1 am the one who 
had that conversation with Akers. Although 1 disagree with his recountiilg of the call, the 
inlportant point is that all my contact with Alters, and all my work on the Akers case, was 
done as an eillployee of Stewart Title Guaranty Company. To my lnowledge Stewart 
Title of Coeur d'Alene was not involved. 
17. To my lnowledge, Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene, Inc. had no 
iilvolveinent in the 1994 insurance contract that North Idaho Title issued to Mortensen. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAl ) 
JOHN HOLT, being first duly sworn, upoil oath states as follows: 
I have read the foregoing Affidavit, lmow the contents thereof, and believe the 
same to be true and correct. 
SIGNED AND A111RMED before me on 
NOTARY PbkLlC il 
AFFlDAVlT OF JOHN HOLT 
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT - 4 
K.V023782\00026\17034-TR\17034P24UU 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on 17th day of January, 2008, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile Transmission 
First Class Mail 
Over Night Delivery 
Vernon J.  Mortensen 
2 120 David Thompson Drive 
PO Box D 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83804 
Telephone: (208) 267-1 385 
Facsimile: (208) 267-1 279 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN HOLT 
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT - 5 
K.\2023782\W026\17034-TR\17034P24UU 
EXHIBIT 2 
' File No. 1556 Policy No. 0-9993-361377 . . 
Amount $. 200,000.00 
Premium $ 865.00 
1. Policy Date: SEPTEMBER23, 1994 AT 4:38 
2. Name of Insured: 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN AND MART1 ELLEN MORTENSEN 
3 .  The .eatate or interest in the land described herein and 
which is covered by this policy is: 
FEE AS TO PARCEL 1; AN EASEMENT AS TO PARCEL 2 
4 .  Title to the estate or interest covered by this policy at 
the date hereof i s  vested in: 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN AND  TI ELLEN MORTENSEN, XUSBAND 
AND WIFE 
5 .  The land ref erred to in this policy is situated in the 
County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, and is described as 
follows: ' 
REFER TO EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED 
Fi le  No. 1556 
Policy NO. 0-9993-361377 
EXHIBIT I1A1l 
\ 5 
I N  TID,STATE'OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
. . PARCEL 1: 
  he East half of the  Southeast quar ter  Sect ion 2 4 ,  ~ o w n s h i b  50 ' 
North, Range 6 West of the  Boise Meridian, and the  East h a l f  of , 
the  Northeast quar te r  Section 25 ,  Township 5 0  North Range 6 West. . , 
of the Boise Meridian, i n  Kootenai County. Idaho. 
PARCEL 2 : 
. .  . 
An easement over and across Lot 2 ,  Section 19 ,~ownship  50 North, 
Range 5 West of the Boise Meridian, 
. . 
a s  s e t  f o r t h  i n  t h e  Warranty Deed. dated December 28, 1966. between these  grantors  and Vernon L. Baker and Kathryn ~lnn 
Baker, husband and wife., , . 
* i.. J n c: ' 
~ i l e  No., 1556 
' Policy NO. 0-9993-361377 
SCHEDULE B 
This Policy does not insure against loss or da&age. by i.eason oE 
the fpllowing : 
(a) Right6 or claims of parties inpo~session or claiming'to be 
in po~session not shown by the public records. 
. (b) , Easements, or claims of easements, not shown bk the public 
records. 
. . 
(c) . Encr'oachments or questions of location, boundary and area, 
whic'h an accurate survey may disclose. 
. . 
(dl Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor, or , 
material heretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law 
and not of the premises for determination. . 
(e) Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in 
patents orin acts authorizing the issuance thereof; water 
rights, claims or title to water. 
(f) Any service, installation or connection charges for sewer, 
'water or electricity. 
(gl General taxes not now payable; matters relating to special 
assessments and.specia1 levies, if any, preceding the same . 
'becoming a lien. . . 
1. GENERAL TAXBS FOR THE YEAR 1994, A LIEN IN THE PROCESS OF 
ASSESSMENT, NOT YET DUE OR PAYABLE. 
. . 
2. AIVY TAXES CONCERNING TIIE PROPERTI IN QUESTION RELATING TO 
FOREST LAND TAXATION ACTS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
. . 
3. SAID PROPERTY INVOLVES MORE THAN TWENTY ACRES,'THEREFORE, A 
MORTGAGE SHOULD BE USED RATHER THAN A DEED OF TRUST. 
EXHIBIT 5 
LAW OFFICES 
MEULEMAN & MILLER LLP 
BUSMESS LAW. REAL ESTATE LAW. CONSTRUCTION LAW 
MICHAEL E BALDNER 
JONATHAN R. BAUER* 960 BROADWAY AVENUE, SUITE 500 
PAUL A BOlCE BOISE, IDAHO 83706 
KIMBAL L. OOWLAND 
GEOFFREY J. MCCONNELL*t 
WAYNE V MBUL3jMAN 
ROBERT L. MILLER 
RICHARD W. MOLLERIJP 
RICHARD L. STACEY 
JEFF R SYKES* 
TRACY V. VANCEt 
ARNOLD L. WAGNER 
PHONE 
(208) 342-6066 
F A X  
(208) 336-9712 
WEB 
w w w . l w i ~ o . c o m  
'mNL 
mollcrup@lrwid.ho.com 
'LICENSED IN IDAHO k CALIFORNIA 
tLICENSED IN IDAHO & UTAH 
*LICENSED h' M A S S A C H U m S  ONLY 
May 18,2004 
Vernon and Marti Mortensen 
12 1 W. Prairie Avenue, Suite Dl 96 
Hayden, ID 83 835 
Re: Stewart Title Guaranty Policy No. 0-9993-2032873 
Our File No. 8684.005 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Mortensen: 
Enclosed is check no.66887 from Stewart Title Guaranty Company ("Stewart Title") in 
the amount of $200,000.00 as payment of the total amount of insurance for access under the 
above policy pursuant to paragraph 6(a) of the Conditions and Stipulations contained therein. 
Under that provision, the payment or tender of payment of the amount of the insurance 
terminates all liability to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation. Therefore, Stewart Title 
wil not be prosecuting the appeal in Akers. v. White and Mortensen. 
Very truly yours, /7 
e4 'chard W. Mollerup 
RWM:aab 
cc: Karen Storlie, Stewart Title Guaranty, Co. 
1:\8684.005\CORR\Mortenscn LO5.DOC 
I FedEx I Ship Manager I Label , -2 .A Page 1 of 1 ! From: higin ID: (208)342-6066 Ship Dale. 1 IMAY04 RICHARD W. MOLLERUP. ESQ. F e d E  Uual,: 1, 
MEULEMAN & MILLER UP SydeM. 565584011NETlBOO 
960 BROADWAY AVENUE, SUITE 9 0  
BOISE, ID 83706 
cL..Bu 
SHIP TO: (000)OOMNK)O BU SENDER Delivery Address Bar Code 
Vernon and Marti Mortensen 
Deliver By: 
TRK# 7926 4298 1994 1 9MAY04 
GEG AM 
121 W. Prairie Avenue, Suite Dl96 
Haden, ID 83835 
Shipping Label: Your shipment is complete 
1. Use the 'Prinl feature from your browser to send this page to your laser or inkjet printer, 
PRIORIN OVERNIGHT WED 
2. Fold the printed page along the horizontal line. 
3. Place label in shipping pouch and a f f ~  it to your shipment so that the barcode portion of the label can be read and scanned. 
Warning: Use only the printed original label for shipping. Uslng a photocopy of this label for shipping purposes is fraudulent 
and could result in additional billing charges, along with the cancellation of your FedEx account number. 
Use of this system constitutes your agreement to the service mnditions in the current FedEx Service Guide, avalable on fedex.com. Fed& will 
not be responsible for any claim in excess of $100 per package, whether the result of loss, damage, delay, non-deliiery, mlsdeliiery, or 
mlslnformation, unless you declare a hlgher value, pay an additional charge, document your actual loss and file a timely claim. Limitations found 
in the current FedEx Service Gulde apply. Your right to recover from Fed& for any loss, Including intrinsic value of the package, loss of sales, 
income interest, profit, attorney's fees, costs, and other forms of damage whether direct, Incidental, consequential, or special is limited to the 
greater of $100 or the authorized declared value. Recovery cannot exceed actual documented loss. Maximum for items of extraordinary value is 
$500, e.g. jewelry, preclous metals, negotiable instruments and other ltems listed In our Servlce Guide. Written claims must be filed within strict 
time Ilmlts, see current FedEx Service Guide. 
Alicia Brown 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Subject: 
Fed- [donotreply@fedex.com] 
Wednesday, May 19,2004 2 9 4  PM 
Alicia Brown 
Fed- shipment 792642981994 
Our records indicate that the shipment sent from RICHARD W. MOLLERUP, ESQ./MEULEMAN & MIL to 
Vernon and Marti Mortensen has been delivered. 
The package was delivered on 05/19/2004 at 12:58 PM and signed for or released by D.KILE. 
The ship date of the shipment was 0511 812004. 
The tracking number of this shipment was 79264298 1994. 
FedEx appreciates your business. For more information about FedEx services, please visit our web site at 
http://www.fedex.com 
To track the status of this shipment online please use the following: 
http://www.fedex.com~cgi-binltracking?tracls=7926429 8 1 994 
&action=track&language=english&cntry~code=us 
Disclaimer 
_______-_-___---__--------------------------------------- 
FedEx has not validated the authenticity of any email address. 
EXHIBIT 6 
MICHAEL E BALDNER 
JONATHAN R BAUER* 
PAUL A BOlCE 
KIMBAL L GOWWND 
OEOPFREY J. MCCONNELLgt 
WAYNE V MEULEMAN 
ROBERT L. MILLER 
RICHARD W. MOLLERUP 
RICHARD L STACEY 
LAW OFFICES 
MEULEMAN & MILLER LLP 
BUSMESS LAW. R U L  ESTATE LAW CONSTRUCTION LAW 
960 BROADWAY AVENUE, SUlTE 500 
BOISE. IDAHO 83706 
PHONE 
(208) 342-6066 
FAX 
(208) 3369712 
WEB 
www.LwidPbo.com 
EM AIL 
moUwup@lawidaho.mm 
I JEFF R SYKES* TRACY V. VANCBt 'LICENSU) IN IDAHO & CALIPOFWIA m 0 L D  L. WAGNER tLICENSED IN IDAHO & UTAH 
*LICENSED IN MASSACHUSETTS ONLY 
May 18,2004 
VIA FACSIMILE (386-9428) & U.S. MAIL 
Terry C. Copple 
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox 
199 North Capitol Blvd., Suite 600 
P.O. Box 1583 
Boise, ID 83701 
Re: A k r s  v. White & Mortensen 
Our File No. 8684.005 
Dear Terry: 
This letter is to inform you that Stewart Title Guaranty Co. ("Stewart Title") has elected 
to pay Mr. and Mrs. Mortensen the amount of insurance for the access claim under their policy 
and, consequently, is no longer obligated to defend or prosecute litigation under the policy, The 
amount of insurance will be tendered to Mr. and Mrs. Mortensen as of Wednesday, May 19, 
2004, which will be the last clay Stewart Title will be responsible for any fees in connection with 
the above litigation. Please forward a final billing as of that date to Stewart Title. 
Thank you for all of your help in this matter. 
Richar W. M erup w 
RWM:aab 
cc: Stewart Title Guaranty Co. 
1:\8684,OD5\CORR\Copplc LO 1 .doc 
MICHAEL E BALDNER 
JONATHAh' R BAUER* 
PAUL A. BOlCE 
KIMBAL L. GOWLAND 
GEOFFREY J. MCCONNELLbt 
WAYNE V MEULFMAN 
ROBERT L. MlLLW 
RICHARD W. MOLLERUP 
RICHARD L. STACEY . 
JEFF R SYKES* 
TRACY v. VANCEt 
ARNOLD L. WAGNER 
LAW OFFICES 
MEULEMAN & MILLER LLP 
960 BROADWAY AVENUE, SUITE 500 
BOISE, IDAHO 83706 
PHONE 
(208) 342-6066 
FAX 
(208) 336-9712 
WEB 
m u w . l r w i ~ o . c o m  
EMAIL 
mollcrup@lwidaho.com 
*LICENSED IN mmo ~r CALIFORNU 
tLlCENSED IN lDAHO & UTAH 
*LICENSED IN MASSACHUSETTS ONLY 
May 18,2004 
VLA FACSIMILE (208-667-4034) & U.S. MAIL 
Michael E. Reagan 
Liesche Reagan & Wallace PA 
1044 Northwest Boulevard, Suite E 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83 8 14-2249 
Re: Akers v. White & Mortensen 
Our File No. 8684.005 
Dear Mr. Reagan: 
Tbis letter is to inform you that Stewart Title Guaranty Co. ("Stewart Title") has elected 
to pay Mr. and Mrs. White the amount of insurance for the access claim under their policy and, 
consequently, is no longer obligated to defend or prosecute litigation under the policy. The 
amount of insurance will be tendered to Mr. and Mrs. White as of Wednesday, May 19, 2004, 
which will be the last day Stewart Title will be responsible for any fees in connection with the 
above litigation. Please forward a final billing as of that date to Stewart Title. 
Thank you for all of your help in this matter. 
RWMaab 
cc: Stewart Title Guaranty Co. 
1:\8684.0DS\CORRUlcsgan LO1 .DOC 
EXHIBIT 7 
-- - - - . I b - -  e @ IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE Viewing Business Entity Ben Ysursa,  Secretary of S ta te  
[ New-Search ] [ Back t o  Summaw ] 
[ Get a certificate of existence for STEWART TITLE OF COEUR D'ALENE, INC. 1 
STEWART TITLE OF COEUR D'ALENE, INC.  
9196 W EMERALD #I00 
BOISE, I D  83704 
Type of Business: CORPORATION, GENERAL BUSINESS 
Status: GOODSTANDING, ANREPT SENT 02 Jul 2007 
State of  Origin: IDAHO 
Date o f  17 Sep 1997 
Origination/Authorization: 
Current Registered Agent: MIKE GROW 
9196 W EMERALD #I00 
BOISE, I D  83704 
Organizational I D  / Filing C120896 
Number: 
Number of Authorized Stock 100000 
Shares: 
Date of Last Annual Report: 16 Jul 2007 
Amendments: 
[ H e l ~  Me Print/View TIFF ] 
Amendment filed 17 Sep 1997 INCORPORATION View Image (TIFF format). 
Amendment fi led 27 Mar 2000 NAME CHANGED TO STEWART View Imaae 
TITLE OF COEUR D'ALENE, INC. [TIFF format) 
Amendment filed 11 Jan 2001 REINSTATEMENT View Imaae (TIFF format) 
Annual Reports: 
[ Help._Me.Pdnt/-vie @_TIFF I 
Report for year 2007 ANNUAL REPORT View Imaae (TIFF format) 
Report for year 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 
Report for year 2005 ANNUAL REPORT View Image [TIFF format) 
Report for year 2004 ANNUAL REPORT View Image (TIFF format) 
Report for year 2003 ANNUAL REPORT View I m a ~ e  (TIFF format) 
Report for year 2002 ANNUAL REPORT View Image (TIFF format) 
Report for year 2001 REINSTATEMENT View Imaae (TIFF format] 
Report for year 2001 ANNUAL REPORT View Image (TIFF format) 
Report for year 1999 ANNUAL REPORT View Image (TIFF format) 
Report for year 1998 ANNUAL REPORT View Imaqe (TIFF format) 
Idaho Secretary of State's Main Paqe State of Idaho Home Paae 
Comments, questions or  suggestions can be emailed to: sosinfo@sos.idaho.~ov 
Todd Reuter ISB # 5573 
KIRKPATRICK & LOCJSHART DE'PUTY 
PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP 
1200 Ironwood Drive. Suite 3 15 
Coeur d7Alene, 1dah0'83 8 14- 1 839 
Telephone: (208) 667- 1 83 9 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2494 
todd.reuter@klgates.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY 
OF COEUR D'ALENE, INC. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, I No. 07-4690 
Plaintiff, 
I Defendant. 1 
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT FONTE IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF COEUR 
D'ALENE, INC., 
Z z  1. I am over the age of 18 and am competent to testify to the matters set forth 
-( herein. , 
- 
a 2. This testimony is based on my own personal knowledge. 
0 3. I am the vice-president of Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene, Inc. 
JUDGMENT 
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT FONTE 
IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
4. Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene, Inc. is a corporation organized under Idaho law. 
It is not owned by Stewart Title Guaranty Company and is a separate company. 
5. I am aware of the Mortensen lawsuit against my employer. I have searched 
Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene, Inc.'s records for documents relating to Mr. Mortensen. I 
could find no file regarding Mr. Mortensen. I have also searched to determine whether 
Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene, Inc. ever insured him, issued a policy to him, or had any 
contract of any kind with him. I found no such records. So far as I could determine, 
Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene, Inc. never insured Mr. Mortensen, never issued him a 
policy and had no relationship with him. Indeed, my search revealed that we did not have 
any file on Mr. Mortensen or the Akers v. Mortensen lawsuit. 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI ) 
SCOTT FONTE, being first duly sworn, upon oath states as follows: 
I am the vice-president of Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene, h c .  I have read the 
foregoing Affidavit, know the contents thereof, and believe the same to be true and 
correct. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT FONTE 
IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
K:\2023782\00026\17034~TR\17034P24UT 
A 
SIGNED AND AFFIRMED before me on the // &'.day of 
4 7 2008, b y & p , / 3 . 7 7 -  "- ~ A I T F  
JOICE A HUPP 
Notary P U ~ I I C  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
17* ZOO@ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that o n m  day of January, 288"r; I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Hand Delivery Vernon J. Mortensen 
Facsimile Transmission 2 120 David Thompson Drive 
, First Class Mail PO Box D 
Over Night Delivery Bonners Ferry, ID 83804 ~ ~ p - ~   
Telephone: (208) 267- 1385 
Facsimile: (208) 267-1279 
n Todd Reuter 
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT FONTE 
IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
Todd Reuter ISB # 5573 
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 
PRESTON GATES QLLIS LLP 
1200 Ironwood Drive. Suite 3 15 
Coeur dYAlene, 1daho-83 8 14- 1 839 
Telephone: (208) 667- 1839 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2494 
todd.reuter@klgates.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY 
OF COEUR D'ALENE, INC. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, n\r AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF COEUR 
D'ALENE, INC., 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Defendant. I 
NO. 07-4690 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
4 '  
'77 ' Plaintiffs action should be dismissed because Defendant Stewart Title of Coeur 
4 ! 
a d'Alene, Inc. had no connection to the facts alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff alleges five 
llLI 
e separate causes of action against Defendant, who he repeatedly refers to only as "Stewart 
0 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 
1 
Title." Specifically, he alleges that "Stewart Title" issued a policy of title insurance, 
breached that contract, and committed fraud against Mr. Mortensen by paying him the 
policy limits and ending its relationship with him, rather than paying for the prosecution 
of an appeal as it had supposedly promised to do. Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene did 
none of those things. It did not insure Plaintiff, defend him, make promises to him, or pay 
him the policy limits. It had no relationship with him. These facts are beyond dispute and 
Mortensen has in fact admitted them all. 
Each of Mortensen's causes of action requires that he prove that either the 
defendant made representations to him, or that it had a contract with him. After all, there 
can be no fraud without a representation. Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 14 1 Idaho 
604, 114 P.3d 974 (2005), reh 'g denied. There can be no breach of insurance contract or 
bad faith if the defendant did not issue or underwrite Mortensen's insurance contract. 
Independence Lead Mines v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 137 P.3d 409 (2006). 
There was no relationship between the parties, so there can be no punitive damages claim. 
If someone committed the alleged acts, it was not the named defendant. Mr. 
Mortensen has no basis to recover against Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene. He 
nevertheless refuses to dismiss his claims, despite being told repeatedly that he named an 
uninvolved entity. 
11. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Mortensen's claims concern his effort to develop property in the Post Falls 
area in the mid-1 990s to early 2000s. He bought his property in 1994. Affidavit of Todd 
Reuter In Support of Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, Ex. 1,72 (Mortensen 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 
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Aff. in Akers v. Mortensen, e f  al, Kootenai County Case No. CV-02-222). An unrelated 
entity, North Idaho Title, issued Mortensen's title policy, Id. North Idaho Title was, at 
that time, an agent of Stewart Title Guaranty Company, but it was in no way connected to 
Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene. Affidavit of John Holt Regarding Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, 7, 15. North Idaho Title issued the policy and Stewart Title 
Guaranty was the actual insurance company. Holt Aff. 
Mortensen's policy insured access to the property, among other things. Holt Aff., 
9, Ex. 2. According to the instant complaint, the access route crossed property owned by 
Dennis and Sherrie Akers. Complaint, 7. The Akers disputed Mortensen's right to cross 
their property, and sued him for trespass, among other causes of action. Id., 10. Stewart 
Title Guaranty Company retained attorney Michael Reagan to defend Mr. Mortensen. 
Holt Aff., I 1. The Honorable John T. Mitchell presided over the trial and decided the 
case by written findings and conclusions issued January 2,2003. Reuter Aff., Ex. 3. 
Mortensen alleges (correctly) that Akers prevailed. Complaint, 24. 
Judge Mitchell's ruling included damage awards against Mr. Mortensen for 
punitive damages ($1 50,000), treble damages (over $5 1,000), and emotional distress 
damages ($10,000). Reuter Aff., Ex. 4. Judge Mitchell's detailed Memorandum Decision 
issued April 1,2004, is enlightening and worthy of this court's review. Reuter Aff., Ex. 4 
(see discussion of damage award at pages 12-28). Judge Mitchell reinstated the exact 
damages awards on remand. Id., Ex. 9,75-7. 
Mr. Mortensen contends in his complaint that following Judge Mitchell's April 
decision, "Stewart Title" "represented to and assured" him that it would assist with an 
appeal. Complaint, 26. But rather than continue with the case, "Stewart Title" elected to 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
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pay Mortensen the limits of his insurance policy ($200,000) and advised him to retain his 
own counsel. Id., 29. By Federal Express letter dated May 18,2004, Stewart Title 
Guaranty -not Stewart Title of Coeur dYAlene - told Mr. Mortensen that under the terms 
of the policy "the payment or tender of payment of the amount of the insurance terminates 
all liability to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation. Therefore, Stewart Title will 
not be prosecuting the appeal in Akers v. White and Mortensen." Holt Aff., Ex. 5. Nearly 
identical letters were also faxed to Mortensen's lawyers, Id., Ex. 6. Thus, Mortensen 
knew by May 18 or 19,2004, that Stewart Title Guaranty was not going to defend him 
through an appeal. He also knew that Stewart Title Guaranty was the entity with which he 
was dealing, not Stewart Title of Coeur dYAlene. Mortensen nevertheless sued Stewart 
Title of Coeur dYAlene. His complaint was filed on July 2, 2007, over three years after he 
learned that Stewart Title Guaranty had ended its relationship with him. 
Stewart Title of Coeur dYAlene is an Idaho corporation. Mortensen pleads several 
counts in his complaint, including fraud (Count One). The essence of the fraud claim is 
that "Stewart Title" promised him "that it would see them through the entire legal action" 
but that when it saw the size of the judgments, "refused to defend" further. Complaint, 
32,33. His cause of action for breach of contract (Count Three) also focuses on the claim 
that "Stewart Title" walked out on him. Specifically, he contends that the parties "had a 
contract by virtue of the Title Insurance Policy insuring access to the Mortensen 
Property," and that the contract was breached when "Stewart Title failed to fully defend 
Mortensen in the Lawsuit." Id., 37,39. His other causes of action (punitive damages, 
bad faith and emotional distress) all stem from these same facts and attribute all the 
alleged wrongdoing to Stewart Title of Coeur d7Alene, not Stewart Title Guaranty. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
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Defendant answered the complaint on August 6,2007. Its answer includes the 
defenses that it did not issue the policy at issue (Defense No. 5) and that Mortensen named 
the wrong defendant. (Defense No. 6). Defendant's answers to Mr. Mortensen's written 
discovery also made clear that Stewart Title of Coeur d' Alene was an uninvolved entity. 
111. ARGUMENT 
Stewart Title of Coeur dYAlene had no involvement in any of the facts that form 
the basis of the complaint. It did not insure Mr. Mortensen or issue him a policy. 
Affidavit of Scott Fonte In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, 5. It did not even 
exist in 1994 when Mr. Mortensen bought his policy from the unrelated North Idaho Title. 
Holt Aff., 15, Ex. 7. Mortensen's claims all stem from the allegation that "Stewart Title" 
left him in the lurch by declining to pay for the prosecution of an appeal. Stewart Title of 
Coeur d'Alene had nothing to do with that decision. Holt Aff., 16. It did not defend 
Mortensen and it did not decide to pay him the policy limits. Id. It played no role in the 
Akers case. Id. After all, it did not issue him a policy, so it would have had no basis to be 
involved. Indeed it did not even have a file regarding Mortensen or the Akers v. 
Mortensen lawsuit. Fonte Aff., 5. 
Mortensen's causes of action for breach and bad faith are premised upon the 
existence of a contract between the parties. See Complaint, 37,42. There is no such 
contract. Fonte Aff., 5; Holt Aff., 16. Mr. Mortensen nevertheless alleges that "Stewart 
Title has an obligation to Mortensen to perform the terms of the insurance contract in 
good faith." Complaint, 41. He further alleges that "Stewart Title" "failed to perform the 
terms of the insurance contract in good faith." Id., 42. The only contract Mortensen 
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entered was his 1994 insurance contract that was issued by North Idaho Title. North 
Idaho Title is not connected to Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene or its predecessor, Stewart 
Title of North Idaho. Holt Aff., 15. Defendant had no involvement in Mortensen's 
contract with North Idaho Title. Holt Aff., 17; Fonte Aff,, 5 .  
Mortensen does not appear to contest the basic facts regarding the defendant's lack 
of involvement. He did not answer the five Requests for Admission that Defendant served 
on him on November 16,2007. Reuter Aff., Ex. 8. Regardless of whether the absence of 
answers was a deliberate concession, Civil Rule 36(a) provides that: 
The matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request, 
or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to 
whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the 
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed 
under oath by the party or by the party's attorney, unless the court shortens 
the time. 
Moreover, CR 36(b) expressly states that any matter admitted "is conclusively 
established" unless the court grants a motion to withdraw or amend. There has been no 
such motion. The result is that by failing to answer the Requests, Mortensen has admitted: 
That Defendant never issued him a title policy. RFA 1 
That Defendant never insured him. RFA 2. 
That Defendant made no representations to him. RFA 3. 
That Defendant never represented or defended him. RFA 4. 
That he was not an insured under the policy Defendant issued to Whites. RFA 5. 
Reuter Aff., Ex. 8. 
But in any case, Mortensen could not in good faith deny these requests given the 
evidence and law set out above. Without a representation, a contract or a relationship, 
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there can be no fraud, breach or bad faith. Mr. Mortensen simply has no basis on which to 
recover from Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene. His claims should be dismissed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Defendant Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene respectfully requests sumhary 
judgment dismissal of all claims for the reasons set out above. 
DATED this 17th day of January, 2008. 
* Todd Reuter, I B # 5573 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on 17th day of January, 2008, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Hand Delivery Vernon J. Mortensen 
Facsimile Transmission 2 120 David Thompson Drive 7 First Class Mail PO Box D 
Over Night Delivery Bonners Ferry, ID 83804 
Telephone: (208) 267- 13 85 
Facsimile: (208) 267- 1279 
Todd Reuter A 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 
7 
Todd Reuter ISB # 5573 
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 
PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP 
1200 Ironwood Drive, Suite 3 15 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 838 14-1 839 
Telephone: (208) 667- 1 839 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2494 
todd.reuter@klgates.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY 
OF COEUR D'ALENE, INC. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF COEUR 
D'ALENE, INC., 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE AND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
-- 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE COURT; 
AND TO: . Plaintiff, Vernon Jerry Mortensen. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Stewart Title of Coeur d' Alene, Inc. 
will bring on for hearing, its Motion for Summary Judgment on Tuesday, February 19, 
2007, at 3:30 p.m. at the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, in and 
for the County of Kootenai, before the Honorable Lansing L. Haynes. 
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE AND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT - I 
K \2023782\00026\17034-TR\17034P24UV 
Defendant Stewart Title of Coeur d' Alene moves this Court for an order granting 
summary judgment dismissal of the case, pursuant to Civil Rule 56. Defendant further 
seeks an award of its attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12- 120(3) and 5 12- 
12 1. This motion is supported by Defendant's Memorandum and by the affidavits of John 
Holt, Scott Fonte and Todd-Reuter being filed herewith. 
DATED this 17th day of January, 2008. 
Attorneys fo; ~e fendan t  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on 1 7th day of January, 2008,I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Hand Delivery Vernon J. Mortensen 
Facsimile Transmission 2 120 David Thompson Drive 
-7 First Class Mail 
Over Night Delivery 
PO Box D 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83804 
Telephone: (208) 267- 1 3 85 
Facsimile: (208) 267-1 279 
f Todd Reuter 
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE AND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT - 2 
Sam Johnson 
JOHNSON C% MONTELEONE, L.L.P. 
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-2100 
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424 
gam@treasur~vaNeYlawyersS corn 
Idaho State Bar No. 4777 
STATE Of lOAH0 COUNfY OF I(r?',lTEW 
FILED. 
)ss 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
COMES NOW, Sam Johnson, of the firm of Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P., and 
hereby gives his Notice of Appearance on behalf of Plaintiff, VERNON JERRY 
MORTENSEN, in this cause of action, and requests that all documents and pleadings 
filed herein be served upon said attorneys at 405 S. 8' Street, Suite 250, Boise, Idaho 
83702. 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF 
COUER D'ALENE, INC 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - I. 
Case No. CV-07-4690 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
DATED this 29'b day of January, 2008. 
JOHNSON C WNTELEONE, L.L.P. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on the 2gdi day of January, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document to be: 
L I Fax: (208) 344-8542 I 
1 
CI mailed 
0 hand delivered 
transmitted fax machine ' to: 208-765-2494 
JOHNSON Br M(#NTELEONE, L.L.P. 
Todd Reuter, Esq. 
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, Preston Gates Ellis, L.L.P. 
1200 Ironwood Drive, Suite 3 15 
Coeur d' Alehe, ID 83 8 14- 183 9 
~ t t o ! . e ~  for piantiff 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2 
Todd Reuter ISB # 5573 
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 
PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP 
1200 Ironwood Drive, Suite 3 15 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 838 14- 1839 
Telephone: (208) 667-1 839 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2494 
todd.reuter@klgates.com 
6TATE OF IDAHI2 
'COUNTY OF KOOTEHAl} ss 
VILE2: 
Attorneys for Defendant 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY 
OF COEUR D'ALENE, INC. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STEWART TITLE GUARANTY 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
NO. 07-4690 
AFFIDAVIT OF TODD REUTER IN 
SUPPORT OF STEWART TITLE 
GUARANTY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify. 
I 2. The matters set forth herein are based on my own personal knowledge. 
3. I am counsel for the defendant in this matter. 
AFFIDAVIT OF TODD 
REUTER IN SUPPORT OF 
STEWART TITLE 
GUARANTY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
4. I have reviewed various pleadings from the court file in Akers v. Mortensen, et 
al, Kootenai County Case No. CV-02-222 and obtained copies of various pleadings from 
that file. It is my understanding that Judge Mitchell initially decided the case on January 
2,2003, and then issued further findings and conclusions. Attached hereto are true and 
correct copies of some of those pleadings. It is my further understanding that the case was 
appealed (see Akers v. DL White et al, 142 Idaho 293 (2005)), remanded, decided, then 
appealed again, and that the case is presently on appeal. 
5. Exhibit I hereto is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of VJ Mortensen In 
Support of Motion For Summary Judgment filed in the Akers case on June 12,2002. 
6. Exhibit 3 hereto is a true and correct copy of the court's January 2, 2003, 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
7. Exhibit 4 hereto is a true and correct copy of the court's April 1,2004 
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order. 
8. Exhibit 5 hereto is a true and correct copy of the Third Amended Judgment and 
Decree on Remand, filed in the Akers case on December 8,2006. 
9. Exhibit 7 hereto is a true and correct copy of the Complaint filed in the Akers v. 
Mortensen et a1 case on January 10,2002. 
10. Exhibit 8 hereto is a true and correct copy of the Memorandum Opinion and 
Order Denying Defendants; Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 16, 2002. 
1 1. Exhibit 10 hereto is a true and correct copy of the Judgment and Decree, filed 
May 25,2004. 
AFFIDAVIT OF TODD 
REUTER IN SUPPORT OF 
STEWART TITLE 
GUARANTY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
K ~2023782\00026\17034~TR\17034P24VI 
12. Exhibit 1 1 hereto is a true and correct copy of pages from the Court Trial - 
Volume I transcript, September 9, 10 and 1 1,2002. 
13. Exhibit 15 hereto is a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs Objections, Answers 
and Responses To Defendant's First Set Of Interrogatories And Requests For Production 
Of Documents. These were sent to me by email on February 15, 2008. A true and correct 
copy of the email is included in Exhibit 12. 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SPOKANE 1 
TODD REUTER, being first duly sworn, upon oath states as follows: 
I have read the foregoing Affidavit, know the contents thereof, and believe the 
same to be true and correct. 
*kT To d Reuter 
4 SIGNED AND AFFIRMED before me on the 19 day of 
AFFIDAVIT OF TODD 
REUTER IN SUPPORT OF 
STEWART TITLE 
GUARANTY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on 19th day of February, 2008, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile Transmission 
First Class Mail 
?( Over Night Delivery 
X Email 
Sam Johnson 
405 South Eighth Street 
Suite 250 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax No. 208-947-2424 
sam~treasurevalleylawyers.con~ 
AFFIDAVIT OF TODD 
REUTER IN SUPPORT OF 
STEWART TITLE 
GUARANTY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
Exhibit 1 
Michael E. Reagan 
LIESCHE, REAGAN, WALLACE 
& WALLACE, P.A. 
1044 Northwest Boulevard 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: 2061664-1 561 
Facsimile: 2081667-4054 
CF IlCKli 
.'.-.CTF;,$J } ss 
C . a .  " .U J -. 
FILED +f 
2D02 JUH 1 2 AH 9: 3 1 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO; IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.) Case No. CV 02-222 
AKERS, husband and wife, 1 
Plaintiffs, 1 
) 
vs. 1 AFFIDAVIT OF V. J. MORTENSEN 
1 SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DAVID L. WHITE and MlCHELLE V. ) -* ' C . .- 
WHITE, husband and wife; and 1 
VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI ) 
E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, ) 
Defendants. 
1 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS. 
County of Kootenai ) 
VERNON J. MORTENSEN, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the defendants in the above-entitled matter. 
AFFIDAVIT OF VERNON J. MORTENSEN, Page 1 
. . . a m r r - -  , - - J , . - ! L - h , I l  ,.--- ,.=..-a - - - - - a  
2. In September 1994,l purchased 160 acres from Mr. and Mrs. Peplinski. At 
the time of purchase, North Idaho Title insured the ingress and egress to the property on 
an existing road going up a hi1 to the property past the property of the Plaintiffs Akers. 
3. . At the time I purchased the 160 acres, I also purchased from Mr. Peplinski 
an oversized gate that was installed at the entrance end of the access road that leads to 
both the property I purchased and to the home of the Akers. Mr. Akers and I agreed with 
to keep the gate closed as a deterrent to trespassing, but unlocked, except during hunting 
season. We each had a key to my .lock on my gate. Starting in December, 2001 , 1 sold 
120 of the 160 acres I purchased from the Peplinskis to Defendants White. 
4. Since my purchase of the property in 1994,l have regularly and continuohsly 
used the subject private roadway for an access to and ftom my property. Over the years, 
I have logged portions of the 160 acres, with logging equipment and trucks passing and re- 
passing on the roadway. Over the years, I have used the road for recreational use of my 
land as well as agricultural uses. I have had any number of real estate agent's prospective 
purchasers and agents pass and re-pass the roadway as access to my 160 acres over the 
years. 
5. When I purchased the property in 1994, the bad had a graveled surface 
which had been recently graded and graveled and the width of the improvements took up 
most of the area between the Reynolds' and the Akers' fences. I used the curved portion 
of the road near the approach, as I did the remainder of the road, because I believed I had 
the right to do so, never having asked for of received the permission of the Akers to use 
the road or any part of it. 
6. Over the years since I purchased the property, I have performed repairs and 
maintenancelimprovements to the road. I have placed, or caused to be placed, gravel or 
fill material o n  the road bed, graded, and made other improvements to the road with heavy 
equipment. 
7. 1 do not believe that any of my use, maintenance or improvement of the 
roadway has ever damaged Mr. Akers or increased the burden on his property, and he has 
never made any such claim to me until the filing of this lawsuit. 
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cars, I have not mted *upon Um property d the Akers. 
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Akers' pro pa^, there was no otbr acms to my umpmly. ExeePfw this @mte -. 
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My 40 acres is cwrlpletely sumwnded by prfvate3c ummed land y\d I )rave ths right d 
mrough me 120 acres I said bp Defendants WhiQc b connect to the partibn of h 
subject private a d w a y ,  but othenuise, 1 have no legal access to get to a puM;c r i p h f -  
way. Except for the subjed private WcWay. my 40 a m  is cdmploOJy kmdbdced. 
& e h  accessible on)y by air, 
10. I have a great and present necessity to an -anent wer and acrw.8 the 
subject p h t e  roadway to cmthue udng my pmpcwly In the way that I have Elnae I 
pwchmd it in tQ94 and for any h @ t  IWU~ purpase. 
1 1. Just oqor to my purdrve of the pmw hwn the PepWs, the PeplinsMs 
obtained a restraining wder a@wt tb Aken from laking any ~ W P  that would change, 
modify wlirnit th6 use af equipment ufthePlalntiffawMi or in- w)lh Peplins4cj 
in using the road. Tine Pepht is  hud daimd that the A b m  had damaged m e  of the 
improverrmnt the Peplinsfcis h d  msde bthe road and WWeintsrfehg with the Peprb&b' 
use of the road. Thi?t casa was eventualfy settled and my ur,de~€tar.dhp WW that I had the 
rm b use, msintair;, repair and impme the R18d, Which I did Up about the tbm d 
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Further your afiiant sayeth naught 
! LIU 
VERNON 3.khORTENSEN 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the & day of June, 2002, a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing document was served upon: 
Leander L. James, Esq. 7 %!veied Owens, James & Vernon, P.A 
Overnight Mail 
- 
1250 Ironwood Dr., Ste. 320 
- Facsimile P 0 Box 1578 Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 6-1 578 
Fax: 664-1684 
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STATE OF IDAHO 1 
Colmty of KOOTENAI )= 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIE-LE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. 
AKERS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON 
J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. 
MORTENSEN, husband and wife, 
Defendants. I 
Case No. 'CV-02-222 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and 
ORDER 
I 
1. Defendants Whites and  ort tens ens are respective marital communities 
residing in and owning property in Kootenai County, Idaho, and are subject to the 
personal jurisdiction of this Court, and venue is  properly with this Court. 
2. Defendant D. L. White Construction, Inc., is an Idaho corporation engaged in 
construction and development in Kootenai C o u ~ t y ,  Idaho, and is subject to the 
jurisdiction of this Court. 
3. Defendants Mortensens are engaged in farming, ranching and land 
development in North Idaho. 
. . n4 8 r- 
'.') 4. Plaintiffs are a marital community residing in Kootenai County, Idaho, and I ..- 
--.-- -.- -. cr r n w r r  I lcrnwc nF LA\V and ORDER Pazc I 
boundary of Government Lot 2. Plaintiffs are returned to the sole and exclusive 
possession of plaintiffs' real property to the west of the western boundary of Government 
Lot 2, and as to the eastern portion of plaintiffs land, defendants have an easement over 
plaintiffs' land as described supra in Conclusion of Law 1 1. Defendants and 
defendants'property are subject to ejectement from plaintiffs' real property located west 
of the western boundary of Government Lot 2, by the S h e d  by issuance of Writs of 
Assistance, Possession, and Eviction, if needed. A permanent injunction restraining the 
defendants from further trespass upon, and interference with, the plaintiffs' quiet 
enjoyment of plaintiffs' real property is GRANTED. 
28. Plaintiffs are the prevailing party. While an  express easement exists in favor 
of defendants, the existence of that easement was not in dispute by plaintiffs. The 
location of that easement was in dispute, and plaintiffs prevailed as to the issue of 
location of the easement. Plaintiffs prevailed on defendants claims of implied easement, 
easement by implication (continuous use prior to severance), and easement by 
prescription. Plaintiffs have obtained the relief sought, defendants have not. 
ENTERED t h i s 2 d  day of January, 2003. 
Y"i T. Mitchell, District Judge w 
Certificate of Service 
I certify that on the > day of January, 2003, a true copy of the foregoing was 
mailed postage prepaid or was sent by interoffice mail or facsimile to each of the following: 
Michael E. Reagan Leander L. James 
Attorney at Law 1301 West Lakewood Dr. 
1044 Northwest Boulevard Ste. 200 ' 
Coeur d' Alene. ID 838 14 Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 14 
AX: (208) 667-4034 
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STATE OF IDAHO 1 
County of KOOTENAI )= 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTE.NA.1 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. 
AKERS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
D. L. WHlTE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID 
L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHlTE, husband 
and wife; and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and 
MARTI E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-02-222 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION, ON 
NEW TRIAL ISSUES, AND ADDlTlON14L 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW REGARDING DAMAGES and 
ORDER 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. .. - 
-c-- 
Court trial in this matter began on September 9,2002. The parties told the Court at the 
June, 28,2002 this would be a three day court trial. After three days of trial, ending on 
September 1 1,2002, the matter was continued to October 15,2002. AftR the first few days of 
trial, and upon the suggestion of the Court, this matter was bifurcated by stipulation of the 
parties. The existence or non-existence of various easements was tried first, the issue of , 
damages left to a later point in time. Thne more days of trial occurred between October 15-17, 
2002, and an additional day on October 21,2002. Briefing and proposed findings w m  
submitted by all parties. 
-.; '.. 
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The Court issued its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order" on January 3, 
2003. Essentially, the Court ruled defendants have an express easement over plaintiffs Akers' 
property along the southern border bf ~ovemment Lot 2, but that the easement ends on the 
western boundary of Government Lot 2, thus, the easement does not run all the way to 
defendants' land. Conclusion of Law n 1-2'6. The Court ruled defmdants did not have a 
prescriptive easement across any other portion of Akers' property (Conclusion of Law fin 3-5) 
and the defendants did not have an implied easement by necessity across any other portion of 
Akers' land. Conclusion of Law 7 7. The Court also ruled that the Akers owned to the 
centerline of Millsap Loop Road (Conclusion of Law flu 7,8), and that Akers are the owners of 
the disputed triangular area to the east of their property, either by direct deed (Id.) or by the 
Kelsch-Akers deed. Conclusion of Law '11 9. The Court ruled defendants conduct resulted in 
damages to be later determined (Conclusion of Law 7 14,23) , that defendants engaged in 
malicious, oppressive, wanton and grossly negligent conduct (Conclusion of Law 17 15-1 8), a .  
that they wi lWy trespassed on Akers' land. Conclusion of Law '11 13. 
In the Court's March 26,2003 Order, Costs to Akers were allowed in the amount of 
.. - , -c-- . 
.. ' * .- .'L ... 
$5,793.01, the issue of attorney fees was left to be heard after the completion of the trial on 
damages. 
Defendants filed a "Motion for a New Trial" under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(4) on August 21,2003. 
Defendants moved for a New Trial and for a continuation of the trial on damages due to "newly 
discovered evidence". At the September 2,2003 hearing, it became apparent that defense 
. 
counsel had this "newly discovered evidence" since at least the spring of 2003 (in fact, Alan 
Kiebert testified he had given Mortensen this new information in January 2003), so this material 
was hardly "newly discovered" evidence. The motion to vacate and continue the trial was 
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denied, but the motion for new trial was granted. The Motion for New Trial was characterized 
by the Court as a motion to "re-open" the previous trial, based on this "new" evidence. The 
Court has discretion to reopen a c&e prior to final judgment, to allow the presentation of 
additional evidence and testimony. Davison 's Air Service, Inc., 119 Idaho 967, 8 12 P.2d 274 
(1991). The trial on Akers' damages and the defendants' 'TJew Trial" (re-opened trial) began 
December 16,2003, carried over to December 17,2003 and concluded December 22,2003. 
Again, all parties submitted proposed findings and briefing. 
On September 3,2003, Akers filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's granting. 
of defendants' Motion for a New Trial, and on November 11,2003 the Court denied Akers' 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
On October 3,2003, Akers moved for leave to file a second amended complaint, to allow 
a claim for punitive damages by Sherrie Akers, and on November 17,2003 and Order was filed 
granting such pursuant to LRC.P. IS@). 
Finally, on November 5,2003, defendants Mortensens filed a 'Motion for 
Reconsideration of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Filed January 2,2003, or 
. - . .J--- 
, '  * - . i -. 
Alternatively Motion to Certify Order Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(B)." Defendants Mortensens 
claimed that "new facts exist that would effect the original decision of this Court, the substantive 
law on easements was not fully explored by counsel and presented to this court, and for other 
grounds and reasons that will be further explored in the Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, which will be forthcoming." Id., p. 2. On November 21,2003 a brief in 
support was filed by defendants Mortensens, and Mortensens noticed up their motions for the 
morning of trial on December 16,2003. The Mortensens in that brief ask the Court to reconsider 
its finding number seven that the easement was approximately 12.2 feet in width (Memorandum 
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in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 2-3), its finding number eleven that Jim Meckel 
did not visit the area when he laid out the subdivision map (Id., pp. 3 4 ,  and its findings number 
eighteen, twenty, twenty-six, twent+eight, twenty-nine, thirty, thirty-five and thrity-six (Id. pp. 
4-9), though later they more candidly state they want the "entire Findings of Fact" reconsidered. 
Id. p. 9. Mortensens also wanted the Court's conclusions of law as to express easement (Id., pp. 
10-16), and easement by implication (Id., pp. 16-22) reconsidered. Akers responded with a brief 
on December 8,2003. Oral argument was held on December 16,2003. The Court advised 
counsel for defendants Mortensons, that the LR.C.P. 54(b) issue had previously been raised by 
prior counsel for Mortensens, and was denied by the Court on March 26,2003. The motion to 
reconsider was taken under advisement, the parties were told the Court would issue its decision 
on these motions along with its additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
II. COURT'S RULING ON MORTENSENS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
As shorn immediately above, defendants Mortensens in essence disagreed with the 
entirety'of this Court's January 2,2003 Order. 
.S 
. b .. .a- -- 
First, the ~ortensens ask the C o w  to reconsider its finding number seven that the 
easement was approximately 12.2 feet in width. Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, pp. 2-3. That finding is consistent with the testimony of Scott Rasor, with Scott 
Rasor's survey. Since the January 2,2003 Order, the Court has personally waked the entire 
length of that easement along with counsel for all parties. The qew of the premises solidifies the 
Court's finding. That finding is consistent with the requisite law that "A grant indefinite as to 
width and location must impose no greater biuden than is necessary. Coulsen v. Aberdeen- 
Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619,628,277 P. 542,545 (1929). 
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Second, Mortensens ask the Court to reconsider its finding number eleven that Jim 
Meckel did not visit the area when he laid out the subdivision map. Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 3-4. This Court's Finding of Fact 1 11 reads in part: 
This Court finds Millsap Loop Road has never traversed the path depicted on the 1980 
Meckel Record of Survey (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 15 and 6), and that the surveyor who 
prepared such documents could not have visited the site to verify the actual location of 
Millsap Loop Road. Scott Rasor testified that apparently Jim Meckel did not survey at 
the time he laid out the subdivision map, and this Court finds that opinion to be fully 
supported by the evidence. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 11. Since those findings were made, Jim 
Meckel testified. ' In his testimony, Meckel testified he recalled being present at the time the 
record of survey was made, that he had a clear recollection of locating the wells, but everythrng 
else was not clear some twenty-five years later. What was clear was that he was wrong on 
Exhibit BB and Z in the way he depicted Millsap Loop Road. The only correction made to the 
above finding, then, is that Jim Meckel was present when he prepared that survey. The corrected 
Finding of Fact 1 1 1 reads: 
This Court finds Millsap Loop Road h b  never traversed the pith ddeptkd 5ii the 1980 
Meckel Record of Survey. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 15 and Defendants' Exhibit Z. Millsap 
Loop Road actually traversed the path shown on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 179. 
Jim Meckel, the surveyor who prepared Plaintif&' Exhibit 15 and Defendants' Exhibit Z 
made a mistake and did not accurately depict and did not verify the actual location of 
Millsap Loop Road. Early in the trial Scott Rasor testified that apparently Jim Meckel 
did not survey at the time he laid out the subdivision map, and this Court found that 
opinion to be fully supported by the evidence. However, later in the trial, Jim Meckel 
testified that he was present, but he acknowledged that he did make a mistake on the 
location of the Millsap Loop Road. Jim Meckel's presence at the time of the survey is 
really immaterial. What is material, is the location of Millsap Loop Road, and Jim 
Meckel c o k e d  that it was located as shown on Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 179 and not as 
shown on Exhibit 15 and Exhibit Z. . 
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Third, defendants correctly note that finding number nineteen [defendants errantly called 
out finding number eighteen, Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration, p. 41 incorrectly 
stated that ". . .contained in plaintiffs Exhibit 3, 175, Warranty Deed W.L. Millsaps and 
Akers.. .", that the deed is between Millsaps and Baker. Accordingly, finding number eighteen 
is corrected to read in pertinent part "...contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3, 175, Warranty Deed 
W.L. Millsaps and Baker had the following charachteristics.. .". 
Fourth, defendants correctly note that Defendants' Exhbit D5 was not admitted at trial. 
Finding of Fact i[ 20 reads in part: 
On April 13,1984, in an affidavit admitted into evidence, W.L. Millsaps explained that in 1966 
when they sold to Bakers, his intent was to reserve an access easement over the roadway right of 
way as the same then existed for ingress and egress for "farming equipmentyy which consisted of 
"trucks", and "various types of field equipment such as combines". Defendants' Exhibit D5. 
This affidavit only speaks to the written easement across the southern portion of Government Lot 
2. In the affidavit, W.L. Millsaps does not claim to have ever given any sort of easement to the 
west of the western boundary of Government Lot 2. According to that Affidavit, the land to the 
west of the western boundary of Government Lot 2 {the land in section 24) was sold to the 
Peplinskis. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, pp. 6-7. However, Peplinski, Millsap and 
Reynolds all testified that that easement was used for farm e&ipment. All other portions of 
.. - 
. .r.' 8 
-.-i -. 
Finding of Fact 7 20 remain. 
Fifth, as pertains to finding number 26,28,29,30,25 and 36, the Court has reviewed 
defendants objections set forth in Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, pp. 5-7. The Court stands by its original findings and is not persuaded by 
defendants' arguments. 
Regarding the Court's prior Conclusions of Law, the defendants first argue that they have 
an express easement which ". . .spans fiom the approach from Millsap Loop Road, a l l  the way 
through Government Lot 2, and crossing over the Section line, and then turning onto Defendants' 
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Property." Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 10. Defendants conclude 
their lengthy argument with the equally unsupported claim: 'Tollowing the well-established 
principles of law, Defendants have express easement over and across the entire access road as 
it traverses to their 160 acres." Id. p. 16. The fatal flaw to this argument is there is no express 
easement beyond the boundary of Government Lot 2 on the west. Defendants' easement dead 
ends at that boundary. Any easement beyond that vanished under the doctrine of merger, as 
previously addressed' by the Court in Findings of Fact 15-1 7, Conclusion of Law '1[ 1. 
Defendants arguments regarding Seacombe v. Weeks, 115 Idaho 433,767 P.2d 276 (1989) are 
misplaced. 
Next, regarding the Court's prior Conclusions of Law, defendants argue: '?n addition to 
the express easement through Plaintiffsy property, Defendants have an implied easement by prior 
use for the very small portion of the access road that traverses over Government Lot 2 into 
Section 24." Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 16. Defendants 
correctly note the elements of an easement by implication from prior use (Id.), but incorrectly 
apply the facts of this case to those elements. The easement by implication theory advanced by 
- C . ' .  - .  
. : '.. .' C .-L - 
defendants, applies only to that tiny section of land which Akers own lying west of Government 
Lot 2. This Court previously found that in 1948, W.L. Millasps purchased the servient estate of 
the aforementioned 20' by 50' easement, creating unity of title between the dominant and 
servient estates of said easement. Finding of Fact, 7 17. This Court also previously noted that 
"Bill Millsaps was also unclear as to whether the access road went on to Reynolds' property or 
whether it went on that portion of plaintiffs land west of the western boundary of Government 
Lot 2." Findings of Fact, 1 21, pp. 7-8.  hep pertinent time period is 1948. Defendants have not 
met their burden of proving that this roadway in 1948 actually continued on beyond the west 
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boundary of Government Lot 2, or whether it dipped down onto Reynolds' land before reaching 
the western boundary of Government Lot 2. Thus, the element of "continuous use" was not met 
by defendants, indeed, proof of "any use" was not met by defendants. Moving to times more 
recent than 1948, Akers testified that at the time he purchased the property in 1980, the road at 
the top of the hill did not exist and that it has been developed with his permission since he 
purchased the property. There is another element lacking in defendants' easement by implication 
fiom prior use theory. The element of "reasonable necessity" is lacking. The Court has already 
discussed the fact that: "The testimony of Mr. Morteken himself, that he felt he had access 
through this back way causes defendants to fail in that burden of proof." Findings of Fact, 
Conclusion of Law and Order, Conclusion of Law 7 7, p. 22. This Court now makes clear that 
such finding, based on Mr. Mortensen's own testimony, applies to both the element of necessity 
for the theory of easement by necessity, and the element of "reasonable necessity" for the theory . . 
of implied easement by prior use. There is a distinction, as noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637,642,991 P.2d 362,367 (1999). This Court specifically h d s  
defendants have not met their burden of proving reasonable necessity, due to the testimony of 
.:t- - 
-: 8 - -a- -- 
Mr. Mortensen. Finally, defendants urge the Memorandum Decision issued by First District 
Judge Charles Hosack in Thomas L. Jaeger, et al. v. Lowell K Nickens, et al., Case No. CV-99 
5213 is instructive. The Court has reviewed such decision, and it is not factually on point. In 
Jaeger, the Court was not presented with a failure of the defendants to prove where this road 
actually went. As discussed above, defendants have failed to prove that back in 1948, when 
merger occurred, that this road traveled west beyond the western boundary of Government Lot 2 
before bending south, or whether it bent south onto Reynolds' land before it even reached 
Government Lot 2. 
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11. COURT'S RULING ON "NEW TRIALn ISSUES. 
Defendants' August 2 1,2003 'Motion for New Trial and Motion to Vacate Trial Setting 
on Damages" was based upon an &davit of Micheal E. Reagan and an Affidavit of Alan V. 
Kiebert dated and filed the same date, and another ffidavit of Alan V. Kiebert filed August 25, 
2003. The essence of those affidavits is that the Post Falls Highway District records showed a 
"Millsap Road No. 229", and that this roadway was additional to and different from Millsap 
Loop Road, previously known as Plonske Road or No. 98. The argument was that this Millsap 
Road No. 229 right of way was in the area of the disputed triangular area on the east side of 
Akres' land, and that if this area was covered by a public right of way, defendants could not have 
trespassed upon the eastern portion of Akres' land. 
Alan Kiebert testified at length about the viewer's report for Millsap Road. Exhibit A. 
He testified about Millsap Road 229. He testified that in his opinion, Millsap Road 229 was a 
valid right of way even at the present time. Kiebert testified about the location of an old school 
house, which is key to the location of that right of way, but that schoolhouse was located by 
Kiebert through comments made by Bill Reynolds who was not alive at the time the schoolhouse 
. :6' 
- '  6 - I C - - . L  -- 
existed. Kiebert testified he could have used a different method (the schoolhouse that does not 
exist) as opposed to using the quarter comer, to determine the location of this Millsap Road 229. 
Bill ~e.ynolcis testified in rebuttal he had never spoken with Kiebert, he testified he has no 
personal knowledge of whether what is shown in Exhibit E was a schoolhouse, he has been told 
it was a schoolhouse but it has no foundation under it. Reynolds has also heard theremay have 
been two schoolhouses near there at the turn of the century. 
Mike Kaes is a professional land surveyor in Washington and Idaho, who works for 
Ruen-Yeager. He was hired by Post Falls Highway District to research this area He was 
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familiar with Kiebert's analysis under Exhibit 33 1. Kaes did not agree with Kiebert's analysis, 
because "There was better evidence regarding the quarter comers" and "The school is not as 
good a monument as the quarter cdmers~  Kaes testified that even though the quarter comer has 
been relocated, he does not believe it is inaccurate. Kaes testified that the surveying manual 
gives the appropriate procedures for relocating obliterated comers, and that Meckel's survey 
indicates he relocated the quarter comers. Kaes' bottom line was Kiebert was off at least 69 feet 
in locating Millsap Road 229. The Court specifically finds Kaes more credible than Kiebert. 
What is clear is that Millsap Road 229 was never built. Kiebert also testified that if 
there were evidence that Millsap Road 229 were abandoned by Post Falls Highway District, it 
would undermine his opinion. Darrell Lynn Humphries, board member and chairman of the 
board for the Post Falls Highway District for the last nine years, testified that Millsap Road 229 
was never built. Humphries testified that at their regular meeting the first Wednesday of 
December 2003, the board took action based on their review of the records, and afErmed that 
Millsap Road 229 had been abandoned as of September 4,1948- He explained that there were 
other roads that had been abandoned in the area, and that the words "closed" in Plaintiffs' 
. - 
. . f ' .  - 
- '  b -.-* -. 
Exhibit 332 means the same as "vacated" in today's terms, as the procedure back in 1948 was 
done by statute. He explained that if it ever was accepted into the highway district as an open 
road, there still could be a right of way, but that the highway district feels Millsap Road 229 was 
not ever a right of way. On cross examination, Humphries testified that although Exhibit 332 
, indicates this Court's finding that defendants had alternative access to their land was a reason for 
board's closing Millsap Road 229, Humphries feels that should be corrected because he didn't 
feel that this Court's decision was a factor their decision to close Millsap Road 229. In any 
event, Post Falls Highway District's decision regarding Millsap Road 229 is compelling 
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evidence that if a right of way ever did exist, it is vacated or closed. This Court specifically && 
defense co.unsel's arguments in Defendants' Reply to Plaintif&' Post Trial Brief and Second 
Proposed Findings of Fact and ~onbllusions of Law, p. 5, misleading, and not supported by 
Humphrey' testimony. 
Even if this Court were to believe that there exists a valid right of way via Millsap Road 
229, from the defendants' standpoint, all it would do is W e r  eliminate the reasonable necessity 
element of implied easement or easement by necessity. 
James P. Meckel, a licensed surveyor since 1978, testified. Defendants' Exhibit Q is a 
record of survey bearing his signature back on December 7,1978. It was recorded on December 
19,1978. Jim Meckel vaguely recalled being on the property, and that he viewed some of the 
property and that he may have set some of the pins. He recalled being there to locate-the wells. 
He did not recall why the survey was done. He recalled that when the survey was done there was 
a county road in existence. He testifled that ,as to Exhibit Z, another record of survey he made of 
this area on August 19, 1980, he was intending to show the east boundary of what is &ers' 
parcel, as Millsap Loop Road, the existing county road. He testified that the surveys-are 
. +- 
' - '  @ .- .-C- - 
inaccurate in that regard as shown on Exhibit BB and Z. Exhibit BB is yet another record of 
survey he prepared on October 25, 1979, which is where they h t  mischaracterized it, and later 
repeated that mischaracterization on Exhibit Z. 
James Meckel also testified that he prepared Exhibit R, the deed that went to A h .  He 
testified that on a more probable than not basis, we intended to follow the centerline of the 
county road, and the only county road in existence then, as now, was Millsap Loop Road, and 
that Meckel Engineering mischaracterized the lower portion of that county road as it actually 
existed. Meckel testified that Exhibit 179 (the Scott Rasor survey done on September 5,2002 for 
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Meckel Engineering) accurately portrays the roads as they actually exist, especially the location 
and the relationship between Millsap Loop Road and the road along the south boundary of Akers 
parcel. Meckel testified that it was his intent to divide to the Akers and others to the west of 
Millsap Loop Road, the property to the west of the road, and to the Kesches the land to the east 
of Millsap Loop Road. He testified that if the error in Exhibit BB and Z were not corrected, 
there could be a 'Eatus", a situation where due to a gap in the surveys, the land is simply left 
out, and no one owns it since it is unaccounted for. Jim Meckel was clear in his testimony about 
what should have happened, and that the Millsap Loop Road as shown in Exhibit Z and BB was 
a mistake, and it should have been as shown on Exhibit 179. As explained by Jim Meckel, who 
prepared the deed to Akers, the Akers own to the right of way ofMllsap Loop Road. That is 
their eastern boundary. 
As a result of the "new trial" (re-opened trial), nothing has changed regarding the eastern 
boundary of Akers' land. This Court's prior finding of fact fi 12 and 7 13 remain the Court's 
finding of fact, and conclusion of law 7 8  remains the Court's conclusion of law on that issue. 
III. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT RE: DAMAGES. 
The following findings of fact are supplemental to findings 1-60 made in this Court's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated- January 2,2003: 
1. Defendants' willfhl trespass encompa&ed Plaintiffs' permitted approach, the disputed 
ar area, those portions of Government Lot 2 outside the scope of the express easement 
and Plaintiffs' real property west of Government Lot 2. The trespass consisted of multiple 
physical trespasses and trespass by water channeled onto Plaintiffs' property. 
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2. The evidence of the reasonable and necessary costs of repairs for the above damage 
I caused by Defendants multiple willful trespasses is$17,002.85, calculated as follows: 
a $2,210.00. ~ateriaiand labor costs to repair and restore the road surface to its 
original condition, including repairing water damage that caused grooving and rutting of the 
easement road. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 2,7,287B (also identified as Exhibit 176), Testimony of 
Terry Mort. Terry Mort is found to be a credible witness, and he testified that the estimate was 
for $1,760, to which $528.50 had to be added for a total of $2,288.50, and then doubled since his 
bid only encompassed up to the driveway to the house, and the length of the traveled surface is 
about twice that length. However, on cross-examination he admitted his confusion, and stated 
$1,760.00 is the reasonable cost for repair to the damage. Mort testified the damage was due to 
the road being broken up due to the use of tracked equipment on the road. Dennis Akers testified 
he saw both defendants run their tracked equipment across his land tearing up the roadway. He 
testified he saw them unload the equipment off a trailer near Millsap Loop Road, then take that 
tracked equipment across his land. There was no reason defendants could not have taken the 
equipment across the road on trailers (ignoring for the moment the fact that their easement ends 
.. . 
. -5: . ". s , - ..-6 - 
at the boundary of Government Lot 2 and Section 24), which would have alleviated such 
damage. The Court finds this to be unreasonable conduct on the part of both defendants. Dennis 
Akers also testified the triangular area needed about three more loads of crushed rock to deal 
with the "boggy" area, at $150 per load, or $450.00 total. Defendants object that the $1,760.00 
was 'berely a bid, and no work was ever performed on the road." Defendants' Reply to 
Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, p. 7. 
Nothing in Idaho law says that damage arno&ts must have been'paid first by an injured party in 
order for them to be actionable damages. Nothing in Idaho law says a bid cannot suffice. The 
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measure of damages in property damage cases is "The reasonable cost of necessary repairs [not 
the cost of actual repairs made] to the damaged property, plus the difference between its fair 
market value before it was damages and its fair market value after repairs." IDJI 2d 9.07. 
b. $1,640.00. Material costs to complete restoration of Akers' permitted approach 
lying outside the road easement area, including cost to remove material dumped a second time by 
Defendants. Plainti&' Exhibits 296,297 and 301, Testimony of Charles Anderson, Testimony 
of Dennis Akers. Defendants make the same objection that the costs were never actually 
incurred. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 7. The same ruling based on IDJI 2d 9.07 applies. 
c. $410.00. Reimbursement of cost to remove fist  load of dirt dumped by 
Defendants on Plain=' approach area lying outside of the easement. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 302,. 
Testimony of Bill Reynolds. Defendants make the same objection that the costs were never 
actually incurred. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 8. The same ruling based on IDJI 2d 9.07 applies. 
d. $6,000.00. Compensation to PlaintiffDennis Akers for Mr. Akers's labor and use 
.. - 
. .  -C . 
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of Mr. Akers's heavy equipment utilized for repairing damage to Plaintiffs' approach and 
restoration of the land outside the easement damaged as a result of Defendants' willful trespass. 
This award represents the fair market value of Mr. Akers's time as an experienced equipment 
operator and fair rental value based upon machine hours for his equipment and is itemized as 
follows: $2,800 for 70 hours which has an average fair market value of $40.00 per hour for Mr. 
AkersZs time spent prior to the liability phase of trial; $1,600 for 40 hours of Mr. Akers's time 
after the liability phase of trial; plus reimburkement of $1,600 equipment costs based upon 40 
machine hours at $40 per hour. Defendants make the same objection that the costs were never 
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actually incurred. This Court finds defendants arguments made at Defendants' Reply to 
Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 8- 
9 to be unpersuasive. 
e. $1,036.00. This includes: repair cost reimbursement of $300 paid for damage 
caused by Defendants tearing out fence and gate posts, and $736 to repair fencing on Akers' real 
property outside the area of the easement, adjacent to Akers' driveway approach and west of 
Government lot 2 tom out by Defendants. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 181, 1 13, 308 and 309. 
Defendants make the same objection that the costs were never actually incurred. Defendants' 
Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, p. 10. The same ruling based on IDJl2d 9.07 applies. The defendants also argue that 
Dennis Akers does not intend to fix the fence. Defendants make the same objection that the costs 
were never actually incurred. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 10. Since Dennis Akers' answer cited by 
defendants was to a compound question, defendants' argument is at best, speculative. 
f. Akers claimed $750.00 for the cost of replacing a mature pine tree located outside 
. . 
' 4 .. . e -. 
the express easement area which was damaged by Defendants' backhoe activity. Plaintiffs 
proposed Finding 2.f The court finds such tree damaged, but fairly insignificantly, so as not to 
justify the replacement cost argued by the Akers. 
g- $800.00. Akers' claimed $900.00 for lost wages arising as a consequence of 
Dennis Akers missing work while attempting to defend his real property fiom Defendants' 
wil1fb.I trespass. Plaintiffs' Proposed Finding 2.g. Dennis Akers testified he spent about 20 
hours defending his property. He testified he makes $30/hour excavating, and $50/hour doing 
body shop work. An average of $40/hour is appropriate. 
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h. $405.00. Cost of sod replacement for the triangular area outside of easement. 
Exhibit 114. Testimony of Sherrie Akers. Defendants make the same objection that the costs 
were never actually incuiied. ~efeidants' Reply to Plainti&' Post Trial Brief and Second 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 1 1. The same m h g  based on IDJI 2d 
9.07 applies. 
1. Akers argued for $175.00 for the cost of carpet cleaning necessitated h m  
tracking of dirt into their residence h m  Defendants' unlawfirl activities on Akers' property, 
citing Plaintif&' Exhs. 1 1 5, 180 and 18 1. Plaintiffs Proposed Second Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law Re: Damages, Finding % 2.i. The Court is m w i k g  to find such as an item 
of damage. Such item of damage could have been alleviated by removal of shoes, washing 
shoes, brushing, etc. Each party has a duty to mitigate their damages. IDJI 2d 9.14. 
j. $225.00. Shenie Akers testified she missed 7.5 hours of work at $30/hour, as a 
consequence of her attempting to defend her real property h m  Defendants' wiMd trespass. 
k. .$2,337.54. Cost to restore survey work damaged by Defendants' willfid trespass, 
including restaking survey boundaries necessitated by Defendants' and/or their agent's removal 
. - . +-' . 
' 8 .-.L - 
of survey stakes and markers outside the easement area Plaintif%' Exh. 3 12. Dennis Akers' 
testimony is credible, that White's employee removed these stakes on an almost daily basis for a 
period of time. Dennis Akers testified that often these stakes and the no trespassing signs were 
removed and left next to Akers' house. The court finds defendants' argument that "...absolutely 
no evidence was presented the Defendants removed any surveying stakes, steel posts or . 
otherwise'' to be completely false. ~efendaks '  Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 16. The Court finds not credible David 
White's denial that he ever moved these stakes or caused to be removed these stakes. Mortensen 
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did not discuss the issue of the stakes. The Court finds defendants argument made at 
Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of law, p. 12, to be unpersuasive. 
1. $1,939.31. Cost of repair to Akers' 2000 Chevrolet pickup damaged when 
defendant Vernon J. Mortensen ran into it with a bulldozer. Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 101, 178, 
300,14 1, Testimony of Gary Scott Shawver. Shawver' s credible and uncontradicted testimony 
is that the original estimate of $1,789.31 is $150 low due to his labor costs increasing $2 per hour 
since the estimate, and the parts costs increasing about 10% since the estimate. Defendants make 
the same objection that the costs were never actually incurred. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' 
'*' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 13. The same 
ruling based on IDJI 2d 9.07 applies. Defendants also argue that it was "Dennis Akers [who] 
drove at a high rate of speed toward the buildozer Defendant Mortensen was driving, and 
slammed on his brakes, but was unable to come to a complete stop before hitting the bulldozer." 
Defendants' Reply to Plaintifi' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, p. 7. Thi Court again fii& Mortensen's testimoiny nbt crediHk 
m. Akers requested $6,200.00 costs to remediate slumping onto Akers' Section 24 
parcel. Akers claimed in his proposed findings 7 2.m., that this '%as begun, and to a reasonable 
degree of certainty, will continue to occur until remediated" and that "The slumping commenced 
when Defendants deposited a large amount of loose fill dirt adjacent to Plaintiffs' property.', 
Dennis Akers testified the slumping "isn't there yet", that in his opinion, and he testified he has 
built roads and has taught hydraulics to excavators, that it will come on to his land. That may be 
true, but at the present, these damages are speculative until such damage actually occurs. 
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n. As set forth below in the Conclusions of Law, defendants Vernon Mortensen and 
David White at all pertinent times are jointly and severally liable for compensatory damages to 
the ALm' property, for the treb~ed'dama~es, and for Shade &as' emotional distress. 
0. As an additional ground for compensatory damages, Vernon Mortensen agreed in 
his testimony at trial, that he is liable for paying for half of the cost of the easement. Defendants 
thus owe half of the above damages on that basis alone. However, due to their conduct, the full 
amount is awarded as damages, not as their obligation to maintain the easement. 
3. Defendants were confrontational with plaintiff Shenie Akers on occasions when she 
sought to prevent their trespass on her property. 
4. Mr. White bullied, threatened and intimidated Sherrie Akers as she tried to assist the 
police in their investigation of an occasion when Defendants trespassed. 
5. D.L. White Construction, Inc.'s operator purposely ran its dump truck toward Sherrie 
Akers and within two feet of her body, acting as though he were going to run over Shenie Akers 
on an occasion when Defendants trespassed. 
6. During the same time period as above, D.L. White Construction, Inc.'s operator 
.. d. .C." 
. . " a .- . C ... 
threatened to run Sheme Akers off her property and threatened to dig a three-foot ditch across 
PlaintBs' driveway to impede her use of the driveway. 
7. Defendants actually impeded Sherrie Akers's access to her work (she is a cardiac nurse at 
a Spokane hospital) by intentionally dumping dirt across Plaintiffs' driveway, which served no 
purpose other than to block Plaintiffs' ingress and egress. 
8. -Defendant Vernon Mortensen cut Plaintiffs' padlock to Plaintiffs' gated entry and 
bulldozed dowq Plaintiffs' gate and fence pdsts, none of which were located on the express 
easement. 
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9. Defendant White had an operator who continuously dropped the blade of heavy 
machinery and removed chunks of earth fkom the driveway, both inside and outside the easement 
area. Testimony of Dennis Akers. 'Plaintiffs' Exhibit 303,304. 
10. Defendants ran tracked vehicles up and down the entire driveway, including inside and 
outside the easement area, for no reason. Testimony of Dennis Akers. Defendants would take 
the tracked equipment from the top of the road, go down to the bottom of the road, do nothing 
with the cat dozer, and return back to the top. Id. The Court finds this was done with the intent 
to destroy the road surface and interfere with Akers' real property rights. 
11. Defendant D.L. White Construction, Inc.'s operator told Dennis Akers such things as: '7 
can't wait 'ti1 we finally run you off of this [plaintiffs'] property." Testimony of Dennis Akers. 
This Court finds such testimony of Dennis Akers credible. 
12. On more than one occasion, Defendants pulled up Akers' survey pins in violation of 
Idaho statute, survey stakes, steel posts and removed 'Wo Trespassing" signs on Plaintiffs' real 
property. ,Again, the court finds defendants' argument that "...absolutely no evidence was 
presented the Defendants removed any surveying stakes, steel posts or otherwise" to be 
. - <c-- - 
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completely fake. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief and Second Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 16. 
13. Defendant White consciously disregarded the Court's permanent injunction (restraining 
Defendants fiom trespassing on Plaintiffs' real property) by trespassing on Plaintiffs' property at 
night, behind Plaintiffs' home, in an effort to intimidate and frighten Plaintiffs, and did , 
intimidate and frighten Sherrie Akers. Dennis Akers testimony is found credible that the Friday 
before the last trial days, David White was f&d off the easement, clearly on Akers' land, thrity 
feet fiom their house, that Dennis Akers ran after him and saw White get in his truck, and when 
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Akers told him 'l've caught you again trespassing", White responded "Go to hell." This is in 
violation of this Court's prior orders. This Court h d s  not credible David White's testimony that 
he was not on the Akers property or the road on that night, that instead he was up on the other 
side of the barn on his own property. Dennis Akers testified that White has sat in his vehicle on 
Millsap Loop Road and watching the Akers' house. White did not rebut this. Dennis Akers 
testified that several times during this protracted trial, there were outbursts in the hallway by 
White and Mortensen. White did not rebut this, nor did Mortensen. 
IS. Defendants made material misrepresentations to their agents and police officers regarding 
their legal rights to operate heavy equipment upon Akers' property. 
16. Defendants deceived police officers who were investigating their illegal activities on 
Akers' real property by representing they had a legal right to do so. Defendants' intent to 
deceive is illustrated by the statement Dennis Akers overheard Vernon Mortensen telling David 
White: '1 can't believe we pulled this off and neither one of us is even in jail." Testimony of 
Dennis Akers. Vernon Mortensen denied making such statement, but this Court finds such claim 
.:- ' a I -  'i - 
by Mortensm to be not credible. 
17. Defendant Mortensen misrepresented facts to the Kootenai County prosecutor (making 
false claims of material facts) in an effort to persuade the prosecutor to prosecute Plaintiff 
Dennis Akers. This tactic was an attempt to manipulate the legal system, to intimidate Plaintiffs 
and to misuse the legal system to gain an advantage in a civil proceeding by use of a criminal 
proceeping. 
18. Defendant Vernon Mortensen further.threatened, intimidated and attempted to incite Mr. 
Akers while on Plaintiffs' real property by physically approaching Mr. Akers in a threatening 
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manner and cursing at him, calling Mr. Akers such things as: "Son-of-a-bitch" and ''chicken 
shit." 
19. Defendant Vernon Mortensen intentionally rammed Akers' truck with a bulldozer. 
20. Defendants blocked Akers' access to their real property at their customary driveway 
approach and the west end of Government Lot 2 on different occasions with a bulldozer, trucks 
and by excavating and dumping dirt on Akers' real property. 
21. Defendant Vernon Mortensen intentionally drove through Akers' barbed wire fence. 
22. Defendants illegally removed thousands of dollars worth of pit run material placed by 
Akers on the easement road to maintain it. Defendants then dumped dirt and gravel in an effort 
to hide the theft. 
23. Defendant White dug up Akers' access to the back of Akers' property. 
24. Defendant Vernon Mortensen threatened witness Bill Reynolds in an attempt to influence 
his testimony in this litigation. Bill Reynolds testified that just before he testified in December, 
2003, Vernon Mortensen said "There is now a county road through your house, I'm suing you 
for everyt6Yng you're worth, get that gate m&d or I'll sue you for &t." h s  C6Z finds such 
testimony of Bill Reynolds credible, and such illustrates the pattern of both defendants, but 
Vernon Mortensen in particular, and their belief that they can do whatever they want without 
consequence. Vernon Mortensen testified he recalled talking to Bill Reynolds, that Mortensen 
testified M o r t e n  said "hello" to Reynolds, told him he was happy to see him and that he 
hoped they could resolve their dispute sensibly. Obviously Mortensen has a completely different 
version of the meeting than Reynolds. This Court finds Mortensen's testimony to be not 
credible. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER, AND ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER page 2 1 
25. Vernon Mortensen disregarded the deputy sheriffs verbal request to leave the Akers 
alone. 
26. The Court has personally observed defmdant David White while on the stand t e s w g ,  
raising his voice and addressing Plaintiffs in anger and has heard testimony that he has yelled at 
Plaintiffs during recesses in the trial while Plaintiffs were waiting in the hallway in direct 
contravention of this Court's order prohibiting the parties from speaking with each other during 
the trial proceedings. The Court has watched defendant Vernon Mortensen testify, and has 
noticed time and time again, his inability to answer a question put to him, either by the opposing 
attorney or his own attomey. At trial on December 15,2004, Mortensen was asked whether he 
sold four properties knowing there was an ongoing dispute over access. Mortensen went on a 
rant, claiming this was malicious prosecution, that Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed, and that 
he would not be intimidated by any of this. He claimed plaintiffs' counsel was trying to extort 
money from an insurance company and using us (he and White) as pawns to do so. 
27. As a result of Defendants' grossly negligent conduct, harassment, threatening, bullying 
and intimidation of Plaintiff Shenie Akers, Mrs. Akers is a h i d  to return home. She-is in fear of 
. - . .c-. 
' b - .. * -. 
damage by Defendants to her real and personal property, in fear of having access to her home 
cut-off and in fear of her physical safety. She is especially afi-aid to be alone at night due to 
Defendants' prior intimidating behavior. 
28. Defendants' tortious conduct has resulted in physical manifestations of emotional distress 
in Sherrie Akers, including anxiety, stomachaches, migraines and sleeplessness. Tr. Vol. IU, p. 
1320, L1. 18-25. 
29. Defendants' tortious conduct has caused Sherrie Akers to be in such fear of her health 
and safety that she has tried to move from Plaintiffs' real property and is in fear of continuing to 
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live on Plaintiffs' real property because of Defendants' ongoing tortious conduct, which has 
continued despite the Court's orders. Tr. Vol. p. 1320, L1. 18-25. 
30. The Court finds Sheme Akers to be a very credible witness. During the course of trial, 
Mrs. Akers's anxiety was observed by this Court (including in her demeanor and voice). 
3 1. Vernon Mortensen (Mortensen) purchased sixty acres near Plainti&' property after the 
commencement of the instant lawsuit. Mortensen is now in the process of developing this 
property. He is subdividing said sixty acres into five-acre parcels and has sold four of these 
parcels. Mortensen has been in a dispute with an adjoining landowner regarding whether or not 
Mortensen illegally subdivided this property and whether or not he has an easement to his 60- 
acre development. The easement-road..dlspute regarding access to these 60 acres is substantially 
similar to the dispute in the present case in that Mortensen is attempting to develop land with a 
disputed access and sell parcels of land to innocent purchasers, thereby leaving the innocent 
purchasers with potential disputes with adjoining landowners, Kootenai County, the Fire District 
and the Highway District. Mortensen's testimony at Tr. Vol. III, p. 1425, L. 24 - p. 1426, L. 7. 
Mortensen has utilized substa&ally the same development strategy insthe bast Ifiiot deterred, 
he is likely to engage in this conduct in the future. Scott Rasor testified about Mortensen's prior 
land development projects that harmed innocent Idaho land owners. Tr. Vol II, p. 539, L. 3 - p. 
540, L. 20. Mortensen admitted he is now developing and selling forty acres near the subject 
property in spite of another easement road dispute similar to the present case. Tr. Vol. III, p. 
1425, L. 24 - p. 1426, L. 7. Even Mortensen's own expert Kiebert testiiied that he has testified 
in litigation on Mortensen's behalf on more than one occasion, that he has worked on subdivision 
projects for Mortensen before and that some of these projects the parcels Mortensen has sold 
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have not been surveyed, that Mortensen works too fast in selling lots before they are surveyed, 
and that he has told Mortensen that it is not prudent to do that. 
32. Since 1980 Defendant ~ o i e n s e n  has owned Mortensen Math. Mortensen Math is a 
highly successful company whose products are sold internationally. Mortensen has generated 
over 300 publications in this business. Mortensen has made millions of dollars through this 
business that he has used in part, and continues to use in part, to purchase and develop real 
property for profit in north Idaho. 
33. Vernon Mortensen did not disclose the existence of Mortensen Math in discovery, even 
in light of an Order by the Court granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel such disclosure. 
34. Defendants Mortensen currently own a number of parcels of real property in north Idaho. 
Defendant Mortensen is a land "speculator" who buys larger parcels and resells them as smaller 
parcels, thus buying larger parcels to subdivide for speculative profik. Mortensen buys and sells 
, ..- 
land through his company Timber-Land-Ag, LLC. Defendants Mortensen are the only memb& 
of this limited liability company. Mortensen does not distinguish between his company and 
himself in his land dealings, using his company as an alter ego in such dealings. - 
..- . <z=-. - 
- ' a  .-..-i .. 
35. Mortensens own a cattle ranch in Bomers Ferry, including 100 to 150 cowlcalf pairs. 
36. Mortensens purchased the original 160 acres involved in this litigation in 1994 by trading 
a piece of land worth $200,000. Thus, Mortensens paid $1,250 per acre. 
37. Mortensens sold 80 acres of the original 160 acres to Mr. White for $460,000, or $5,750 
an acre, during 2001-2002. Thus, Mortensens received a profit of $4,500 per acre, for a 360% 
total return on investment. 
38. Mortensen h g  aspirations of making "millions of dollars" through the sale and 
development of land with White. 
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39. Mortensen testified that he is on the verge of bankruptcy. Throughout these proceedings, 
the Court has observed Mortensen to prevaricate in some instances, and not to be credible in 
others. Mortensen has made a co&cious effort to mislead the Akers and the Court in an effort to 
hide the significant value of his income and assets. With regard to this particular testimony, the 
Court finds Mortensen's testimony to be an attempt to hide the true strength of his fiscal 
condition Once again, Mortensen's testimony is not credible. 
40. Defendant White's assets include the 90 acres he purchased fiom Mortensen with a value 
of at least $460,000. 
41. Vernon Mortensen has violated and disregarded Kootenai County ordinances and the 
orders of this Court for pecuniary gain, specifically to increase the value of his land development 
projects. In his actions, testimony k d  demeanor he has shown a conscious disregard and 
disrespect for the law. He has harmed innocent North Idaho landowners, .. . - ->-. including Plainti&E, by 
this conscious disregard for the law. As such, it is highly likely-that he will continue to harm 
Plaintiffs and other Idaho landowners unless he is deterred fiom engaging in like conduct in the 
future. 
- 
42. David White and D.L. White Construction, Inc., has violated and disregarded Kootenai 
County ordinances and the ordm of this Court for pecuniary gain, specifically to increase the 
value of his land development project. In his actions, testimony and demeanor he has shown a 
." .. 
conscious disregard and disrespect for the law. He hk harmed innocent North Idaho 
landowners, including Plaintiffs, by this conscious disregard for the law. As such, it is highly 
likelythat he will continue to harm Plaintiffs and other Idaho landowners unless he is deterred 
from engaging in like conduct in the future. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION.AND ORDER, AND ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FAm, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER Page 25 
V. ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING DAMAGES. 
The following Conclusions of Law are supplemental to Conclusions of Law 1-28 in this 
Court's Findings of Fact, ~onclusidns of Law and Order dated January 3,2003: 
1. Pursuant to LC. 56-202, the willful trespass damages are trebled in the total amount of: 
$51,008.55. Defendants are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiffs in said amount. Defendants 
argue that in order to have trebled damages awarded against them, their conduct must be 
intentional, and that since they "thought" they owned a right of way, they can only be negligent 
for being wrong in their belief. Post-Trial Memorandum, pp. 21-25. Defendants cite 
Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,639,862 P.2d 321,33 1 (Ct.App. 1993). That is an 
accurate summary of Bumgarner's holding. But that is an interesting argument for Mortensen 
especially, to hake. This is not the first time Mortensen has bought property low, sold quickly 
for a marked increase, then found himself in litigation because of a lack of access to that 
property. Mortensen is arguing that as long as he argues about access and is later proven wrong, 
he can't be liable for treble damages. The fallacy of that argument in the present case is: 1) 
Mortensen bought at a low price because there were problems with access, he knew of the prior 
-6- 
' & . & .-. 
Pepiinski suit; 2) he tried buying right of way £tom Bill Reynolds to fix that problem, but Bill 
Reynolds was unwibg to do so, and 3) Stewart Title company called and spoke to Sherrie 
Akers in December 2001. Additional reasons were set forth in this Court's prior finding of fact 7 
48. Defendants intentionally misrepresented to their agents, employees, the County 
Building Inspector, the Kootenai County Sheriff and the public that defendants had a legal 
' 
- right to engage in the activities on. plaintiffs' property described above, when defendants 
knew their legal rights were at best questionable and undetermined. Defendants could 
have come to no other conclusion than that they had no express easement past the western 
boundary of Government Lot 2, and that the best they could hope for is to convince a court 
that they had a claim of implied easement, prescriptive easement or easement by necessity. 
The problem with that is, at the time he purchased from Peplinskis (or at least by the time 
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defendants committed their acts that led to the present lawsuit), Mr. Mortenscn knew there 
were some claims made against Pcplinskis by the A h  and that Peplinskis dismissed that 
lawsuit without Peplinski gaining any legal rights, Mr. Mortensen knew he paid a reduced 
price due to the lack of access, and Mr. Mortcnsen was convinced he had access via a back 
road to his property. Thus, th& is serious doubt that defendants in good faith believed they 
had access to their land over plaintiffs land. 
Plaintiffs argue that defendants attempted to use a letter drafted in 1994 by Attorney 
Michael J. Newel1 as binding legal authority for defendants to excavate on plaintiffs' real 
property (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 172), but there was no proof of that claim offered at trial. That letter 
had no legal effect on plaintiffs' real property and did not give defendants any legal rights. The 
reason defendants had knowledge that they had no right to excavate on plaintiffs' real property is 
manifold. First, there is nothing in the deed from W.L. Millsaps to Bakers, which gives Millsaps 
and their successors (defendants) a right to excavate or widen the easement over Bakers and their 
successors' (plaintiffs') land Second, the easement only goes over the land owned by Bakers and 
their successors' (plaintiffs') land contained in Govemment lot 2. In other words, deferidants do 
not have the right to even travel over, let alone excavate or widen, and portion of plaintiffs' land 
not contained in Government lot 2. That is, defendants knew they had no right to travel over, let 
alone excavate the land owned by plaintiffs to the west of Government lot 2. Third, as mentioned 
above, at the time he purchased from Peplinskis (or soon thereafter), Mr. Mortensen knew there 
were some claims made against Peplinskis by the Akers and that Peplinskis dismissed their 
lawsuit without gaining any legal rights, Mr. Mortensen knew he paid a reduced price due to the 
lack of access, and Mr. Mortensen was convinced he had access via a back road to his property. 
Findings, 748. At1 of these things cut against defendants' claim of ownership being "negligent". 
Defendants at all times knew their claims were at best speculative. Defendants h e w  they had no 
express or deeded easement. Defendants knew at best they would have to purchase actual right 
of way to their property fiom the Akers, others, or simply hope for the best in litigation. But it 
wasn't defendants who brought this litigation(<lt was Akers who brou&t the litikilifibn due to the 
intimidating, high-handed conduct of the defendants. In order for Bumgarner to give defendants 
a "safe harbor" for "guessing wrong" or "negligent" conduct, it would seem imperative for 
defendants to have initiated the litigation, for them to try to work this out in a more civilized 
manner in our courts. Instead, they chose intibidation, to which the Akers responded with 
litigation. 
2. The evidence of the reasonable and necessary costs of repairs for the above damage 
caused by Defendants multiple willful trespasses is $17,002.85. 
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3. Defendants have caused Sherrie Akers significant emotional distress for which Mrs. 
Akers is entitled to just compensation. The Court finds the total amount of Sherrie Akers's 
compensatory damages for her emitional distress in the amount of $10,000.00. Defendants are 
jointly and severally liable for this damage. 
4. As to compensatory damages for Akers property, and for Sherrie Akers emotional 
distress, and for the trebled damages, defendants Mortensens and White are jointly and severally 
liable for those damages under Idaho Code 5 6-803, as this Court finds at all pertinent times they 
were each "acting in concerty' as defined by that statute, in that they were "pursuing a common 
plan or design which result[ed] in the commission of an intentional or reckless tortuous act." 
5. Looking at the criteria of StateFann Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, Slip 
Op. No. 01 -1289 (2003), p. 8, an award of punitive damage against Mortensen is appropriate. . . 
The ham caused to Akers was physical, emotional, and not just economic. Mortensen's conduct 
evinced an indifference to or reckless disregard for the health or safety of others. Mortensen's 
conduct was repeated, occurring over a lengthy period of time and even after Court order in this 
. ... 
case, this was not an isolated incident. The harm resulted from intentional malice, trickery or 
. .r: 
" 6 ." .'c -. 
deceit. Finally, compared to Mortensen and whoever is backing this litigation on Mortensen's 
behalf, the Akers are financially vulnerable in comparison. Campbell states ". . .that a recidivist 
may be punished more severely than a &t offender [because] repeated misconduct is more 
reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance.. ." Id. p. 13, citing BMW of North 
America, Ilnc. v. Gore, 5 17 U.S. 559,577 (1 996). The amount of punitive damages likely to, 
deter Defendant Mortensens fkom engaging in like conduct in the future is $150,000.00. 
6. The amount of punitive damages b l y  to deter Defendant Whites fiom engaging in like 
conduct in the future is $30,000.00. 
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VI. ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY O R D E ~ D  defendants Mortensens "Motion for Reconsideration of 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Filed January 2,2003, or Alternatively Motion 
to Certify Order Pursuant to LRC.P. 54(B)" is DENIED IN ALL ASPECTS, consistent with 
the above opinion. 
IT IS FURTHERE ORDERED that upon hearing additional evidence presented after 
the Court's January 2,2003 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, that each and every 
finding of fact and conclusion of law set forth in such remains intact. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' counsel shall prepare a judgment 
consistent with the above opinion and this Order. The issue of attorney fees remains open. 
DATED this i se 'ry of * 2004. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Jo T. Mitchell, Distnct Judge CC 
I hereby certify that on the /CTday of 
w 
.t 2004, I caused to be served a h e  and correci copy of the 
4 - . - foregoing instrument by the method indi ated below, and addressed to the followin'g: 
Michael E. Reagan 
Attorney at Law 
1044 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14 
U.S.MAIL 
- 
TELECOPY (FAX) (208) 667-4034 
Terry R Y ost 
P.O. Box 1583 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
f 99 North Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
Boise, ID 83701 
- U.S.MAIL 
TELECOPY (FAX) 1-208-386-9428 
Leander James 
~ t t o m i y  atLaw 
1875 North Lakewood Dr., Suite 200 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
U.S.MAIL 
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Exhibit 5 
@ STATEOF IDAHO I -- 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
D E W S  LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. 
AKERS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. 
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. I 
Case No. CV-02-222 
THTRD 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE ON REMAND 
The Court having previously entered its Judgment and Decree on May 25, 
2004, and entered its Order on Remand on September 7, 2006, following remand 
fiom the Idaho Supreme Court case of2fker-s v. D.L. White Cohsfrftction;Inc., et al., 
142 Idaho 93,127 P.3d 196 (2005); 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED ANI) . 
DECREED: 
1. Defendants do not have .any implied easement rights in Plaintiffs' 
property. 
- 
2.  The Court hereby enters a decree granting an easement by prescription to 
Defendants across Plaintiffs' property as follows: a twelve point two 
AMENDED JUDGMENT.AND DECREE ON REMAND - 1 
foot (12.2') wide strip located just inside the northeast comer of 
defendants' land, turning south immediately west of the west boundary 
of Government Lot 2 (where the express easement ends) and the east 
boundary of Parcel B as depicted. .by "hatch" marks on Exhibit "B" 
attached hereto. The 12.2' wide easement mates with the western 
boundary of the express easement across plaintiffs' Government Lot 2, 
and immediately proceeds south at an immediate right angle or 45" turn 
on plaintiffs' Parcel By onto defendants' property, as shown on Exhibit 
"B". The outer boundary of this easement as it turn on plaintiffs' Parcel 
B, is an arc 12.2' from the axis, and the axis of the arc is the West 
~ & e r  Section Comer of Section 19, TSON., R.SW., as shown on 
Record of Survey in Kootenai County Case Number CV 02-222, and 
attached as Exhibit "A" of the original Judgment and Decree filed in this . 
case on May 25, 2004. To avoid conflict between land owners, the 
entire easement, both the express and prescriptive portions should be 
: ' b - .- 
definitely and certainly fixed. Argosy Trust v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, 
572-73, 1 14 P.3d 128,130-3 1 (2005), citing Hall v. Taylor, 57 Idaho 662, 
668-69, 67 P.2d 901, 903 (1937); Kosanke v. Kopp, 74 Idaho 302, 261 
P.2d 815 (1953); Palmer v. Fitzpatrick 97 Idaho 925, 557 P.2d 203 
(1 976). As defendants' prescriptive easement burdens plaintiffs' Parcel 
B, and the express easement burdens plaintiffs' Government Lot 2, 
defendants shall jointly and severally bear the expense of the survey to 
locate this prescriptive easement across all of the land owned by 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE ON REMAND - 2 n - 
plaintiffs. Defendants are ordered to prepare and record a metes and 
bounds survey, based upon Exhibit "A" to the Judgment and Decree filed 
May 25,2004 and Exhibit "B" attached to this Third Amended Judgment 
and Decree on Remand. 
3. Plaintiffs are awarded compensatory damages for willfbl trespass in the 
amount of $17,002.85, which amount of trespass damages are trebled 
pursuant to I.C. 56-202 for the total amount of $51,008.55, which 
amount is awarded jointly and severally against Defendants D. I,. 
WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE 
V. WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and 
MARTI E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, pursuant to I.C. $6-803. 
4. Shem Akers is awarded compensatory damages for emotional distress in 
the amount of $10,000.00 jointly and severally against Defendants D. I,. 
. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID L. WHITE and 
MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J, 
. -a- . C - . -  . 
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, 
pursuant to I.C. $6-803. 
5 .  Plaintiffs are awarded punitive damages jointly and severally against 
Defendants Vernon J. Mortensen a id  Marti E. Mortensen, husband and 
wife, in the amount of $150,000..00. 
- 6 .  Plaintiffs are awarded .punitive damages jointly and severally against 
Defendants David L. White and Michelle V. .White, husband and wife, in 
the amount of $30,000.00. 
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7, Plaintiffs' award of costs and attorney fees jointly and severally against 
each defendant in the amount of One Hundred Five Thousand, Five 
Hundred ~huty-Pour Dollars and Six Cents ($105,534.06) together with 
interest at the applicable statutory rate is reinstated; 
8. Plaintiffs shall further be entitled to seek a judgment of costs and 
attorney fees incurred after remand as permitted by rule or statute. 
ENTERED this 8' day of December, 2006. 
Distric Judge u 
AMENDED JUDGMENT.AND DECREE ON REMAND - 4 
I ' 
L . :1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of December, 2006, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Robert E. Covington 
8884 North Government Way, Suite A 
Hayden, ID 83 83 5 
FAX: (208)762-4546 
Terri R. Yost 
Jones, Gledhill, Hess, Fuhrman & Eiden, P.A. 
The 9" & Idaho Center 
225 North 9" Street, Suite 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208)33 1-1 170 
Facsimile: (208)33 1-1529 
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Akers 
TH. 12094 
'204 aacr 
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OWENS, JAMES b VERNON, PA- . 
- .  - -  J>.?i 1 D Y?l l~: 3 I 
h 
p.0 Box 1578 
Coeur d' W e ,  ID 838 14 
K7f,- 
Attorneys at Law ,.: .. . -  . ' - . -I  3 '  T .  
1250 Ironwood Drive. Suite 320 'T ?&/ -_. , _  - I .  
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Leander L. James, TSl3#4800 
Attorneys for: Raintiff , 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
Ei 1 STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
Plaintiffs, 
Q 
10 
vs. 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. Case No& Oa - @as 
AKEPS, husband and wife, 
D. L. WHITE'CQNSTPUCTION, INC.; 
DAVID L. W T E  and MICHELLE V. 
WHTTJ3, husband and wife; and 
VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI 
E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, 
1 COMPLAINT 
l7 1 Defendants. 1 
IDENTITY OF THE PART- 
JURlSDICTION AND VENUE 
1.1 PaintiEs: Plaintiffs are residents of Kootenai Counw, Stay 
PAGE 2/13' RCW AT 11512001 3345331 PM Facitlc Standard Time] a SVR:SPOFAXI1 DNIS:3497' CSID:+12084461188 a DURATION (mm.ss):O5.56 
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H 
g i  z3 3 2 == 1 ag 24 
of &bho. At all time materid hereto. Plaintiffs have awned real property 
in Kootenai County, Idaho, more pardcdwly described in Exhibit 1 
attached hereto (Plainriffs' Real 
COMPLAINT - PAGE 1 - 
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1.2 Defendant D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION. MC.: Defendant D. 
( L, WfliTE CONSTRUCTION, INC., (Corporate Defendant) is  a mrpararion 
I County, Idaho. Copra te  Defendant is a for-profit domestk corporadon d 
3 
4 
5 
I the State of Idaho rhat may be served with process -ugh its registered 
carrying out continuous and systematic business in rhe State of Idaho, 
with its principal place of business and headquarters in Kootenai 
1, I Defendants DAVID I. WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE arc husband and 
9 
10 
121 wife, sonstiluting a marital cwm-q in the State of Idaho. Said 
agent: David L. White, 2380 Horsehaven, Ave. Post Falls, Idaho 83854. 
1.3 Pefendant DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE: 
l3 1 Defendants reside in Kmtenai County, Idaho. The acfs of each of these 
1.4 Defendant WRNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. 
14 
15 
16 
'1 MORTENSEN: Defendants VE&ON J MORTENSEN and MARn E. 
19 
defendants alleged herein were done on his/her own behalf and on 
behalf of the marital community. 
20 I MORTENSEN are husband and wife, constituting a marital communiry in 
the State of Idaho. Said Defendants reside in Kootenai County, Idaho. 
The acts of each uf these defendants alleged herein were d w e  on &/her 
own behalf and on behalf of the marital community. 
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1 1 1.5 Venue and Jurisdiction are properly with this Court; pursuant 2 1  to I.C. s5401, t35-404 and 55-514 this action is appropriately filed in 
'1 Kwtenai County, State of Idaho, since it is the E O U I ? ~ ~  where ihe  red 
4 1 propmy subject of this action i s  situated, the county in which the cause 
5 
1 of action accrued, and the county where the Defendants reside and 
71 ~msact business. This C o w  has in personam jurisdiction over 
1 Defendants and in rem jurisdiction over the real propem involved in this 
I action. The amount in controversy is  within the jwisdictional firnits of 10 
l8 1 2.2 At all times material hereto Plaintiffs, pursuant to a Warranty 
15 
16 
17 
19 1 Deed, have been the heowncrs of the real propem desnibcd in -bit 1 
2.1 Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all other paragraphs of this 
complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
attached hereto, incorporated by reference herein (Plaintiffs' Re& 
Pr~pern). 
2.3 On or abaut January 3, 2002, Defendants D. L. WHITE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC. and DAVID L. WHITE, without authority or proper 
permi~s, commenced excavation work on Plaintiffs1 Real Property and 
anempted to alter and damage said Real Ropeny. Said Defendants 
COMPLAINT - PAGE 3 
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1 I specifcally artempted m dig up portions of Plaintiffs' Real Property, 
1 eqand and grade an adsting dirt/~avel mad and othrrwiw alter 
ti 1 inspector caught Drzfendanrs engaged the unlawful activities described in 
3 
4 
5 
7 1 fhe preceding paragraph and immediately entered a STOP WORK order, a 
Plaintiffs' Real Property. . - 
2.4 On or about January 3, 2002, a Kootenai Counw building 
' ( copy of which is attached bereto as Exhibit 2 and incorporated herein by 
1 reference. Said STOP WORK order provides in pan that Defendants 
i2 1 33 excavations & fill. Co. ordinance 283 sire disturbance." 
LO 
11 
l3 I 2.5 Prior to Defendants' activities described in the preceding 
violated the following: *Knatenai County ordinance 22 1 (a) sect. 330 1 ch. 
l4 1 paragraph, Plaintiff DENNIS L. AKERS urged Defendant DAVlD L. WHITE 
lsl L. WHITE ignored Mr. Aken's requests and disregarded his concerns 
15 
16 
17 
19 / a b u ~  the prorcctian and presemation of Plaintifl'sy Real Propem. 
to not aespass on Plaintiffs' Real RopeF.ry, excavate on Plaintiffs' Real 
Property or athenvise disturb Plaintiffs' Real Propem. Defendant DAVID 
*O 1 2.6 Defendants D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC. an4 DAbID L. 
1 
cOI@LA~NT - PAGE 4 
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2 1 
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5 22 
23 
WHITE represented to their agents, employees, the County Building 
Inspector and the Sheriff that Defendmts had a legal right to engage in 
the activities alleged above. Specifcdly, Defendants attempted to use a 
lcncr drafred in 1994 by attorney Michael J. NeweU as binding legal 
a-ority for Defendants to excavare on Plaintiffs' Real Ropefil. Said 
1 I lette~, b fact, has no legal afiecr on Plaintiffs' Real Propem and did not 
1 give Defendants any legal rights. 
. 2.7 Defendants have further trespassed on Plaintiffs' Real Property 
on occasions other than those described on J a n u q  3, 2002, above. 
5 I 
1 Defendant VERNON J. MORTENSEN specifically has trespassed on 
7 1 P1aintiffsY Real Fropew and damaged Plaintiffs' Real Pmprty, inchding 
1 excavation extending an exisring madway on Plaintiffss' Real Property. 
m. 
FIRST CAVSE OF ACTION: TRESSPAW 
l3 I 3.1 Plaintiffs incorporate by reference dl otber paragraphs of this 
l4 1 Complainr as if set forth W y  herein. 
181 
3.3 Such conduct was without lawful authority and constitutes a 
15 
16 
17 
19 trespass under common law and Idaho code Section 6-202; Plaintiffs I 
3.2 Defendants, and each of them, willfully and intxtntiody 
trespassed upon Plaintiffs' Real Properry. 
201 seek remedies as provided under common law and statute, including but 
.i: 21 1 not Limited to treble damages and attorney lees. 
I 
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1 GECONI) CAUSE OF ACTIOlrJ; Q m  TITLE 
6 1 4.2 Defendants claim property rights in Plaintiffs' R e d  Property 
3 
4 
5 
4.1 Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all other.paragraphs af this 
Campfaint as if set forth herein. 
1 is  a cloud upon Plainms* tide. 
7 
8 
l+1 5.1 Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all other paragraphs of this 
that Defendants, in fact, do not have. 
4.3 Defendants' claim TO propem rights in Plaintiffs' Real Property 
'' 1 Complaint as if set forth heein. 
16 
5.2 At the time of the events described in the preceding 
l8 1 paragraphs, Defendants had certain duties imposed upon them by 
19 1 statutes, regulations and common law which each Defendant then and 
''1 there awed to Plaintsffs. and Defendants did negligently and carelessly 
i I breach said duties, including but not limited to excavating and digging 
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up portions af Plaintiffs' Real Prope~.ty. 
5.3 As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants' breaches of 
d 4 ~  Plaintiffs have incurred damages. 
COWWT - PAGE 6 
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1 PRAYER IPOR RELIEF 
3 
4 
7 ( attorney's fees and such other relief as the COW may deem appropriate. 
WHEEZEFORE, Plaintiffs prsy for judgment against Pefendants in 
5 
6 
( specifically including, but not Limited to: 
an amount in excess of $10,000.00 as will suffkiently compensate 
Plaintiffs for damages received, abng with reasonable costs, interest, 
6.1 A decree of quiet title against the Defendants, and each 
of them, as TO Plaintiffs' right, title and interest in the 
I Plaintiffs' Real Property; 
131 
6.2 A decree that Plaintiffs are entitled to be returned to the 
l4 I sole and exclusive possession of Plainms' Re4 Property and 
l5 I ta have the Defendants and Defendants' Praperty ejected 
from Plaintiffs' Real Propem by the Sheriff by issuance of 
17 
l8 I Writs of Assistance, Possession, and Eviction; subject to 
191 
such lawful rights Defendants may have in the use of an 
2o 1 easement over Plaintiffs' Real Property; 
6.3 A Permanent Injunction restraining the Defendants from 
further trespass upon, a d  interference with, the Plaintiffs' 
quiet enjoyment of Plaintiffs' Real Property; 
PAGE 8113 "CW AT 81512008 3:45:31 PM [Pacific Standard Time] "VR:SPOFAXI1 TINIS:3497 VSlD:+12084461188 "DURATION (mm.ss):05.56 C 7 
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I 6.4 Compensation for damages caused by Defendants' \ trespasses on P l ~ ~ f s '  Real Propem, including cost of 
I repairs; 
6.5 Reasonable attorney's fees and costs, including 
statuto~~ attorney's fees and costs pursuant to I.C. P6-202. 
I 5 12- 12 1.I.R.C .P. 54 and any other applicable law; 
1 6.6 Such other and further relief, including statutory, 
I general and special relief? at law and in equiry, to which 
Plaintiffs are justly entitled. 
Plaintiffs further reserve their right to move for aa order of 
1 the court granting kave to amend this complaint under sratc law 
l5 I DATED this 10" day of January, 200 1. 
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KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO 
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DO NOT REMOVE THIS-NOTICE 
MIS BUILDING HAS BEEN INSPECTED AND M E  FOUOWlNG ITEMS FOUND TO 
COMPLY WITH THE UNIFORM BUILDING CODE: 
NO FURTHER WORK 16 TO BE DONE W~T~~~UTAPPROVAL OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL; 
Continualon of worlc or removal of thls notice is a misdemeanor under Idaho State C o b  (9F)-4126), 
punishable by fws of not more than $3W.e or irnprisonmenr of not more Man 90 dam or bMh. Each day 
such violation continues conslitutaa a 
-PQY!* \ y., \ ( ,.( -. . 7 
- - n, 
DATE BUILDING INSPECTOR 
DETACH THIS STUB AND BRlNG IT WITH YOU Tm 
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OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL 451 GOVERNMENT WAY COEUR P'ALENE, ID. 
f 
1 - . .  '. Location , ,' 
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Date '? 1 -  - , --{ . 1, 
- 
\. f 
Buiiding Official I ,  
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STATE OF IDAHO 1 
County of KOOTENAI )U 
FILED p 1 b - d ~  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FfRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS, etal., 
Case No. CV 2002 0222 
Plaint@, 
) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
VS. ) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTSy 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., etal., ) 
Defendants. 
This case has arisen from a dispute about the existence and scope of an 
easement across the Akers' property that WhitelMortensen have used to access their 
.C - 
land. The Millsaps were the 'common grantors of the property now dwned by the Akers 
and White/Mortensen. When William and Patricia Millsaps sold a portion of the original 
property to the Bakers, White/Mortensen9s predecessor in interest, the Millsaps 
reserved an easement for ingress and egress to their adjoining property. That adjoining 
property is now owned by defendants Mortensen and White. Mortensen owns 160 
.acres south of the Akers' land, with another 100 acres adjoining this 160-acre parcel to 
the south. White bought 80 acres of Mortensen's 260 acres with the intention of 
developing the land. The subject easement roadway is situated in the southern portion 
of Government Lot 2, Section 19, and in its present condition is approximately 30 feet in 
width. The conflict arose when WhitelMortensen began widening and improving the 
subject easement into a proposed 60 feet wide access. WhitelMortensen claim that 
C '  
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they either have an (1) Express Easement; (2) Easement by Implication; (3) Easement 
by Necessity; or (4) Easement by Prescription, for the entire length of the road, 
including the curved portion at the entrance of the easement. The Akers dispute the 
scope, nature and location of the easement. 
11. EXPRESS EASMENT 
In following the rules of construction for determining the existence of an 
easement, this Court will first examine whether an express easement exists. 
WhitelMortensen argue that they have an express easement granting them access to 
the public road through the private road on the Akers' property. They point to deed 
language in the deed from Millsap's deed to Baker that reserved an easement 
"Reserving to the Grantors a roadway right of way over and across the southern portion 
of Lot 2 as the same now exists, for purposes of ingress and egress to adjoining 
property." English depo. Exh. "D". The Millsap's adjoining property is now owned by 
WhitelMortensen. In their briefing and at the hearing, the Akers do not dispute that 
there is an express easement; they dispute the scope and location of the easement. 
This is important because WhitelMortensen are asking this Court to declare an 
easement over a portion of the Akers' property that the Akers argue is not part of the 
easement. 
The Akers contend that an express easement over a twenty feet by fifty feet 
piece of land southwest of Lot 2 cannot be used by WhitelMortensen because the 
easement was extinguished by the docthne of merger when Mhlliam' Bnd Patricia 
Millsaps reacquired ownership of the seivient estate from A.J. and Nellie Ruth Millsaps. 
A.J. and Nellie Ruth Millsaps had conveyed a 20 x 50 foot strip of land "for right of way 
purposes only" (English Aff. Exh. "B") in 1945 as Instrument No. 172592, which seivient 
property was purchased by William and Patricia Millsaps in 1948. The Akers assert that 
they only gave Mortensen an oral license to use the portion of plaintiffs' private road that 
passes through this 20 x 50 foot strip of land and revoked the license once 
WhitelMortensen began widening the easement. 
WhitelMortensens' Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of express 
easement is DENIED as to the 20 x 50 foot strip of land adjoining the Akers' property on 
the southwest portion of Lot 2. There is not only a material dispute of fact as to the 
hIEhlOrWNDUh1 OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' hlOTlON FOR SUhlMARY JUDGMENT 
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existence of an express easement, but also as shall be discussed below, a material 
dispute of fact as to whether there is an easement by necessity, implication or 
prescriptive easement. 
WhitelMortensen are also asking this Court to rule that the curved approach from 
the easement road built by the ~ k e r s  as required by the Post Falls Highway District in 
1982, is part of the original express easement. WhitelMortensens' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on this issue is also DENIED. 
There is an issue of material fact as to whether this curved portion is indeed part 
of the original express grant of easement across the Akers' property. Also, as shall be 
discussed below, a material dispute of fact as to whether there is an easement by 
necessity, implication or prescriptive easement exists. 
Because this Court has denied WhitelMortensens' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the issue of prescriptive easement pertaining to the 20 x 50 foot strip of 
land abutting the southwest corner of plaintiffs' Lot 2 property and the curved portion of 
the road on plaintiffs' eastern border, there is no need to address issues of scope, use 
and location of the easement at this time. These are issues that will be decided at trial. 
This includes the Akers' assertion that there is a conflict between the call (South 15 
25'28" East, 244.46 feet) and the monument ("along said centerline"). 
Ill. EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION 
WhitelMortensen argue that they have an easement by implication because there 
was (1) unity of title and subsequent seperation by grant of the domini"t estate (2) 
apparent continuous use of an access; and (3) reasonable necessity for an easement. 
Bob Daniels 8 Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 542, 681 P.2d 1010, 101 7 (Ct. App. 
1984). The Akers respond that WhitelMortensen does not have an easement by 
implication because ( I )  an express easement was given and (2) neither 
. WhitelMortensen nor their predecessors in interest used the portion of the private road 
across the section line between section 19 and 24. In order for an easement .by 
implication to arise, continuous use of the easement is required from the time the 
property was separated. 
Because there is an issue of material fact about the type.of use, duration of use, 
and scope of use WhitelMortensen made of the subject easement, summary judgment 
hlEMORANDUhl OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUhlMARY JUDGMENT 
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would be inappropriate at this time on the issue of easement by implication. Whether 
or not an easement encompassing an area greater than the express easement was 
created is a disputed question of fact. Therefore, WhitelMortensens' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the issue of easement by implication is DENIED. 
IV. EASEMENT BY NECESSITY 
WhitelMortensen also claim that they have an easement by necessity. They 
claim that there is only one ingress to their property and that ingress is through the 
Akers' private road. This claim seems to be contradicted by the record because in 
depositions WhitelMortensen have admitted that there is a back easement that 
connects the 260-acre property to a public road. Mortensen depo. 47:23-53:22, White 
depo. 28:23-29:4. An easement by necessity does not rest on the pre-existing use of 
the land but instead is based on a need for a way across the granted or resewed 
premises. If a new access is opened to the property, then the need for an easement by 
necessity ends. Any easement by necessity that may have existed may well have 
ended due to the new access route to defendants' property. This is an issue of material 
fact in dispute that should not be decided on summary judgment. Finally, if Mortensen 
can show that he has an easement by necessity, this does not necessarily create an 
easement by necessity for his successor in interest, White, who is a grantee of a 
subdivided portion of the original dominant estate. Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 
(Ct.App. 1983). 
Therefore, WhitelMortensens' ~ o t i d n  for Summary ~ud$m&t o n  the issue of 
easement by necessity is DENIED. 
V. EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION 
Defendants White and Mortensen assert that they have a prescriptive easement 
to use the subject private roadway, including the curved portion. "In order to establish a 
private prescriptive easement, a claimant must present reasonably clear and convincing 
proof of open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use under a claim of right and 
with the knowledge of the owner of the servient tentament for the prescriptive period of 
five years. Under a claim of right means that the claimant has used the way without 
recognition of the rights of the owner of the sewient tentament." See Marshall v. Blair, 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
130 ldaho 675, 946 P.2d 975 (1 997). WhitelMortensen claim that they used the curved 
portion of the Akers' road without permission from the time they bought their property. 
Further, they maintain that Peplinski, the previous owner, also used the curved portion 
and 20 x 50 foot strip of land without permission and that this time should be tacked on 
to the prescriptive period. 
The Akers counter that they gave defendant Mortensen permission to use the 
curved portion of their private road and only revoked that permission after 
WhitelMortensen began widening the road. "A permissive use cannot ripen into a 
prescriptive easement." See State ex re. Haman v. Fox, 100 ldaho 140, 594 P.2d 1093 
(1979). This being the case, there is an issue of material fact about whether the Akers 
did indeed give Mortensen permission to use the curved portion of the private road. 
Therefore, WhitelMortensens' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED on the 
issue of prescriptive easement. 
VI. CONCLUSlOm 
This dispute is not about the existence of an easement; both sides agree that an 
express easement exists. The dispute centers around the location and scope of the 
easement. Each side has put forth credible evidence that would support their idea of 
where the easement is located and the type of use and scope of said easement. 
Because of this, WhitelMortensens' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED in full. 
Entered this 16* day of August, 2002. 
/A,%rq h& 
John . Mitchell, District Judge 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMhlARY JUDGMENT 
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Certif~cate of Service 
I certify that on the /6 day of August, 2002, a true copy of the foregoing was 
faxed to each of the following: 
Leander L. James 
Michael E. Reagan 
Dep ty Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. 
AKERS, husband and wife, 
Case No. CV-02-222 
Plaintiffs, I JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
VS. 
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. 
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. I 
This Court, having previously entered its "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law ahd Order" and its subsequent "Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Reconsideration, On New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, 
.b-. 
- ' *  - -* - Conclusions~of Law Regarding Damages and Order" and its ' 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
1. The eastern border of Plaintiffs' property runs along the centerline of 
Milsap Loop Road, excepting out -a  thirty-foot right-of-way for Milsap 
Loop Road. 
2. The Court hereby enters a decree quieting title to Plaintiffs for the 
property identified as: . "Area Confirmed to Akers by Court" set forth in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto, and incorporated by reference herein. 
*.$ . . 1n m ,  %-'kt 
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~ 3. The Court hereby enters a decree quieting title to, and returning 
Plaintiffs' to the sole, exclusive control of, Plaintiffs' property to the 
west of the western border of Government Lot 2, located in a portion of 
the Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 24, Township 
50 North, Range 6 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho, free 
and clear from any claim by Defendants of an easement across this 
property. Defendants are enjoined fiom utilizing said property for any 
purpose. 
4. Defendants and Defendants' property are subject to ejectment from 
Plaintiffs' property located west of the western boundary of Government 
Lot 2 and Plaintiffs' property located outside the scope of the easement 
set forth below, by the Sheriff by issuance of Writs of Assistance, 
Possession, and Eviction, if needed. Defendants are further permanently 
enjoined and restrained from further trespass upon, and interference 
with, the Plaintiffs' quiet enjoyment of Plaintiffs' property. 
5. The Court hereby defines the scope of the express easement granted in 
1966 across the Southern boundary of Plaintiffs' property located in a 
portion of Government Lot 2, Section 19, Township 50 North, Range 5 
West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho as follows: 
a. The width of the easement is limited to the travel width.. of the 
. .. : .. 
' 4 .- ..i -. 
driveway, which is 12.2 feet wide throughout its length, from the 
border of Government Lot 2 to the west its entire length to Millsap 
Loop Road to the east. 
b. The easement is bounded by the border of Government Lot 2 to the 
west and to the east includes the area known as Reynolds' driveway 
where the easement bends 90 degrees generally to the north where it 
tenninates at Millsap Loop Road. This route is shown by the cross- 
hatched area shown in Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
6. Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to record a Record of Survey defining the 
above decrees and orders as set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE ,- 2 
7. Plaintiffs are awarded compensatory damages for trespass in the amount 
of $17,002.85, which amount of trespass damages are trebled pursuant to 
LC. §6-202 for the total amount of $51,008.55, which amount is awarded 
against ~ e f e n d a k  D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID L. 
WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON 
J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, 
jointly and severally pursuant to I.C. 56-803. 
8. Sheni Akers is awarded compensatory damages for emotional distress in 
the amount of $10,000.00 against Defendants D. L. WHITE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID L. WKITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and 
MARTI E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, jointly and severally 
pursuant to I.C. 56-803. 
9. Plaintiffs are awarded punitive damages against Defendants Vernon J. 
Mortensen and Marti E. Mortensen, husband and wife, in the amount of 
$150,000.00. 
10. Plaintiffs are awarded punitive damages against Defendants David L. 
White and Michelle V. White, husband and wife, in the amount of 
$30,000.00. 
11. Plaintiffs shall further be entitled to seek a judgment of costs and 
.C 
. '  a - .& 
attorney fees as permitted by rule or statute. 
ENTERED this 2 -day of May, 2004. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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I hereby certify that on th 
to be sewed a true and correct 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: f- 
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Michael E. Reagan 
Attorney at Law 
1044 Northwest Blvd. 
- TELECOPY (FAX) (208) 667-4034 
Teny R. Yost 
P.O. Box 1583 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
83701 "XSS. .= 
- 
- . TELECOPY (FAX) 1-208-386-9428 
Leander L. James 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive, Ste. 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83 8 14 
'U.S. MAIL 
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- TELECOPY (FAX) 1-208-664-1 684 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE .- 4 
C ' *; :{ 
. .. 
BOOK - PACE 
KRA TION, NO. 
LUSlONS OF LA W REGARDING 
cv- 02-222 STATE OF IDAHO Coum OF KOOTOHAl 
EAST QUARER, AT THE REOUESr OF: 
MECKa tYCINEtP/NC & SURYMUC 
. -. .. 20UN T x  IDAHO At - mlnut- pmt - o'clock - M 
Dot.: 
DANIEL J. ENCUSH. RECORDER 
-..-.._ , 
-..  - . . - . ._ ev 
- - - -  
NW 1/18 COR. 
5/8' IRON ROD 
W/YPC PLS 4182 
SUANT TO COURT 
JOt EASTERN 
JHoARY OF AKERS 
PERN Kelch 
T.M. 16937 
Q.C. DEED 1427048 
. 
ORDER: EAS~ERN 
TERMINUS OF EASEMENT I 
I I I 
I I i b2755'31' 
R=Z00.00 I I I :  L-f 7.54' I - I 
CWRT TO BEloNC _.__. . -  
TO AKERS BY VIRTUE 
OF INSTRUMENT NO. 
851 34Q 
m 
- 
- 
SUR VEYOR 5 CER TIFICA TE 
I P C O R  I, ,..C..I ..-----.- .... . . 
u r  3Ul-C V b  Y 
'N CONFORMANCE WITH COURT' AORANDUM DECISION AND OR 
W,4L ISSU;E;S, AND ADDITIONAL 
* N  RE1 
INGS OF FACT, AND COIJCLUSIO OF LA 
DECISIONS AND ORDER IN KOOENAI COUNTY, CASE NO. CV-02-222 
A PORTION OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER, 
SEC. 24, 150N., R.6W, B. M., 
ND GOVERNMENT LOT 2, SEC. 19, %50N., R .5K,  B.M., KOOTENAI COUNTY, IL 
G O ~ T  LOT 1 
- - -  - -  - - - - - - I .  - - - - - 
GOV'T LOT 2 
Akers 
Pt. T.N. 12095 
(3950) 
PURSUANT TO COURT 
'ORDER: EASTERN 
Pt. T.N. 12094 
3.093 ocres 
134.7\4 sq.ft. 
EXISTING EXPRESS 
PRIVATE ROAD 
EASEMENT SEE 
INSTRUMENT NO.'S 
851349 & 824615. 
DETERMINED BY 
b 
c 
- - ' - . _ _ ,  (NaY29 '59 W RJ) MTERYlNED BY - . . - . . - . . __ ,_  
N8950'13'W 2718.14: COURT TO BnMJC TO AKERS BY WRTUE 
Reynolds Ltd. Partnersh OF MSIROUENT NO. 851 340 
v. 
-wGa€+. 
16 THE *ST LINE OF THE 
5 PER A RECORD OF 
aa2, RECORDED IN BOOK SURVEYS OF RECORD & PRIOR SUE VE YS 
1. J. MECKEL PLS 3451 DEC. 1978 UNRECORDED 
- I LIrCYrI DI c 7 1 ~ 1  ~ P T  qn-8 m n n u  4 OAPT -7 
Akers 
T.N. 12094 
2.04 acres 
: 
- 
NOTE: ' 
THIS RECOYD OF SURMY DOES NOT A 
, ALL EASEMENTS OR RIGHTS-OF-WAY OF *O. %"EW 
SIZE OR LOCATION OF PRESCRlPTlM EASEMENTS, FENCE PREPA'REI 
LINES OR PHYSICAL FEATURES OF THE PROPERTY. ITEMS 
SUCH AS BUllDlNCS AND FENCES WHICH ARE SHOW, ON NEH 
ARE FOR INFORMATIONM PURPOSES ONLY. 
lHIS RECORD 'OF SURMY SHOWS W E  EASEMENT ON TAX I NUMBER 12094 PURSUANT TO KOOlENAI COUNlY, IDAHO, 
CASE NUMBER CV-02-22. ; 
. l u 3  
' fiP' 
1. 83,' 
I 
1 
I 
I ....... g5 
I 
I 
. -  
. . 
N 1/16 COR. 
5/Bm IRON ROD 
wmc PEPLS 345 
, _ .  -.. ___e.. 
_. . - "  
_..-..- ,,f ----
b 
I 
I 
' 1 I 
1D > In 
I W El 9 s  
I I 
I 
. Z I 
CURE TABLE 
PURSUANT TC COURT 
LEGEND LS M a  41112 
FOUND AN IRON ROD, 5 / ~  IN: DIAM.. WITH PUS~C CAP MARKED I CPW /(5(14~74 
AS NOTED 
o FOUND AN IRON ROD. 1/2 IN. DIAM.. WITH P u s n c  CAP AS 
NOTED 
I 
0 SET AN IRON ROD, 30 INS. LONG. 5/B IN. .DIAM.. WITH A PLASTIC 
CAP MARKED PLS 6374 BASIS OF BEARING 
BASIS OF BEARING - N0024 '3TE A 
o CALCULATED POINT (NOMING FOUND OR SET) NORTHVEST WARTER OF SECTION I! 
. ; '\P 
-. L o . * . - -  ^- - - - - 
SURMY BY DAWD E. SCHUMANN, PL 
- -  - -  - 
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) CASE NO.  
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A t t o r n e y s  a t  L a w  
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1 A. waved a l l  the time. stopped and chatted. 
2 I nv i t ed  me t o  come up and 'see h i s  cars. 
3 Q.  id you ever drive across t h e  curved secrion 
4 of the road when Mr .  ~ k e r s  was v i s i b l e  on h i s  p ropem? I 
5 A. ~l l  the time. would meet each other a t  the 
6 gate, and one would open the gate and one o f  us would 
7 say, hey, 1'11 get it. YOU know, t ha t ' s  where we'd 
8 stop and chat. 
9 MR. R w :  I don't have anything further.  
1.0 THE COURT: ~ l l  right.  ~ e t ' s  conrinue -- do 
U. you have redirect? 
12 MR. JAMES: I do, your Honor. 
U THE COURT: okay. We'll take t h a t  up 
14 tomorrow. ~ e t ' s  plan on being here tomorrow a t  -- 
15 well. 1'11 be here a t  8:00, and we ' l l  s t a r t  w i t h  t h i s  
16 case j us t  as soon as possible. we ' l l  s t a r t  r i g h t  a t  
17 8:00 wi th  t h i s  case, and we ' l l  go u n t i l  noon tonorrow, 
18 and I guess I want you t o  be honest w i t h  me. With four 
19 hours o f  t r i a l  time tomrrow and r e a l i s t i c a l l y  ohly an 
20 hour and a ha l f  on Thursday i s  there any prayer o f  
21 gett ing t h i s  done by Thursday? 
22 MR. JAMES: A t  the ra te  we' re  going I don't 
23 th ink  so, Your Honor. I imagine Mr. white w i l l  take 
1 24 maybe not qui te as long as Mr.  mrtensen, and Scott 
25 Rasor, he -- I guess the answer's I don't t h i n k  so. 
I PT 
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1'PI THE DISTIUCT OOURT OF THE FIRST JUDI- DETRICT OF 
2 THE STATE OF IDAHO, I N  AND FOR THE COllNlY OF KOOTENU 
3 * . * * * . *  
5 DENHIS LYLE AKERS ~d SHWLIE L. ) 
AKERS, husband and m f e .  ) I r 1 W E  NO. p l a i n t i f f s .  2 cv 02-222 I 
vs . $ c x K ~ R T T R W . -  
8 1 M Y  THREE, 
0. L. W K E  CONSTRKITON. INC. : 1 
g DAVID L. WHT~ and MICHELLE V. 1 
m, husband and wife:  and VERNON ) 
10 3. MORTENSPI and WTI E: 
MORTENSDI, husband and wtfe, 
1 
.. a 
~ e f  endants. 
12 1 
l3 
14 AT: Kootenai County, Coeur d'nlene, Idaho 
1 15 ON: ~eptember ll. 2002 1 1 16 BEFORE: f i e  Honorable lohn T. w i t che l l  I 
1 8  For e ~ a i n t i s :  WENS. JAMES, VERNON &WEEKS. P.A. 
Attorneys a t  ~ a w  
By: ~ e i n d e r  L. James 
1875 North Lakewood Dr ive  
Su i te  200 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Ll I 22 For the Defendants: UESCME, R E A W  & WALLACE, P.A. ~ t t o r n w s  a t  Law 
By: Michael E. Reagan 
1044 Northwest ~ou leva rd ,  Sui te E 
coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-2249 
2 THE COURT: well, I don't see any po in t  then 
3 i n  coning i n  on Thursday fo r  an hour and a h a l f  o f  
4 testimony when we're going t o  need t o  continue i t  t o  
5 another week anyway, and so why don't -- when both 
6 counsel go back t o  t he i r  of f ices get a l i s t  o f  
7 available weeks that  we can have t h i s  heard where 
8 you've got an ent i re week free and we ' l l  se t  it. we' l l  
9 have a t  i t  tomorrow from eight u n t i l  noon, and l e t ' s  
10 not t r y  anything on Thursday. I t h i nk  i t ' s  pointless 
11 t o  come i n  and t r y  and do an hour and a h a l f  on 
12 Thursday because that's r e a l i s t i c a l l y  a l l  ~ ' d  have on 
13 Thursday. 
14 ~ll right.  we' l l  be i n  recess i n  t h i s  matter 
1 5  u n t i l  tomrrow lnorning a t  8:OO. 
16 (CWRT AOJOURNED AT l l : 5 8  A.M.) 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2 1  
22 
23 
24 
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1 honestly. 
2 M E  WURT: We're s t i l l  w i t h  Mr.  Mortensen, 
3 and I need t o  remind you, s i r .  t h a t  you're s t i l l  under 
4 oath. 
5 REDIREtr EXAMINATION 
6 BY MR. JAMES: 
7 Q. Mr. mrtensen. t o  s o l i d i f y  a few th ings x'd 
8 l i k e  t o  ask f i r s t  when you purchased the  160 acres am 
9 I correct tha t  the  lawsu i t  was s t i l l  pending between 
10 the peplinskis and the Akers? 
ll A. Yeah. According t o  my reco l lec t ion ,  I bought 
12 that  property i n  the  f a l l  of '94. and I know t h a t  the 
13 lawsuit was -- between pepl inskis and Akers was s t i l l  
14 going on i n  '95. 
15 Q. Did you not ice  i n  the  reservat ion language o f  
16 tha t  document we discussed reserving t o  t he  grantors 
17 tha t  language tha t  you discussed wi th  your counsel 
18 regarding the easement? 
19 A. I did  read t h a t  when M r .  Reagan pointed it 
20 out t o  me. 
2 1  Q. And you've draf ted easements o r  granted 
22 easements i n  your work as a property purchaser and 
23 se l le r  o f  property. Fa i r  t o  say? 
24 A. I do i t  a l l  the time, but I always r e l y  on 
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i 25 1 125 the t i t l e  officers and the t i t l e  company. I never re11 - . 
1 2  t h i s  curved porr ion up here? 
13 A. urn, he -- yes, he d i d  express swie concerns 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT 
14 down there. 
15 Q. And also t h i s  port ion past &vernment Lot 2? 
. . 
16 A. ;;?4$ii?',.d3dd hot .--. i t  was d m  below. 
17 Q. ~ n d  you agree wi th  me the Mi l l sap mad . 
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1 regarding use o f  that '  road? 
2 A. I th ink  Mr. Akers expresses a l o t  o f  
3 concerns. 
4 Q. so he d id  express concerns p r i o r  t o  the use 
S o f  the road? 
6 A. what k ind  of concerns are you ta l k i ng  about? 
7 THE QXIRT: YOU need t o  answer the question. 
8 what d fd  he t e l l  you? 
9 THE ~ ~ N E S S :  Yes. He expressed solne 
10 concerns. 
11 Q. (BY wr .  J ~ S )  ~n part icular,  your use of 
12 THE COURT: YOU may c a l l  your next witness, 
U Mr. James. 
14 MR. JAMES: P l a i n t i f f s  c a l l  sher r ie  Akers. 
15 THE COURT: MS. Akers, i f  you'd please stop 
16 r i gh t  there and raise your r i g h t  hand. 
17 SHERRIE LYNN AKERS, 
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1 MR. JAMES: NO f u r the r  questions, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT A l l  r i g h t .  Any recross, 
3 ~ r .  Reagan? 
4 MR. REAGAN: NO. Thank you. 
5 THE UXIRT: YOU may step down, wr. white. 
6 Mr. J m ,  if you'd please gather up t h e  exh ib i t s  and 
7 hand them t o  mdam c lerk .  l e t ' s  go ahead and -- we ' l l  
8 take a ten-minute recess. we may have t o  take another 
9 one l a t e r  i n  the morning, bu t  we ' l l  be i n  recess u n t i l  
10 9:45. 
13 (RECESS) 
1.8 r igh t -o f&ay went straight and i n  fact t h i s  'day s t i l l  1 1l8 called as witness a t  the request of  the 
19 goes s t ra ight  here that tha t  wouldn't have been the I 1 "  Plaint i f fs,  being f i r s t  du l y  sworn. was 
1 2 Inore t a c i t  -- you've been t r y i n g  t o  k ind o f  -- 1 1 2  A. IS 3003 South  ills sap, post Fal ls.  
' 
' 
3 MR. REAM: 1 ' m  j u s t  gonna object  t o  -- 
4 THE ~ E S S :  YOU know, you' r e  t r y i n g  t o  lead 
5 me up t o  sanething. You've done t h i s  i n  depositions 
6 and everything else SD I ' m  very cautious o f  ta lk in$ko 
7 you, Mr. -- 
-meis=, '* 
8 THE ZT: okay. Stop. 
20 sakcrs property? 
21 A. Say t h a t  again. 
22 Q. ~f the willsap Loop ~ o a d  right-of-way 
23 extended s t ra ight  south here o r  does today. t h a t  would 
24 not be the Bakers' property? 
25 A. r'm not understanding what you're gett ing at. 
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1 ~ o u ' r e  t r y i ng  t o  -- I think you're t r y i n g  t o  get some 
9 THEW-~WESS: okay. Sorry. 
10 MR. JAM'S: I'll withdraw the question. 
20 examined and t e s t i f i e d  as follows: 
21 THE CLERK: Be seated. 
22 PIRErT D(AMJCNAT1ON 
23 BY MR. JAMES: 
24 Q. Please s ta te  your ful l  name. 
25 A. Shcrrie ~ y n n  ~ k e r s .  
400. 
1 Q. And your cur rent  address? 
11 ME COURT: what's the  question? 
12 MR. JAMES: 1'11 withdraw the question, j us t  
13 ask it t h i s  way. 
14 Q. (By Mr. ~ m e s )  Do you have any knowledge 
15 where the right-of-way  ills sap Loop Road i s  today? 
16 A. Do I have any knowledge o f  rvhere  ills sap Loop 
17 ~ o a d  i s  today? 
3 Q. ~ n d  i s t h a t  t he  address o f  t he  property 
4 that 's the  subject of t h i s  l i t i g a t i o n ?  
5 A. ~t was changed due t o  t he  9U. ~t was 4075 
6 south Mil lsap, Post Fa l l s .  
7 Q. nut i t ' s  t he  same property? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. consisting o f  t e n  acres? 
10 A. yes. 
11 Q. ~ n d  you are married t o  Dennis Akers? 
A. Yes. 
I l3 Q. HOW long have you been married? 
1 l4 A. Thi rty-one years. 
Q.  when d id  you and Dennis purchase t h a t  t e n  
16 acres? I 
1 l7 A. we o r i g i n a l l y  purchased the  f i r s t  f i v e  i n  
18 Q. Right-of-way. 
19 A. The right-of-way? Yes. ~ t ' s  indicated i n  
20 t ha t  map r i gh t  there. could you br ing  t ha t  up here? 
21 This i s  Mil lsap Loop Road. 
22 Q.  DO you have any idea where the -- do you have 
23 any personal knowledge ?ere the  right-of-way was i n  
24 1966? 
25 A. NO. I don't. 
18 1980 and then picked UP t he  second f i v e  I t h i nk  
19  roba ably a couple years l a te r ,  two o r  three years 
20 l a te r .  
21 Q. I s  the f i r s t  f i v e  Tax Number 12094 t h a t  we 
22 see here i n  p la in t i f f s '  ~ x h i b i t  6? 
23 A. yes. 
24 4. A t  tha t  t ime t h a t  you purchased the 
25 property -- do You r e c a l l  the testimony o f  Mr. Reynol 
'? 
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3 g ive  us a bui ld ing pernit. was there i n  f a c t  a fence there? 
A. yes. Q.  DO you know what type of approach permit i t 
5 Q. what type o f  fence? 
6 A. Barb wire. 
7 a. please show us i f  you can show the judge on 
8 p l a i n t i f f s '  Exhibi t  17 approximately where tha t  fence 
9 was? 
10 THE COURT: okay. ~ ' n  sorry. , 
L1 ME WTNUS: There was a fence l i n e  t h a t  ran 
12 along th i s  f ie ld.  This i s  Reynolds' driveway here. It 
13 ran across and r i g h t  over t o  Reynolds' driveway r i g h t  
14 over t o  the fence that  was -- tha t  went up the h i l l .  
15 Q. (BY MP. 3ame.s) was there a gate i n  t h a t  . 
16 fence? 
17 A. Yes, there was. 
18 Q. Looking a t  Exh ib i t  -- l e t ' s  j us t  put on 
19 Exhibit 6 so we can t a l k  about it a l i t t l e  easier. 
20 Maybe draw i n  green where t h a t  fence was q d  then 
21 i n i t i a l  i f  t h i s  i s  Reynolds' driveway r i g h t  here. 
22 A. okay. The fence ran along the county road. 
23 There's ~eynolds'  driveway, and it came out and curved 
24 out and went l i k e  that, and i t  crossed over t o  the 
' 
5 was? 
6 A. what type? 
7 Q.  For example, was i t a slngle-fami ly approach? 
8 A. 1t was for a s i ng le  residence. . 
9 Q. m d  do you know what t he  width o f  tha t  
10 approach permit allowed f o r ?  
ll A. NO, I don't. 
12 Q. okay. I'll ask your husband that.  when d id  
13 you put t ha t  approach In?  
14 n..,.-we put i t  i n  i n  '82 i s  when we applied f o r  
15 the  bu i ld ing  pennit. 
Q. NOW. was there any road there. any evidence 
#,:> 
17 o f  t r ave l  over t ha t  area of your approach a t  t ha t  t h e ?  I l6 
18 A. NO. 1t was a l l  pasture and the  fence went 
19 r i g h t  across there. 
20 Q. Okay. was t h a t  a lso  t r ue  i n  1980 when you 
21 f i r s t  saw the ,property t h a t  there  was no evidence o f  
22 t r a v e l  here? 
23 A. That i s  t rue.  
24 Q. NOW, t o  your knowledge have you and Dennis 
] 2 i n i t i a l s .  I s  t h i s  a new fence, an old fence? 1 1 2  Q.  m d  t o  your knowledge where -- what property 
25 fence that  was over here. 
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1 Q. ~ u s t  put a l i n e  and fence and then your 
3 A. It was an o ld  fence. It was rusty. 
4 Q. m d  I want t o  cover the  gate. was there a 
5 gate i n  the fence a t  any po in t  d m  i n  here? 
6 A. Yeah. The gate actual ly was down -- the gate 
7 actually ran r i g h t  along here. 
8 Q. what type o f  gate was that? 
9 A. It was -- hung on an o ld  wooden post, and i t  
10 actually wasn't l i k e  -- what it was i s  old fence. It 
11 was o ld  f i e l d  fence. ~t was hung on a wooden post, and 
1 2  you had t o  take the w i re  o f f  i t  and drag i t  across the 
25 paid t h e  taxes on t h i s  properc);? ' I 
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1 A. yes. 
13 road t o  get through there. 
Q.   id you remove t h a t  fence a t  some point? 1: A. Yes,wedid. 
3 a re  you paying taxes on and spec i f i ca l l y  referencing 
4 t h e  eastern border there? 
5 A. what follows t h e  county road up t o  where 
6 there was a property stake up here, and we -- up t o  
7 here and then l i k e  tha t .  
8 Q. . okay. ~d af ter  removing the  fence d i d  you 
9 pu t  anything here t o  show the  edge o f  your property o r  
10 d i d  you put anything i n  there? Let's go with that .  
11 A. we didn't put  anything i n  there, but the 
12 fence l i n e  bordered B i l l  Reynolds' driveway. and i t  ran 
13 along the driveway so t h a t  was where we kind of 
14 f igured -- 
15 Qt okay. But my question i s  d id  you put 
1 16 Q. when d id  you remove i t ?  1 1 16 anything i n  the ground there? We have the stake here. 
1 l7 A. we removed i t  when we put t h i s  curve i n  here 17 r i g h t  here, but I ' m  t a l k i n g  about d id  you plant I I 1 18 when we b u i l t  the house. 1 1 18 anything? 
119 , Q. which curve are you referr ing to? A. oh. ~ ' m  sorry. 
I XI A. TO our approach here. Q .  That's okay? I 21 Q.   his i s  ~ i11Sap  Loop Road? I I 2 l  A. Yes, we did. B i l l  Reynolds had o r i g i na l l y  
1 22 A.  his one here. ( ( 22 planted some seed, but he 1 e f t  holes k ind  o f  i n  i t  w i t t  
1 23 Q. okay. when d i d  you put the approach in?  1 1 23 the  equipment tha t  he used, and we f i l l e d  i n  w i th  some 
1 24 A. we put the approach i n  -- when we went t o  1 1 24 more seed. 
25 apply f o r  a bui ld ing permit  they said we can' t  come out 
A K F R C  \ iC W I - I T T F .  ~t ii1 
I 2 here i n  the survey o f  ~ l a i n t i f f s '  Exhibit 6? 1 1 2  A. NO. 
TR IAL  TRANSCRIPT 
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1 described here? 
2 A. yes. 
3 Q. m d  d i d  you maintain t h a t  lawn? 
4 A. yes, we did. we've mowed it. we've sprayed 
5 i t  f o r  weeds.  owed a t  l e a s t  once a week. 
6 Q.  side from Mr. ~eyno lds  -- did he ass is t  you 
7 i n  putt ing i n  the  lawn or d id  you put it i n  separately? 
8 A. I th ink  he and Dennis d i d  i t  together. 
9 Q. ~ n d  have you and Dennis pr imari ly maintained 
10 that  lawn since 19 -- when was i t  put i n  approximately? 
ll A. ~pproximately somewhere between 1980, 1982. 
12 Q. m d  have you naintai  ned -- you and Dennis 
3.3 maintained that  lawn since? 
14 A. yes. 
15 Q. And when I say since, t ha t  would be up u n t i l  
16 the time that  the defendants dumped the fill on there? 
17 A. yes. 
18 Q. m d  i s  it your understanding you paid taxes 
19 on that  property during t h a t  per lod o f  time? 
20 A. yes. 
21 Q. NCW, I want to  t a l k  about t h i s  road i n  1980 
22 when you moved -- you didn' t  see t h i s  property p r i o r  t o  
23 1980, correct? 
24 A. correct. 
25 Q. I n  1980 was the road on the western s ide o f  
406 
1 the property i n  the same configuration t h a t  we see ~t 
A. NO. 9. okay. Was it passable i n  ea r l y  spring during 1 :  Q. ~ 1 1  r i gh t .  where d id  tha t  road run? 1 1 the  thaw? 
5 A.  he road turned r i g h t  here and ran r i g h t  
6 along the l i n e  r i g h t  and sometimes kind o f  across over 
7 onto the l i n e  r i g h t  there. 
8 Q. crossed over? 
9 A. onto the  section. 
1 10 Q. 1s there a fence on tha t  section t h a t  t h i s  
407 l t h e  l i ne ,  and he crossed across r i g h t  there  and up t o  
2 h i s  barn. I 
3 Q. okay. o id  he and -- when you purchased the 
4 pr0pe1Ty was i t  your under -- d id  you have an 
5 understanding where t h i s  road -- s t r i k e  tha t .  w i t h  
6 respecc t o  the Pep1inskis t r ave l i ng  on t h i s  road -- 
7 s t r i k e  that .  1f anybody had a r i g h t  t o  t r a v e l  on t h i s  
8 road a t  the t i ne  you purchased t h i s  property what was 
9 your understanding as t o  whether o r  not  they  could 
10 cross over Government Lot  2? 
11 A. MY understanding i s  they have 531 f ee t  on 
12 ~ o t  2 and nothing beyond. 
3.3 Q. nothing beyond here? 
14 A. Right. 
15 Q. was t h a t  your understanding when you 
16 purchased the property? 
17 A. yes. 
18 9. h d  what was your understanding t h a t  t h i s  
19 road was used fo r?  
20 A. Fam equipment. 
21 Q. I n  1980 when you f i r s t  saw t h i s  road 
22 describe t o  the Court what i t  looked l i k e .  
23 A. That road was j u s t  t racks from cars. j u s t  
24 t i r e  tracks basical ly where they had dr iven onto the  
25 grass. &d i t  was showing d i r t  through. 
1 
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Q. was i t passable year round? 
5 A. NO. 
6 Q. was it passable i n  the  summer? 
7 A. yes. 
8 Q. m d  d i d  the road or  d i d  these tracks go 
9 st ra ight  from east t o  west or  d i d  they -- s t r i k e  tha t .  
10 where d id  the tracks run on t h i s  side, l e t  me j u s t  ask 
1 
I 11 road' s at? I I u YOU. 
A. yes, there i s .  A. The tracks went down t o  Reynolds' driveway 
Q. Did the  road a t  times run i n t o  Mr.  Reynolds' 13 and then turned and Went out t o  Mi l lsap, and it cut  the  I I ( 14 property there? 1 114 corner j us t  a l i t t l e  b i t  r i gh t  -- r i g h t  where it goes 
1 A. yes. He moved the fence back. I 115 i n t o  ~eynolds' as they swung around they cut rhe  corner 
1 l6 Q. okay. So conceivably at  the t ime t h a t  you 1 116 a l i t t l e  b i t  there. 
117 mved i n  could someone dr ive  from  ills sap Loop Road on ( 117 Q. Pr io r  t o  Mr. white purchasing any property I I8 t h i s  road and. i n  the conf igurar im the road was there. 18 here did you receive a c a l l  from any o f  h i s  agents, any I I 1 19 cross over Mr. Reynolds' p r o p e m  i n t o  t h i s  160 acres 19 o f  h is  people? I I 
20 over here? 
21 A. Yes. ~ e p l i n s k i  d i d  i t  a11 the -- 
22 Q. He d i d  do i t ?  
20 A. 1 received a c a l l  from the t i t l e  company i n  
2 1  B O ~ S ~ .  
22 Q. And -. 
1 23 A. That's what he did.  hat's how he .got up I 1 2 3  A. The Stewart T i t l e  Company. 1 24 there t o  farm i s  he came through, through here, and 1 1 24 Q. ~ n d  what d i d  they want t o  know? 
25 then he crossed across, and it was cut back r i g h t  on 
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Sam Johnson 
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P. 
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-2 100 
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424 
sum @ treasurevalleybers. corn 
Idaho State Bar No. 4777 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, 
STEWART T W  COMPANY OF 
COUER D'ALENE, INC 
Case No. CV-07-4690 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
I 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS, 
ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS , 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Vernon Jerry Mortensen, by and through Sam Johnson 
of Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P., his counsel of record, and in accordance with the rules 
and regulations promulgated by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and for response to 
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to 
Plainrig, states as follows: i ! 
GENERAL STATEMENT 
Plaintiff provides this response to each request in Defendant's First Set of I 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Plaintip, These responses 
r 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS, ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO DEnNDANT'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENT - 1 
are made solely for the purpose of this action. Each response is subject to all objections 
as to competence, relevance, materiality, propriety and admissibility, and to any and all 
other objections on any grounds that would require the exclusion of any statements 
contained herein if such request for the production of documents were asked of, or 
statements contained herein where made by, a witness testifying in court, all of which 
objections and grounds are hereby expressly reserved and may be interposed at the time 
of trial. 
The following responses are based upon information and writings presently 
available to and located by Plaintiff and his counsel. Plaintiff has not completed an 
investigation of the facts relating to this case, has not completed discovery in this action, 
and has not completed preparation for trial. The documents that will be produced in 
response to these Requests are those documents, which were located upon reasonable 
search of Plaintiffs files, as they are kept in the ordinary course of business and the frles 
of those individuals most likely to have responsive documents. Plaintiff objects to these 
Requests to the extent that any Request calls for a search of all files or all locations of 
Plaintiff. The responses given herein are without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to produce 
any subsequently discovered documents or to revise these responses if further discovery 
so indicates. 
These responses shall not be deemed to constitute admissions (i) that any 
particular document or thing exists, is relevant, non-privileged, or admissible in evidence, 
or (ii) that any statement or characterization in the requests is accurate or complete. 
Documents that are being produced by Plaintiff in response to these requests will 
be made available to counsel for copying and inspection at the undersigned's office at a 
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date and time mutually agreeable to the parties. Or, if requested, copies of documents 
being produced can be delivered, without inspection, subject to reimbursement for 
reasonable and necessary costs of production. 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
Plaintiff objects to Defendant's Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents to the extent that they seek information already in the possession of 
Defendant or in the possession of third parties from which such information may be more 
readily andlor cost effectively obtained. Such interrogatories and requests are designed 
for no other purpose than to burden and harass Plaintiff; therefore, they are improper. 
Plaintiff objects to Defendant's Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents to the extent that they purport to require Plaintiff to provide detailed 
information in a form or m m e r  not required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff objects to Defendant's Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents to the extent that they seek documents or information protected by (a) by the 
attorneylclient privilege, (b) under the work product doctrine, (c) under the exceptions to 
discovery set forth in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Idaho Rules of Evidence or 
other rules applicable to this action, (d) by state or federal statutes and regulations andlor 
(e) due to their confidential nature or the confidential nature or the confidential 
information contained herein. 
Plaintiff objects to Defendant's Interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33(c) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent that they purport to require Plaintiff to repeat in 
detailed narrative form information which can be derived or ascertained from the 
business or other records of Plaintiff. An undertaking of such nature is not only 
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unnecessary, wasteful and duplicative, but also is designed to burden and harass Plaintiff. 
The burden of deriving or ascertaining the answers to these interrogatories is substantially 
the same or less for Defendant based on a review of the applicable documents. 
Plaintiff objects to Defendant's Intemgatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents to the extent they seek the identification, description or contents of 
documents not within Plaintiff's possession, custody or control. 
Plaintiff objects to Defendant's Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents to the extent they purport to seek information beyond the scope of the 
complaint filed in this action. Plaintiff further objects to Defendant's Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents to the extent they purport to elicit information that 
is confidential and proprietary, not relevant to any issue in this action, or not reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
Plaintiff objects to Defendant's Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents to the extent that any particular request contained therein is unduly 
burdensome, vague, ambiguous, overbroad, unintelligible or lacking in specificity 
required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff objects to Defendant's Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents to the extent they are duplicative, cumulative, and redundant or seek to elicit 
repetitive information. 
Plaintiff objects to Defendant's Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents to the extent they purport to require Plaintiff to apply or set forth conclusions 
of law to ultimate issues for trial and/or to apply the law to facts as presently known. 
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All responses set forth below art subject to and without waiving any of the 
foregoing general objections and to the other more specific objections set forth below. 
Plaintiff will not in every instance repeat or specifically incorporate these objections 
although they are intended to apply throughout. 
Plaintiffs response to any of these discovery requests does not constitute a waiver i 
of her right to object to any future, additional or supplemental requests covering the same 
or similar subject matter. 
INTERROGATORIES AND REOUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: All documents you provided to 
Stewart Title of Coeur d ' A l e ~  regarding the property referenced in paragraph 3 of the 
Complaint. 
RESPONSE: To the extent said documents may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Amdavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January lo', 2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
Plaintiff further represents that attorney Terri R. Yost may have documents in her I 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for 
examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: All documents Stewart Title of Coeur 
d'Alene provided to you regarding the property referenced in paragraph 3 of the 
Complaint. 
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RESPONSE: To the extent said documents may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the AfF~davit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January lo', 2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
Plaintiff further represents that attorney Tem R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for. 
examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: A copy of the commitment and 
policy referred to in paragraph 4 of the Complaint. 
RESPONSE: To the extent said documents may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Affidavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January lo', 2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008, 
Plaintiff further represents that attorney Terri R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for 
examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: All correspondence Stewart Title 
(including any Stewart Title entity) provided to you regarding the Title Insurance Policy 
referenced in paragraph 4 of the Complaint. 
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please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Midavit of J o h  Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January 1 0 ~ ,  2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
Plaintiff further represents that attorney Tcrri R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for 
examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: All correspondence you provided to 
Stewart Title (including any Stewart Title Entity) regarding the Title Insurance Policy 
referenced in paragraph 4 of the Complaint. 
RESPONSE: To the e&t said documents may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Affidavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January lo', 2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
Plaintiff further represents that attorney Tem R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for 
examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS, ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT'S FiRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENT - 7 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: A copy of the deed, deed of trust, 
mortgage, note and any other conveyance documents regarding your 2001 sale of 80 
acres to Whites, as alleged in paragraph 5 of the Complaint. 
RESPONSE: To the extent said documents may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Affidavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January loa, 2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
Plaintiff further represents that attorney Terri R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for 
examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: A copy of the commitment and 
policy referred to in paragraph 6 of the Complaint. 
RESPONSE: To the extent said documents may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Affidavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January lom, 2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
Plaintiff further represents that attorney Teni R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for 
examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
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REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: All documents exchanged between 
you and Dennis andlor Sheme Akers regarding the property owned by them that is 
referenced in paragraph 7 of the Complaint. This request does not call for documents 
exchanged between your counsel and counsel for Akers, nor does it include pleadings 
filed in Akers v. White, et al. 
RESPONSE: To the extent said documents may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Affidavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January 10'. 2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
Plaintiff further represents that attorney Terri R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for 
examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: All documents Stewart Title of Coeur. 
d'Alene provided to you regarding the easement that was the subject of the Akers v. 
Mortensen case referenced in paragraph 10 of the Complaint. 
RESPONSE: To the extent said documents may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 .through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Affidavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January lo', 2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
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REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: All documents that you provided to 
Stewart Title of Coeur d9A1ene regarding the easement that was the subject of the Akers 
v. Mortensen case referenced in paragraph 10 of the Complaint. 
RESPONSE: To the extent said documents may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Affidavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January lorn, 2008. and 
the Exhibit. appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
Plaintiff further represents that attorney Terri R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for 
examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: All documents exchanged between 
you and Kathryn Baker regarding the property that is referenced in paragraph 20 of the 
Complaint. 
RESPONSE: To the extent said document. may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Affidavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holton January loth, 2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
Plaintiff further represents that attorney Terri R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for 
7 
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examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: All documents that constitute the 
representations referenced in paragraph 21 of the Complaint. 
RESPONSE: To the extent said documents may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Affdavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January 10\ 2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and sighed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
Plaintiff further represents that attorney Terri R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available, for 
examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
INTERROGATORY N O  1: Identify (as defined above) the person(s) whom 
you contend "represented to and assured" you and White that you and White "owned the 
triangular shaped parcel." 
ANSWER: Agents andlor employees of Stewart Title Guarantee Company 
represented and assured Plaintiff that he owned the triangular shaped parcel. These same 
representations were also made to DavidlMichelle White. Although the exact identity of 
the person making the representations can not be made at this time, Plaintiff is confident 
it was one or more of the individuals involved in the Kathryn Baker land acquisition 
transaction. Plaintiff further indicates that one or more of the following persons may 
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have represented and assured Plaintiff that he owned the triangular shaped parcel: (1) 
David English; (2) Richard Mollerup; and (3) John Holt. 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: All documents that constitute the 
representations referenced in paragraph 23 of the Complaint. 
RESPONSE: To the extent said documents may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Affidavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January 10'. 2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
Plaintiff further represents that attorney Terri R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for 
examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify (as defined above) the person(s) who 
made the representations you refer to in paragraph 23 of the Complaint. 
ANSWER: See Plaintiff's Answer to Interrogatory No. 1. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: All documents that constitute the 
representations referenced in paragraph 26 of the Complaint. 
RESPONSE: To the extent said documents may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Affidavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January 10~,2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
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Plaintiff further represents that attorney Terri R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for 
examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify (as defined above) the person(s) who. 
made the representations you refer to in paragraph 26 of the Complaint. 
ANSWER: Agents andlor employees of Stewart Title Guaranty Company. 
Plaintiff further indicates that one or more of the following persons may have represented 
to and assured Plaintiff that Stewart Title Guaranty Company would assist in the appeal 
of the district court decision: (I) David English, (2) Richard Mollerup; and (3) John Holt. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify who directed you to retain your own 
counsel to continue defending the Lawsuit, as alleged in paragraph 29 of the Complaint. 
ANSWER: Stewart Title Guaranty Company directed Plaintiff to retain his own 
counsel to continue defending the Lawsuit Please refer to the May 18', 2004, 
correspondence sent to Plaintiff from Richard W. Mollerup and a similar letter sent on 
the same date to Plaintiff's counsel. 
REOUEST POR PRODUCTION NO. 15: All documents that constitute the 
representation referenced in paragraph 32 of the Complaint. 
RESPONSE: To the extent said documents may be, responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Affidavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January lo', 2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
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Plaintiff further represents that attorney Tem R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for 
examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Regarding your allegation in paragraph 32 of the 
Complaint that "Stewart Title represented to and pmmised Mortensen and White that it 
would see them through the entire legal action including a Supreme Court appeal," please 
provide the following information: 
a. Identify (as defined above) the person(s) whom you contend made the 
representation andlor promise; and 
b. State the content of each representation and/or promise; and 
c. State the date(s) on which each representation andor promise was made. 
ANSWER: See Plaintiffs Answer to Interrogatory No. 3. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16: All documents that constitute the 
representations referenced in paragraph 34 of the Complaint 
RESPONSE: To the extent said documents may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Affidavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January loLh, 2008, and 
the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
Plaintiff further represents that attorney Terri R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for 
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examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Regarding you aIlegation in paragraph 34 of the 
Complaint that "Stewart Title has made representations" to you, please provide the 
following information: 
a. Identify (as defined above) the person(s) whom you contend made the 
representation; and 
b. State the content of each representation; and 
c. State the date(s) on which each representation was made. 
ANSWER: See Plaintiffs Answers to the previous Interrogatories. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Regarding paragraphs 37 and 38 of your 
Complaint, set forth the language from the Title Insurance Policy that you contend 
obligates Stewart Title of Coeur d' Alene to defend you "throughout the Lawsuit." 
ANSWER: Objection. This Interrogatory seeks information protected by the 
work product doctrine in that it solicits the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, 
and legal .theories of Plaintiff's counsel. 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17: Regarding your allegation in Count 
Three of the Complaint (Breach of Contract), please provide a copy of all documents that 
you contend constitute the contract that you alleged was breached. 
RESPONSE: To the extent said documents may be responsive to this Request, 
please see Stewart Title Documents, Bates Nos. 00003 through 00182, the Exhibits 
appended to the Affidavit of John Holt and signed by Mr. Holt on January loL, 2008, and 
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the Exhibits appended to the Affidavit of Todd Reuter and signed by Mr. Reuter on 
January 17,2008. 
Plaintiff further represents that attorney Tem R. Yost may have documents in her 
possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made available for 
examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of reasonable expenses 
for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Regarding your allegation in paragraph 42 of the 
Complaint, do you contend that Stewart Title of Coeur d'Alene failed to perform in good 
faith? I€ so, set forth the specific tenns of the insurance contract that you contend 
Stewart Title of Coeur d' Alene failed to perform in good faith. 
ANSWER: Objection. This Interrogatory seeks information protected by the 
work product doctrine in that it solicits the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, 
and legal theories of Plaintiffs counsel. Without waiving and subject to the foregoing 
objections, Plaintiff does contend Stewart Title Guaranty Company failed to perform the 
tenns of the insurance contract in good faith. Plaintiff contends Stewart Title had a duty 
to perform all contractual duties in good faith. Plaintiff contends Stewart Title failed to 
perform (in good faith) its contractual duty to defend Plaintiff in legal matters 
challenging Plaintiffs right to do acts insured under the policy, (i.e.) Plaintiffs right of 
access to his property. In regard to the contractual provisions insuring access to the 
property, Plaintiff contends Stewart TitleIJohn Holt failed to act in good faith by 
contacting the Akers about an access issue concerning Plaintiff instead of speaking about 
the matter directly with Plaintiff first. This failure to act in good faith ultimately resulted 
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in trespass actions brought by Akers against Plaintiff which in turn lead to Stewart Title's 
election to renege on its commitment to provide Plaintiff a defense to the action. 
The company failed to act in good faith when exercising its right under the policy 
to take action in an effort to cure Plaintiff's lack of right to access the property. This 
principally involves the actions surrounding the Kathryn Baker land acquisition 
transaction which resulted in a large punitive damage award rendered against Plaintiff. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Regarding Count Four of the Complaint (Bad 
Faith), please set forth: 
a. A detailed description of everything that you contend Stewart Title of Coeur d' 
Alene did and failed to do that constitutes a failure "to perform the terms of the insurance 
contract in good faith." 
b. For each act or omission identified in subpart (a) of this interrogatory, the 
identity of each person who you claim failed to perform in good faith. 
c. For each act or omission identified in answer to subpart (a) of this 
interrogatory, the date on which you claim such act or omission occurred, 
ANSWER: See Plaintiffs Answer to Interrogatory No. 8. 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: All documents relating to your 
claim to have suffered "physical manifestations, including stress, sleeplessness, 
headaches and concentration problems." This request includes, without limitation, 
medical bills and records, and receipts. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff represents that attorney Terri R. Yost may have 
documents in her possession which are responsive to this Request which can be made 
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available for examination upon reasonable notice and request or upon payment of 
reasonable expenses for reproducing and delivering the documents. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Regarding your claim to have been damaged in 
excess of $400,000, please itemize your losses so Defendant can determine how much 
money you have spent or lost by category. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff seeks to recovery both special and general losses and 
damages. The general losses are not subject to itemization. Plaintiff is in the process of 
itemizing his special damages and once the itemization has been completed, he will 
supplement his answer hereto. Plaintiff notes that the judgment rendered against him in 
the Akrs litigation comprises, in part, the monetary damages he seeks to recovery here. 
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19: A copy of all written agreements 
between you (including businesses you control), David L. White, Michelle V. White, 
andlor D L White Construction. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request seeks information not reitsonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: All journal/diary entries that relate 
to the claims set forth in the Complaint. 
RESPONSE: No such journal or diary entries exist. 
DATED this (&ay of February, 2008. 
JOHNSON & MOWLEONE, L.L.P. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
L 
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VERIF'ICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
): ss 
County of Boundary 1 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 
says that I am the named plaintiff the above discovery requests were served upon; that I 
verify the within and foregoing Answers and Responses to the above First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaina and that I have 
read the Answers and Responses, know the contents thereof, and state that they are true 
and correct to the best of my knowledge. 
B y: 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN 
SUBSCRIBED & SWORN to before me this - day of ,2008, 
Notary Public for the State of Idaho 
~ e s i d i n ~  at 
My commission expires: 
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, 1: 
Reuter, Todd 
From: Cara Rice [cara@treasurevalleylawyers.com] 
Sent: Friday, February 15, 2008 4:14 PM 
To: Reuter, Todd 
Cc: 'Sam Johnson'; 'Tern' Willard' 
Subject: Mortensen v. STG 
Attachments: P's Ans. & Resp. to D's 1st Set of Rogs & RFP.pdf 
Mr. Reuter: 
Attached hereto are Plaintiffs Objections, Answers and Responses to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Mr. 
Johnson. Thank you. 
CARA 
Cara D. Rice 
Legal Assistant 
Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P. 
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-2100 
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424 
cara@treasurevalleylawyers.com 
www.treasurevalleylawyers. corn 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail is intended only for the personal and confidential use of 
the individual(s) named as recipients and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§25 10-2521. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential, andlor protected from 
disclosure under applicable laws and/or privileges, including, but not limited to, the attorney-client 
privilege and/or the attorney work-product doctrine. If you are not the intended recipient of this 
transmission, please notify the sender immediately by telephone. Do not deliver, distribute, or copy this 
transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the information it contains. 
